According to the four reports, the Fukushima Daiichi accident is due to a lack of
preparation of TEPCO and the concerned institutions to deal with such an event.
They reveal therefore that TEPCO staff lacked adequate training and appropriate
skills to respond to emergency situations. They also point out the fact the communication between the workers and the authorities and the poor coordination of
the emergency response centres has not permitted to react effectively.
Furthermore, the accident could have been avoided if the state of the art and the
new safety concepts have been applied, especially the defence-in-depth concept.
TEPCO and the Japanese institutions had not taken the appropriate measures to
bring their facilities’ safety up to current international standards. The reports
underline also the necessity for all nuclear power plants to strengthen the
defence-in-depth provisions, and to consider the occurrence of beyond design basis
and multi-unit accidents.
Another recommendation involves the lack of independence of the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). Although the nuclear regulatory body knew
about some of TEPCO safety deficiencies, it did not face its responsibilities. The
competencies, the involvement and the transparency of the NISA have been called
into question. Consequently, Japan needed to deeply reform its nuclear facilities’
regulation and monitoring system.
This short overview shows that the four reports do not bring renewed reflections
on accident management. Instead, they only emphasise the need to strengthen
concepts already acknowledged and to take larger margins to avoid potential
accidents. New standards might be suggested and taking beyond design basis
accidents is encouraged. To sum up, major accident management is regarded
through the already existing organisation and resources.
However, during the accident, the operators found themselves in the face of a
scenario that exceeds by far every known standard. The loss of electricity resources
and the worsening of the site conditions point out the need to adapt to new and
unexpected circumstances. The hearings of Masao Yoshida bring out a new consideration of the accident, giving specifications and details unfound elsewhere. His
testimony enables a better understanding of the proceedings of the Fukushima crisis
management.
3 The Importance of Yoshida’s Testimony
This section analyses the hearings of Masao Yoshida and shows that the testimony
he made can be considered as a narrative. A comparison is then made between the
content of the institutional reports and the disclosures of the manager, binding these
information and the concept of “engineering thinking in extreme situations”.
236
A. Afrouss
preparation of TEPCO and the concerned institutions to deal with such an event.
They reveal therefore that TEPCO staff lacked adequate training and appropriate
skills to respond to emergency situations. They also point out the fact the communication between the workers and the authorities and the poor coordination of
the emergency response centres has not permitted to react effectively.
Furthermore, the accident could have been avoided if the state of the art and the
new safety concepts have been applied, especially the defence-in-depth concept.
TEPCO and the Japanese institutions had not taken the appropriate measures to
bring their facilities’ safety up to current international standards. The reports
underline also the necessity for all nuclear power plants to strengthen the
defence-in-depth provisions, and to consider the occurrence of beyond design basis
and multi-unit accidents.
Another recommendation involves the lack of independence of the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). Although the nuclear regulatory body knew
about some of TEPCO safety deficiencies, it did not face its responsibilities. The
competencies, the involvement and the transparency of the NISA have been called
into question. Consequently, Japan needed to deeply reform its nuclear facilities’
regulation and monitoring system.
This short overview shows that the four reports do not bring renewed reflections
on accident management. Instead, they only emphasise the need to strengthen
concepts already acknowledged and to take larger margins to avoid potential
accidents. New standards might be suggested and taking beyond design basis
accidents is encouraged. To sum up, major accident management is regarded
through the already existing organisation and resources.
However, during the accident, the operators found themselves in the face of a
scenario that exceeds by far every known standard. The loss of electricity resources
and the worsening of the site conditions point out the need to adapt to new and
unexpected circumstances. The hearings of Masao Yoshida bring out a new consideration of the accident, giving specifications and details unfound elsewhere. His
testimony enables a better understanding of the proceedings of the Fukushima crisis
management.
3 The Importance of Yoshida’s Testimony
This section analyses the hearings of Masao Yoshida and shows that the testimony
he made can be considered as a narrative. A comparison is then made between the
content of the institutional reports and the disclosures of the manager, binding these
information and the concept of “engineering thinking in extreme situations”.
236
A. Afrouss