of decommissioning. The reaction of the European Union was ambivalent:
Germany brought forward the date of the closure of its plants, while France refused
to abandon nuclear power. Several factors explain the failure to radically reexamine
the French nuclear sector. Politicians simply relegated the Japanese accident to an
exceptional event: “Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl accident, the exception
has again served as the main element of arguments that aim to provide reassurance: the Japanese geographic exception has now replaced the Soviet technological exception (victims of their lack of technical expertise)” [16]. Experts issued
reassurances that they would take into account feedback from the Fukushima
accident to “imagine the unimaginable”, and strengthen plant safety. Political and
industrial actors, profiting from the Chernobyl experience, promoted transparency.
4
Politicians managed to make nuclear energy acceptable, and effectively prevented
any further escalation of the dispute.
The French nuclear energy controversy therefore has several particular characteristics. It is both technological (‘the industrial war’ between supporters of the
French and American technology in the late 1960s) and post-technological (site
selection, rejection of large-scale nuclearization).
5 The controversy over the
industry, and more generally the issue of radioactivity [19], has developed slowly,
with periods where it has received little attention, followed by periods of intensification or renewal. This periodicity implies changes in the composition of social
groups that are involved, and a change in their strategic action plan. Going beyond
issues of energy policy, accident risk, or environmental and health impacts, French
controversy is intrinsically linked to power struggles in society, underlined by the
concept of technopolitics.
6 It also questions other ideas, such as the relationship
between Man and Nature. Controversy emerges from the construction of identities
and strongly-held collective practices (the pride of nuclear energy pioneers, the
collective memory of militants at Plogoff or Creys-Malville), which plays a part in
the production and reception of cultural objects.
4
The contribution of the anti-nuclear movement to the history of the industry illustrates the thesis
of Lascoume on the social production of controversy [17]: “Criticism has helped to modernize
nuclear institutions, forcing them to improve their communication strategies and crisis management systems, requiring them to improve their communication with the public, bypassing the
dominant idea in 1986 that all means—first and foremost extreme secrecy—were useful in order to
preserve the future of nuclear energy” [16].
5
This distinction mirrors that of Callon in his article about the sociology of technological controversies [18], where he suggests that controversies emerge during, but not after technological
invention.
6
This concept corresponds to strategic practices that consist of designing or using technology to
implement policy objectives [20]. Technopolitical regimes designate groups of individuals,
engineering and industrial practices, technical objects, political programs and institutional ideologies. These elements are connected to each other and interact to govern the development of
technology and in turn, enable technopolitics to develop.
What Cultural Objects Say About Nuclear Accidents …
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