Ricoeur’s concept of the “just institution” offers another lever for the construction of systems that are better able to manage extreme situations and preserve
safety. The “just institution” rests on the fact that it responds to the individual’s
sense of justice, and achieves an appropriate balance between the obligations that
are imposed on them and the privileges that are granted [11]. Its primary aim is to
ensure that individuals are free to act. The concept of the “institution” refers to a
structure with shared interests, or belonging to a specific community: according to
Ricoeur, “the idea of the institution rests fundamentally on shared customs, not on
binding rules” [11]. It argues that the individual is free to act and pursue ethical
aims. It relates to the way people interact, and how they are brought together and
live with one another, as these interactions (reified in the form of shared customs)
constitute the institutional environment. Finally, it rests on a principle of plurality,
which in turn implies diversity and the potential for (potentially contentious)
dialogue.
This perspective appears to be at odds with current organizations, which rest on
engineered methods and designs and therefore primarily seek uniformity and
abstraction from individuality. However, it may be possible to translate it into
concrete actions that organizations can implement. Such organizations would be
called “safe institutions”. At a general level, this means refocusing organizations on
people, their sense of justice, their ability to exercise practical reason, and their goal
of leading “a good life for oneself as well as others”, rather than the design or
procedures of organizations themselves. On a more practical level, it suggests
actions related to training (i.e. ensuring that people are in a position to maintain
safety), and redefining how careers are built and what success means.
Organizations that apply the “safe institutions” philosophy and favor practical
reason could be said to enable “practical safety”. We define practical safety as “the
ability of individuals to appropriate safety as an internal value, which enables them
to decide on a course of action that preserves the safety of others as well as their
own, when a situation requires them to do so”. Such an approach asserts the idea
that safety can only be managed by people in organizations, rather than by organizations through people. It also reminds us that safety can only be maintained
through concrete actions, rather than predesigned, abstract rules and procedures.
More broadly, the concept of the just (safe) institution resonates directly with a
number of questions raised during the workshop. For example, the question of
consent and self-sacrifice: if an individual’s obligations include the potential need to
sacrifice oneself, how is it possible to establish a sense of justice? What should the
status of voluntary actions be, from both a moral and legal standpoint, when things
“go back to normal”? What criteria should be used to judge, both morally and
legally, an action that could be nothing but ad hoc and voluntary?
Once again, this raises the question of the moral and legal status attributed to an
action and the actor by the collectivity once the situation goes back to normal. And,
once again, Ricoeur’s philosophy provides a heuristic. He argues that action can be
compared to texts, in the sense that once they are achieved, they are out in the
world, available for interpretation by third parties who may not share the frame of
“reference” for the action, i.e. the situation from which it stems. As action is
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191
safety. The “just institution” rests on the fact that it responds to the individual’s
sense of justice, and achieves an appropriate balance between the obligations that
are imposed on them and the privileges that are granted [11]. Its primary aim is to
ensure that individuals are free to act. The concept of the “institution” refers to a
structure with shared interests, or belonging to a specific community: according to
Ricoeur, “the idea of the institution rests fundamentally on shared customs, not on
binding rules” [11]. It argues that the individual is free to act and pursue ethical
aims. It relates to the way people interact, and how they are brought together and
live with one another, as these interactions (reified in the form of shared customs)
constitute the institutional environment. Finally, it rests on a principle of plurality,
which in turn implies diversity and the potential for (potentially contentious)
dialogue.
This perspective appears to be at odds with current organizations, which rest on
engineered methods and designs and therefore primarily seek uniformity and
abstraction from individuality. However, it may be possible to translate it into
concrete actions that organizations can implement. Such organizations would be
called “safe institutions”. At a general level, this means refocusing organizations on
people, their sense of justice, their ability to exercise practical reason, and their goal
of leading “a good life for oneself as well as others”, rather than the design or
procedures of organizations themselves. On a more practical level, it suggests
actions related to training (i.e. ensuring that people are in a position to maintain
safety), and redefining how careers are built and what success means.
Organizations that apply the “safe institutions” philosophy and favor practical
reason could be said to enable “practical safety”. We define practical safety as “the
ability of individuals to appropriate safety as an internal value, which enables them
to decide on a course of action that preserves the safety of others as well as their
own, when a situation requires them to do so”. Such an approach asserts the idea
that safety can only be managed by people in organizations, rather than by organizations through people. It also reminds us that safety can only be maintained
through concrete actions, rather than predesigned, abstract rules and procedures.
More broadly, the concept of the just (safe) institution resonates directly with a
number of questions raised during the workshop. For example, the question of
consent and self-sacrifice: if an individual’s obligations include the potential need to
sacrifice oneself, how is it possible to establish a sense of justice? What should the
status of voluntary actions be, from both a moral and legal standpoint, when things
“go back to normal”? What criteria should be used to judge, both morally and
legally, an action that could be nothing but ad hoc and voluntary?
Once again, this raises the question of the moral and legal status attributed to an
action and the actor by the collectivity once the situation goes back to normal. And,
once again, Ricoeur’s philosophy provides a heuristic. He argues that action can be
compared to texts, in the sense that once they are achieved, they are out in the
world, available for interpretation by third parties who may not share the frame of
“reference” for the action, i.e. the situation from which it stems. As action is
An Ethical Perspective on Extreme Situations …
191