awareness.”
12 This ongoing construction of earthquake risk was also not a one-way
street; instead, it has been a slow elaboration of the capacities needed to understand
both earth science and resident behavior, and many things in-between, such as the
legacy of past and distant disasters, as well as cultural, philosophical, and metaphysical questions, often viewed in a reflective manner. In this context, experts and
scientists have learned not only how to be rational subjects but also beneficiaries of
their own expertise, specifically aware of the inherent tensions between forms of
knowledge. In this process, scientists and experts have learned how to deal with,
and even respect, residents’ understandings and practices.
Moving away from the easily-taken-for-granted discourse regarding the lack of
preparation and the irrationality of the residents
13 [84, 85], and also taking their
distance with infructuous attempts to detach irrational thinking from idealistic,
“pure” scientific knowledge, these experts have accepted that several “frames can
be considered rational yet lead to radically different solutions” [86], p. 35). Taking
this perspective spurs large possibilities, as this expert explained: “We need to
define what is rational by what people do, rather than decide what’s rational and say
that they’re not being rational. They are the definition of rational, and therefore we
have to rethink what rational is” (emphasis added).
14 This new perspective also
changes preconceived narratives about people’s relations to risk,
15 and in a broader
sense, experts and scientists understandings of individual and collective dynamics
and social phenomena. As one respondent who has worked in the field of hazards
mitigation for 30 years recalled, the process of defining priorities for earthquake
preparedness is often full of surprises.
16 Taking the time to listen to the people they
12
Respondent J.12, personal communication, 2011.
13
As one, a structural engineer by training, summarized, “If it does not make sense for the people
to retrofit their home, then it does not make sense by scaring them into doing it.” This thought is
echoed as a common Bay Area sentiment.
14
Respondent D.21, personal communication, 2011.
15
Here, I mean “risk” in the literal sense. See, for instance, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of
Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming [87].
16
As one respondent stated: “We did a mail survey of people in the mid-1990s. It was intended to
find out why people would choose do structural retrofit in their homes, and as part of that, we
wanted to see the correlation with whether or not people have done the Red Cross kind of things,
like food, water, and first aid. And it turned out—as a side-line, because we also asked their age and
income—that the more educated you are, the less likely it was that you’re going to have food, water,
[and] first-aid training; and the less likely it was that you would have made the structural changes to
retrofit your house, regardless of income! [Laughs] And we thought, ‘Okay … somehow, when
people get a lot of education, they tend to have more blind faith that the utility companies are going
to come through and they’re going to have food and water. And [they think] they don’t need to do
this, because they know that their house is going to fall on the ground and therefore they’re going to
fix it. Whereas the other group, which was less well-educated, was convinced that it was going back
to that basic survival training.’ We were trying to hypothesize why this was going on, the basic
survival training that they knew: that food and water were important on a day-to-day basis because
they’re having to deal with it weekly, as they did their budgeting. And therefore: ‘I need to make
sure that I have set aside a little extra so that I will have food and water in case of any emergency,
not just a disaster’” (Respondent J.8, personal communication, 2011).
Hybrid Disasters—Hybrid Knowledge
345
12 This ongoing construction of earthquake risk was also not a one-way
street; instead, it has been a slow elaboration of the capacities needed to understand
both earth science and resident behavior, and many things in-between, such as the
legacy of past and distant disasters, as well as cultural, philosophical, and metaphysical questions, often viewed in a reflective manner. In this context, experts and
scientists have learned not only how to be rational subjects but also beneficiaries of
their own expertise, specifically aware of the inherent tensions between forms of
knowledge. In this process, scientists and experts have learned how to deal with,
and even respect, residents’ understandings and practices.
Moving away from the easily-taken-for-granted discourse regarding the lack of
preparation and the irrationality of the residents
13 [84, 85], and also taking their
distance with infructuous attempts to detach irrational thinking from idealistic,
“pure” scientific knowledge, these experts have accepted that several “frames can
be considered rational yet lead to radically different solutions” [86], p. 35). Taking
this perspective spurs large possibilities, as this expert explained: “We need to
define what is rational by what people do, rather than decide what’s rational and say
that they’re not being rational. They are the definition of rational, and therefore we
have to rethink what rational is” (emphasis added).
14 This new perspective also
changes preconceived narratives about people’s relations to risk,
15 and in a broader
sense, experts and scientists understandings of individual and collective dynamics
and social phenomena. As one respondent who has worked in the field of hazards
mitigation for 30 years recalled, the process of defining priorities for earthquake
preparedness is often full of surprises.
16 Taking the time to listen to the people they
12
Respondent J.12, personal communication, 2011.
13
As one, a structural engineer by training, summarized, “If it does not make sense for the people
to retrofit their home, then it does not make sense by scaring them into doing it.” This thought is
echoed as a common Bay Area sentiment.
14
Respondent D.21, personal communication, 2011.
15
Here, I mean “risk” in the literal sense. See, for instance, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of
Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming [87].
16
As one respondent stated: “We did a mail survey of people in the mid-1990s. It was intended to
find out why people would choose do structural retrofit in their homes, and as part of that, we
wanted to see the correlation with whether or not people have done the Red Cross kind of things,
like food, water, and first aid. And it turned out—as a side-line, because we also asked their age and
income—that the more educated you are, the less likely it was that you’re going to have food, water,
[and] first-aid training; and the less likely it was that you would have made the structural changes to
retrofit your house, regardless of income! [Laughs] And we thought, ‘Okay … somehow, when
people get a lot of education, they tend to have more blind faith that the utility companies are going
to come through and they’re going to have food and water. And [they think] they don’t need to do
this, because they know that their house is going to fall on the ground and therefore they’re going to
fix it. Whereas the other group, which was less well-educated, was convinced that it was going back
to that basic survival training.’ We were trying to hypothesize why this was going on, the basic
survival training that they knew: that food and water were important on a day-to-day basis because
they’re having to deal with it weekly, as they did their budgeting. And therefore: ‘I need to make
sure that I have set aside a little extra so that I will have food and water in case of any emergency,
not just a disaster’” (Respondent J.8, personal communication, 2011).
Hybrid Disasters—Hybrid Knowledge
345