apply to nuclear accidents because they rely on past behaviors and thus require data
[36–38]. Stated-preference methods are based on surveys that try to elicit the willingness to pay of people to restore the environment. The contingent valuation method
is often used to value the environmental consequences of rare disasters.
Regarding health costs, the human capital method calculates the economic value
of fatalities or impairments by assessing the number of lost years of production and
multiplying it by the average yearly production of a human being. Other methods,
such as the friction cost method, exist and have very different ways of calculating
those health costs [39–42]. This variety of methods is responsible for some of the
discrepancies observed in Table 1. First, a consequence can be assessed by different
methods. Second, even if a cost is assessed by two studies with the same method,
some aspects of the evaluation remain quite arbitrary. In the human capital method
applied to the cost of radio-induced cancers, Hohmeyer assesses the cost of a death
at $1 million while Ottinger assesses it at $4 million [15].
4.4 Drawbacks
Table 1 shows that the tendency over the last twenty years has been to provide an
estimation of the cost of nuclear accidents which would account for as many
consequences as possible. This emphasis on completeness, which is particularly
stressed in the IRSN study, is indeed necessary for the goals mentioned in the
introduction of this paper. Ex ante policy making and ex post compensations both
need to rely on a complete assessment of the consequences of a nuclear accident,
since an incomplete assessment might lead to an underestimation of the cost and
entail an underinvestment in nuclear safety, a disproportionate share of nuclear
power in the electricity mix, or an inadequate compensation of victims [43, 44].
This quest for completeness also has its drawbacks. First, it fosters the aggregation of numbers that differ by nature. As we have seen, all costs of consequences
are not assessed using the same methodologies, and are thus not subject to the same
uncertainties. Summing them up to provide a global cost of nuclear accidents
propagates the highest uncertainty to the final result. Second, completeness can be
detrimental to scientific rigor. Some costs currently have no corresponding
assessment methods. It is the case for food bans; which are estimated in the most
recent study by comparison with recent non-nuclear food bans [16]. Their integration in cost assessments is thus parochial, since they don’t stand on robust
economic grounds. Finally, to achieve completeness, existing studies have focused
on damage and consequences, and tried to identify new consequences, or “lines of
cost”. By doing so, most studies overlook the impact of nuclear countermeasures,
which is the object of the next part of this paper.
92
R. Bizet and F. Lévêque
[36–38]. Stated-preference methods are based on surveys that try to elicit the willingness to pay of people to restore the environment. The contingent valuation method
is often used to value the environmental consequences of rare disasters.
Regarding health costs, the human capital method calculates the economic value
of fatalities or impairments by assessing the number of lost years of production and
multiplying it by the average yearly production of a human being. Other methods,
such as the friction cost method, exist and have very different ways of calculating
those health costs [39–42]. This variety of methods is responsible for some of the
discrepancies observed in Table 1. First, a consequence can be assessed by different
methods. Second, even if a cost is assessed by two studies with the same method,
some aspects of the evaluation remain quite arbitrary. In the human capital method
applied to the cost of radio-induced cancers, Hohmeyer assesses the cost of a death
at $1 million while Ottinger assesses it at $4 million [15].
4.4 Drawbacks
Table 1 shows that the tendency over the last twenty years has been to provide an
estimation of the cost of nuclear accidents which would account for as many
consequences as possible. This emphasis on completeness, which is particularly
stressed in the IRSN study, is indeed necessary for the goals mentioned in the
introduction of this paper. Ex ante policy making and ex post compensations both
need to rely on a complete assessment of the consequences of a nuclear accident,
since an incomplete assessment might lead to an underestimation of the cost and
entail an underinvestment in nuclear safety, a disproportionate share of nuclear
power in the electricity mix, or an inadequate compensation of victims [43, 44].
This quest for completeness also has its drawbacks. First, it fosters the aggregation of numbers that differ by nature. As we have seen, all costs of consequences
are not assessed using the same methodologies, and are thus not subject to the same
uncertainties. Summing them up to provide a global cost of nuclear accidents
propagates the highest uncertainty to the final result. Second, completeness can be
detrimental to scientific rigor. Some costs currently have no corresponding
assessment methods. It is the case for food bans; which are estimated in the most
recent study by comparison with recent non-nuclear food bans [16]. Their integration in cost assessments is thus parochial, since they don’t stand on robust
economic grounds. Finally, to achieve completeness, existing studies have focused
on damage and consequences, and tried to identify new consequences, or “lines of
cost”. By doing so, most studies overlook the impact of nuclear countermeasures,
which is the object of the next part of this paper.
92
R. Bizet and F. Lévêque