3.1 Voluntary Action and Decision-Making, the Ethical
Way Out of Extreme Situations
As Masao Yoshida indicates in his testimony, in Japan, the law on nuclear catastrophes is invoked when an exceptional situation develops in a nuclear power plant.
Under this law, he became responsible for crisis management [5]. He had the power
to make decisions, and take responsibility for any actions supervised by him.
Considering the potentially immense consequences of any decisions made in this
context, it seems reasonable to reflect on the implications of such a responsibility
for an individual, to question whether s/he is in a position to hold it, and the
attribution of responsibility by legal and organizational systems. Furthermore, such
situations make individuals responsible “not because one is free by nature, but
because society judges it ‘fair’ to place responsibility in a particular social location”, displacing the source of responsibility “from the individual onto society” [3].
The imposition of such a responsibility therefore appears to be heteronomous
(i.e. obeying an external rule), rather than autonomous (i.e. following a
self-imposed rule). This is no surprise, as heteronomy lies at the heart of contemporary organizations. They rest on engineered processes and rules and therefore on
a reified rationality, that is external to the individual and imposed upon them [1].
Consequently, actions that are carried out in such a context do not result from
individual free will, which implies that they cannot be deemed voluntary. Indeed,
according to Ricoeur [10], following Aristotle [8], to qualify as voluntary an action
has to have a specific goal and result from free will. From the perspective of these
philosophers, individuals can only be held responsible for their voluntary action. As
Irwin [7] comments on Nicomachean Ethics, “only voluntary actions can be
assessed for praise and blame. To find a voluntary action is to find an action it is
reasonable to consider for praise and blame. Aristotle (…) assumes that the same
conditions make actions candidates for moral and for legal scrutiny and reactions—
praise, blame, reward, punishment, and so on.” If only voluntary actions can be
subject to moral or legal judgment, is it fair to consider the decision-maker in
extreme situations as responsible? Given that their responsibility stems from a
heteronomous, rather than an autonomous source, and that organizations usually
restrict autonomy, can an individual truly be held responsible?
Obviously the question is far from new. However, the fact that the extraordinary
collapse of the Fukushima Daiichi plant placed a specific individual, Masao
Yoshida, under moral and legal scrutiny, indicates the need to reflect on the relationship between responsibility, voluntary action, and safety when managing
extreme situations. Furthermore, if individuals are to be considered responsible for
their actions, not only is it fairer to build systems that provide them with the means
to act voluntarily and responsibly, it is also a necessity imposed by extreme
situations.
Extreme situations lead to the collapse of systems and vitiate all preexisting
rules, including symbolic ones [4]. There are no longer any procedures that guide
actions and decisions. The individual is no longer heteronomous, and autonomous,
An Ethical Perspective on Extreme Situations …
189
Way Out of Extreme Situations
As Masao Yoshida indicates in his testimony, in Japan, the law on nuclear catastrophes is invoked when an exceptional situation develops in a nuclear power plant.
Under this law, he became responsible for crisis management [5]. He had the power
to make decisions, and take responsibility for any actions supervised by him.
Considering the potentially immense consequences of any decisions made in this
context, it seems reasonable to reflect on the implications of such a responsibility
for an individual, to question whether s/he is in a position to hold it, and the
attribution of responsibility by legal and organizational systems. Furthermore, such
situations make individuals responsible “not because one is free by nature, but
because society judges it ‘fair’ to place responsibility in a particular social location”, displacing the source of responsibility “from the individual onto society” [3].
The imposition of such a responsibility therefore appears to be heteronomous
(i.e. obeying an external rule), rather than autonomous (i.e. following a
self-imposed rule). This is no surprise, as heteronomy lies at the heart of contemporary organizations. They rest on engineered processes and rules and therefore on
a reified rationality, that is external to the individual and imposed upon them [1].
Consequently, actions that are carried out in such a context do not result from
individual free will, which implies that they cannot be deemed voluntary. Indeed,
according to Ricoeur [10], following Aristotle [8], to qualify as voluntary an action
has to have a specific goal and result from free will. From the perspective of these
philosophers, individuals can only be held responsible for their voluntary action. As
Irwin [7] comments on Nicomachean Ethics, “only voluntary actions can be
assessed for praise and blame. To find a voluntary action is to find an action it is
reasonable to consider for praise and blame. Aristotle (…) assumes that the same
conditions make actions candidates for moral and for legal scrutiny and reactions—
praise, blame, reward, punishment, and so on.” If only voluntary actions can be
subject to moral or legal judgment, is it fair to consider the decision-maker in
extreme situations as responsible? Given that their responsibility stems from a
heteronomous, rather than an autonomous source, and that organizations usually
restrict autonomy, can an individual truly be held responsible?
Obviously the question is far from new. However, the fact that the extraordinary
collapse of the Fukushima Daiichi plant placed a specific individual, Masao
Yoshida, under moral and legal scrutiny, indicates the need to reflect on the relationship between responsibility, voluntary action, and safety when managing
extreme situations. Furthermore, if individuals are to be considered responsible for
their actions, not only is it fairer to build systems that provide them with the means
to act voluntarily and responsibly, it is also a necessity imposed by extreme
situations.
Extreme situations lead to the collapse of systems and vitiate all preexisting
rules, including symbolic ones [4]. There are no longer any procedures that guide
actions and decisions. The individual is no longer heteronomous, and autonomous,
An Ethical Perspective on Extreme Situations …
189