7 Conclusion
Characterizing the determinants of entry into resilience is a major challenge. It is
clear that very little is known about it. Some disciplines (for example, psychology
and ecology) have made more progress than others. These disciplines have the
advantage that research is based on a clinical approach, and they are able to
examine extremely well-documented cases. However, the challenge that remains is
to generalize the examination of a specific and particular situation. In the fields of
management science and human resources, the work of Powley [79] is particularly
interesting. The author proposes a data analysis methodology and a model for
determinants that are very relevant to our understanding of the mechanism for entry
into resilience. The field of safety sciences has made its own contribution. The work
of Hollnagel [32] provides a definition of the concept of resilience and its application to the measurement of the performance of a safety management system on
the one hand, and, on the other hand, four meta-categories (respond, monitor,
anticipate, and learn) that offer other ways to investigate the issues in more depth.
While the number of conceptual models that are aimed at standardization is legion,
the fact remains that little is known about the actual teams, groups, and organizations that must face the unthinkable. This lack of knowledge favors an approach in
the field that tries to immerse itself as deeply as possible into the mechanisms and
processes that come into play when facing an extreme situation. The Fukushima
Daiichi accident offers an extraordinary field for researchers by virtue of the profusion of data sources and the information that has already been made public and
which will eventually be made public in the future. One example is the hearing
attended by the plant’s Director [12]. His very personal testimony helps us to
understand what motivated the responses of engineering teams who were faced with
an unprecedented situation and offers an initial starting point for thinking about the
concept of engineering in extreme situations [81].
References
1. United States, President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Kemeny, J.G.,
The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (United States Government Printing Office, 1979)
2. P. Tanguy, Les leçons de Tchernobyl. Conclusions of the SFEN-SNS colloquia held at Paris
15–17 April 1991. Revue Générale Nucléaire, (2), 157–157 (1991)
3. IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review
Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident, International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (Safety
Series 75-INSAG-1), Vienna (1986)
4. IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Culture, International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group (Safety Series 75-INSAG-4), Vienna (1991)
5. IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Examples of Safety Culture Practices (Safety
report series No 1), Vienna (1997)
14
F. Guarnieri
Characterizing the determinants of entry into resilience is a major challenge. It is
clear that very little is known about it. Some disciplines (for example, psychology
and ecology) have made more progress than others. These disciplines have the
advantage that research is based on a clinical approach, and they are able to
examine extremely well-documented cases. However, the challenge that remains is
to generalize the examination of a specific and particular situation. In the fields of
management science and human resources, the work of Powley [79] is particularly
interesting. The author proposes a data analysis methodology and a model for
determinants that are very relevant to our understanding of the mechanism for entry
into resilience. The field of safety sciences has made its own contribution. The work
of Hollnagel [32] provides a definition of the concept of resilience and its application to the measurement of the performance of a safety management system on
the one hand, and, on the other hand, four meta-categories (respond, monitor,
anticipate, and learn) that offer other ways to investigate the issues in more depth.
While the number of conceptual models that are aimed at standardization is legion,
the fact remains that little is known about the actual teams, groups, and organizations that must face the unthinkable. This lack of knowledge favors an approach in
the field that tries to immerse itself as deeply as possible into the mechanisms and
processes that come into play when facing an extreme situation. The Fukushima
Daiichi accident offers an extraordinary field for researchers by virtue of the profusion of data sources and the information that has already been made public and
which will eventually be made public in the future. One example is the hearing
attended by the plant’s Director [12]. His very personal testimony helps us to
understand what motivated the responses of engineering teams who were faced with
an unprecedented situation and offers an initial starting point for thinking about the
concept of engineering in extreme situations [81].
References
1. United States, President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Kemeny, J.G.,
The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (United States Government Printing Office, 1979)
2. P. Tanguy, Les leçons de Tchernobyl. Conclusions of the SFEN-SNS colloquia held at Paris
15–17 April 1991. Revue Générale Nucléaire, (2), 157–157 (1991)
3. IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review
Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident, International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (Safety
Series 75-INSAG-1), Vienna (1986)
4. IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Culture, International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group (Safety Series 75-INSAG-4), Vienna (1991)
5. IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Examples of Safety Culture Practices (Safety
report series No 1), Vienna (1997)
14
F. Guarnieri