movement against nuclear bombs did not emerge until after the Bikini Atoll incident in March 1954, when the crew of a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to
nuclear fallout from the American testing of thermonuclear bomb.
Second, in the Cold War context, Japan came to thoroughly embrace the concept
of “peaceful” use of nuclear technology, which was aggressively promoted by the
United States. With the 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech, Eisenhower sought to
recast nuclear technology for world redemption and incorporate it into the emerging
Cold War order by promising to share it with non-communists countries. Japan’s
nuclear energy industry came about in this context, simultaneously with the rise of
anti-nuclear weapons movement. Here, the rejection of weapons not only did not
contradict the excitement about “peaceful” use, but also served as a driving force of
the latter [42]. In the name of turning a tragedy into inspiration, the US government
even launched a campaign to build an NPP in Hiroshima in 1955 [35]. The US
found powerful Japanese allies including young politician Yasuhiro Nakasone (later
Prime Minister) and media tycoon and politician Matsutaro Shoriki, who ran the
Yomiuri Shimbun, helped launch the Japanese professional baseball, and later came
to be known as the father of nuclear power in Japan. For instance, Shoriki worked
with the US government to organize the traveling exhibition on “the peaceful use of
atomic power.” The exhibition started in Tokyo and visited nine other cities
including Hiroshima, where it was co-sponsored by local municipalities, university,
and newspaper, and received enthusiastically in spring 1956. While many hibakusha were initially cautious about this “peaceful” application of the technology,
arguing that no solution had been found to the problem of managing radioactive
materials, by summer 1956, even Moritaki Ichiro, an intellectual leader of survivors
and nuclear weapons abolitionist, came to embrace the idea of “peaceful” use [35].
Importantly, this dichotomous view in which the tragedy of military use is contrasted to the prosperity of “peaceful” use, as well as eventual decoupling of the
two, resulted from concerted efforts by the US government and Japanese supporters
of nuclear energy. In the late 1950s, very little opposition existed to the ideas of
nuclear power production or plans of building NPPs. Narratives of nation-building
through nuclear energy were not hindered by the memories of the bombs or
the growing anti-nuclear weapons movement; rather, they were supported by the
exceptionalist idea that, as the “sole victim” of the bombs, Japan should lead the
world in this technology.
Third, as some scholars argue, behind the de-politicized nature of nuclear energy
production was the long-standing history of “internal colonialism” in Japan,
whereby Tokyo and the power that be there have exploited and colonized the
periphery such as the Tohoku region, of which Fukushima Pref. is part. As Hopson
[15] points out, Tohoku-born intellectuals have long described the region a
domestic colony of the center, whose subjugated and “backward” status resulted
from official policy decisions during the Meiji period (1868–1912) of rapid modernization. These intellectuals were aware—some as early as in the 1890s—that the
region’s often essentialized “backwardness” was a product of the exploitation of its
resources and domination [15]. As the region turned into a significant provider of
rice and labor for the growing Tokyo Metropolitan area, the narrative that the
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
201
nuclear fallout from the American testing of thermonuclear bomb.
Second, in the Cold War context, Japan came to thoroughly embrace the concept
of “peaceful” use of nuclear technology, which was aggressively promoted by the
United States. With the 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech, Eisenhower sought to
recast nuclear technology for world redemption and incorporate it into the emerging
Cold War order by promising to share it with non-communists countries. Japan’s
nuclear energy industry came about in this context, simultaneously with the rise of
anti-nuclear weapons movement. Here, the rejection of weapons not only did not
contradict the excitement about “peaceful” use, but also served as a driving force of
the latter [42]. In the name of turning a tragedy into inspiration, the US government
even launched a campaign to build an NPP in Hiroshima in 1955 [35]. The US
found powerful Japanese allies including young politician Yasuhiro Nakasone (later
Prime Minister) and media tycoon and politician Matsutaro Shoriki, who ran the
Yomiuri Shimbun, helped launch the Japanese professional baseball, and later came
to be known as the father of nuclear power in Japan. For instance, Shoriki worked
with the US government to organize the traveling exhibition on “the peaceful use of
atomic power.” The exhibition started in Tokyo and visited nine other cities
including Hiroshima, where it was co-sponsored by local municipalities, university,
and newspaper, and received enthusiastically in spring 1956. While many hibakusha were initially cautious about this “peaceful” application of the technology,
arguing that no solution had been found to the problem of managing radioactive
materials, by summer 1956, even Moritaki Ichiro, an intellectual leader of survivors
and nuclear weapons abolitionist, came to embrace the idea of “peaceful” use [35].
Importantly, this dichotomous view in which the tragedy of military use is contrasted to the prosperity of “peaceful” use, as well as eventual decoupling of the
two, resulted from concerted efforts by the US government and Japanese supporters
of nuclear energy. In the late 1950s, very little opposition existed to the ideas of
nuclear power production or plans of building NPPs. Narratives of nation-building
through nuclear energy were not hindered by the memories of the bombs or
the growing anti-nuclear weapons movement; rather, they were supported by the
exceptionalist idea that, as the “sole victim” of the bombs, Japan should lead the
world in this technology.
Third, as some scholars argue, behind the de-politicized nature of nuclear energy
production was the long-standing history of “internal colonialism” in Japan,
whereby Tokyo and the power that be there have exploited and colonized the
periphery such as the Tohoku region, of which Fukushima Pref. is part. As Hopson
[15] points out, Tohoku-born intellectuals have long described the region a
domestic colony of the center, whose subjugated and “backward” status resulted
from official policy decisions during the Meiji period (1868–1912) of rapid modernization. These intellectuals were aware—some as early as in the 1890s—that the
region’s often essentialized “backwardness” was a product of the exploitation of its
resources and domination [15]. As the region turned into a significant provider of
rice and labor for the growing Tokyo Metropolitan area, the narrative that the
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
201