may be susceptible to changes in working conditions is something which requires
wisdom of “living in” the system as well as “planning and controlling it from
outside”. This feature of “lay people” being the “users” and “day-to-day supervisors” of the systems experts devise, is what makes their input more valuable upon
considering what is too costly to plan at the normal engineering scale of time and
probability. The method suggested in this study may contribute to such efforts in its
approach to clarify what input we are asking from whom.
This is not to say that conventional expertise is neutralized. Resilience is
essentially about the efficiency of the system, so we are acting as those “planning
and controlling the system from outside” when we feel the need for resilience.
When considering how to formulate resilient solutions, we need to integrate
expertise, and consider in systems and balances. Here, the importance of a deep
understanding of how much we know/don’t know should not be diminished.
4 Conclusions
High level radioactive waste disposal policy has not worked out in Japan as it has
been designed, and a study of the criticism it has received shows that those
responsible for maintaining its policy have not been able to respond to such debate
due to its lack of consideration about the value judgments incorporated in issues of
technology use. This understanding of the problem has been applied to fieldwork in
Tokai village, where group interviews were conducted with the cooperation of
young citizens, to ask for ideas on “What would be a desirable means of ‘disposal’
of high level radioactive waste”. The results centered on ideas to tackle the “fundamental” problems of the waste, such as its presence, amount, radiotoxicity and
“uselessness” or “unwanted-ness”, rather than just cope with the safety risks the
waste imposes. There were also opinions on what sort of environment would be
best for storing the waste, which shared points in common with the present
policy but also added that the “unfairness” of concentrated siting should be
reconsidered. Other opinions opted for persisting in R&D and maintenance, for
reducing or reusing the waste, hauling it to outer space, etc. These opinions on the
desirable means of dealing with the waste hold respective implications for those
with the know-how to consider how they may be realized, or to evaluate their
technical feasibilities into the future so that they can be reconsidered as alternative
options.
A consideration of what it means to “engineer resilience” led to the idea that
resilience can be considered as the “added value” of enduring efficiency during
crises, added to the societal value realized in an engineered solution. The approach
in this study of asking citizens for input on discussions of value also applies to
“resilient” solutions, perhaps in the same way. One marked research agenda would
be to obtain input of “what matters and why” in reconsideration of how societies
have addressed passed disaster situations, especially to grasp what has developed in
Fukushima. Another point made was that obtaining input from “non-experts” as the
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R. Watanabe
wisdom of “living in” the system as well as “planning and controlling it from
outside”. This feature of “lay people” being the “users” and “day-to-day supervisors” of the systems experts devise, is what makes their input more valuable upon
considering what is too costly to plan at the normal engineering scale of time and
probability. The method suggested in this study may contribute to such efforts in its
approach to clarify what input we are asking from whom.
This is not to say that conventional expertise is neutralized. Resilience is
essentially about the efficiency of the system, so we are acting as those “planning
and controlling the system from outside” when we feel the need for resilience.
When considering how to formulate resilient solutions, we need to integrate
expertise, and consider in systems and balances. Here, the importance of a deep
understanding of how much we know/don’t know should not be diminished.
4 Conclusions
High level radioactive waste disposal policy has not worked out in Japan as it has
been designed, and a study of the criticism it has received shows that those
responsible for maintaining its policy have not been able to respond to such debate
due to its lack of consideration about the value judgments incorporated in issues of
technology use. This understanding of the problem has been applied to fieldwork in
Tokai village, where group interviews were conducted with the cooperation of
young citizens, to ask for ideas on “What would be a desirable means of ‘disposal’
of high level radioactive waste”. The results centered on ideas to tackle the “fundamental” problems of the waste, such as its presence, amount, radiotoxicity and
“uselessness” or “unwanted-ness”, rather than just cope with the safety risks the
waste imposes. There were also opinions on what sort of environment would be
best for storing the waste, which shared points in common with the present
policy but also added that the “unfairness” of concentrated siting should be
reconsidered. Other opinions opted for persisting in R&D and maintenance, for
reducing or reusing the waste, hauling it to outer space, etc. These opinions on the
desirable means of dealing with the waste hold respective implications for those
with the know-how to consider how they may be realized, or to evaluate their
technical feasibilities into the future so that they can be reconsidered as alternative
options.
A consideration of what it means to “engineer resilience” led to the idea that
resilience can be considered as the “added value” of enduring efficiency during
crises, added to the societal value realized in an engineered solution. The approach
in this study of asking citizens for input on discussions of value also applies to
“resilient” solutions, perhaps in the same way. One marked research agenda would
be to obtain input of “what matters and why” in reconsideration of how societies
have addressed passed disaster situations, especially to grasp what has developed in
Fukushima. Another point made was that obtaining input from “non-experts” as the
332
R. Watanabe