focuses on a universal definition of health (e.g. the World Health Organisation) and
negotiations to establish indicators, then standards for environmental pollution.
Other debates focus on securing financial compensation for victims, the social
acceptability of a hazardous technology, or the pristine condition of a shoreline
prior to environmental clean-up or decontamination, etc.
The search for the foundations of natural law corresponds to the desire to define,
then respect ‘the’ or ‘a’ human nature. The latter cannot be distinguished from
nature itself, which is here defined as what surrounds human beings. Both the
history of ideas about human nature and growing awareness of environmental
degradation show the need to reduce the philosophical, political, moral and economic divide between Man and Nature. This is not without consequences. It means
that:
(a) In the context of Fukushima Daiichi, Nature (made up of human and
non-human elements) should be considered as an integral victim of the accident
and the ongoing catastrophe, and should be able to claim compensation. This
would force people to redefine their moral responsibility vis-à-vis the impact of
their activities on the environment.
(b) Distinguishing the three elements that made up the events of 11 March, 2011
suggests that only the nuclear accident was the source of the damage to the
environment. The accident cannot be likened to a simple natural disaster, just
because there was an earthquake and a tsunami. Nature cannot be considered as
a victim of itself, nor can a natural event be distinguished from a manifestation
of Nature. The argument simply lends weight to an anthropocentric perspective
that maintains the divide between Nature and human nature. Nature is constantly evolving, and the distinction between how this happens (e.g. low-level
changes or sudden and dramatic events) may reinforce the anthropocentric
tendency.
The distinction between a natural event and a nuclear accident makes it possible
to think about two types of resilience: the first relates to the self-regulation of
Nature, which is constantly changing and can never be considered as the return
to a previous state; while the second relates to human resilience and focuses on
life during and after the disaster.
An illustration of this comes from Fukushima Daiichi (or Chernobyl) where a
decision was taken to establish no-go zones around the facility. This type of
decision implicitly reaffirmed the divide between human and non-human
beings. It designates humans as the most important victims of the ongoing
disaster. However, the decision to ban fishing or hunting in areas adjacent to the
no-go zone shows than there were other victims.
(c) Although the earthquake and tsunami led to the destruction of nature, humans
did not see it as a victim. However, this depends on the anthropological status
that is assigned to it. Moving a random stone may not lead to a claim for
damages, while moving another that is part of a dyke or historic monument can
lead to funds being allocated for its reconstruction. In the first case, the stone
does not have victim status, it the second, it does. The same argument can be
30
D. Pecaud
negotiations to establish indicators, then standards for environmental pollution.
Other debates focus on securing financial compensation for victims, the social
acceptability of a hazardous technology, or the pristine condition of a shoreline
prior to environmental clean-up or decontamination, etc.
The search for the foundations of natural law corresponds to the desire to define,
then respect ‘the’ or ‘a’ human nature. The latter cannot be distinguished from
nature itself, which is here defined as what surrounds human beings. Both the
history of ideas about human nature and growing awareness of environmental
degradation show the need to reduce the philosophical, political, moral and economic divide between Man and Nature. This is not without consequences. It means
that:
(a) In the context of Fukushima Daiichi, Nature (made up of human and
non-human elements) should be considered as an integral victim of the accident
and the ongoing catastrophe, and should be able to claim compensation. This
would force people to redefine their moral responsibility vis-à-vis the impact of
their activities on the environment.
(b) Distinguishing the three elements that made up the events of 11 March, 2011
suggests that only the nuclear accident was the source of the damage to the
environment. The accident cannot be likened to a simple natural disaster, just
because there was an earthquake and a tsunami. Nature cannot be considered as
a victim of itself, nor can a natural event be distinguished from a manifestation
of Nature. The argument simply lends weight to an anthropocentric perspective
that maintains the divide between Nature and human nature. Nature is constantly evolving, and the distinction between how this happens (e.g. low-level
changes or sudden and dramatic events) may reinforce the anthropocentric
tendency.
The distinction between a natural event and a nuclear accident makes it possible
to think about two types of resilience: the first relates to the self-regulation of
Nature, which is constantly changing and can never be considered as the return
to a previous state; while the second relates to human resilience and focuses on
life during and after the disaster.
An illustration of this comes from Fukushima Daiichi (or Chernobyl) where a
decision was taken to establish no-go zones around the facility. This type of
decision implicitly reaffirmed the divide between human and non-human
beings. It designates humans as the most important victims of the ongoing
disaster. However, the decision to ban fishing or hunting in areas adjacent to the
no-go zone shows than there were other victims.
(c) Although the earthquake and tsunami led to the destruction of nature, humans
did not see it as a victim. However, this depends on the anthropological status
that is assigned to it. Moving a random stone may not lead to a claim for
damages, while moving another that is part of a dyke or historic monument can
lead to funds being allocated for its reconstruction. In the first case, the stone
does not have victim status, it the second, it does. The same argument can be
30
D. Pecaud