172
8 How Society Works
community-based way. Therefore, only a few cases will require legal mediation.
Most activities would be self-governed through a system of sanctions and rewards
by peers. In the following chapters, I will explain in more detail how information
technology will enable people and companies to coordinate their interests in entirely
new ways.
References
1. G.R. Price, Selection and covariance, Nature 227, 520–521 (1970).
2. R. Axelrod and W.D. Hamilton, The evolution of cooperation, Science 211, 1390–1396 (1981).
3. E. Fehr and S. Gächter, Altrustic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137–140 (2002).
4. Ö. Gürerk, B. Irlenbusch and B. Rockenbach, The competitive advantage of sanctioning
institutions. Science 312, 108–111 (2006).
5. D. Helbing, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, and G. Szabó (2010) Evolutionary establishment of moral
and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PLoS Computational Biology 6(4),
e1000758.
6. D. Helbing, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc and G. Szabo (2010) Evolutionary establishment of moral
and double moral standards through spatial interactions, PLoS Comput. Biol. 6(4): e1000758.
7. M. Perc, K. Donnay and D. Helbing (2013) Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent
collective behavior. PLOS ONE 8(10), e76063.
8. F. Winter, H. Rauhut and D. Helbing (2012) How norms can generate conflict: an experiment
on the failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level. Social Forces 90(3),919946.
9. V.C. Wynne-Edwards, Evolution Through Group Selection (Blackwell, 1986).
10. D. Helbing and W. Yu (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals
under noisy conditions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA (PNAS) 106(8),
3680–3685.
11. D. Helbing and W. Yu (2008) Migration as a mechanism to promote cooperation. Advances in
Complex Systems 11(4), 641–652.
12. C. P. Roca and D. Helbing (2011) Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy,
mobile individuals. PNAS 108(28), 11370–11374.
13. C. Efferson, C.P. Roca, S. Vogt and D. Helbing, Sustained cooperation by running away from
bad behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/art
icle/pii/S1090513815000574.
14. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner and J. Walker, Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources (Michigan,
1994).
15. T. Vinko et al., Sharing in BitTorrent communities, see http://www.researchgate.net/profile/
Stefano_Balietti/publication/270615664_QLectives_Ebook_Quality_Collectives/links/54b
975b90cf253b50e2a807e.pdf.
16. D. Helbing (2013): Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature 497, 51–59.
17. A.G. Haldane and R.M. May, Systemic risk in banking ecosystems. Nature 469, 351–355
(2011).
18. M. Mäs and D. Helbing (2015) The competitive advantage of wasteful cultural institutions, preprint, see also https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/nl/publications/the-competitive-adv
antage-of-wasteful-cultural-institutions(5d62bd50-21a4-46e0-8ccf-5f5126a2731f).html.
19. W. Przepiorka, Buyers pay for and sellers invest in a good reputation: More evidence from
eBay, The Journal of Socio-Economics 42, 31–42 (2013).
20. J. Lorenz, H. Rauhut, F. Schweitzer, and D. Helbing (2011) How social influence can undermine
the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA (PNAS)
108(28), 9020–9025.
21. E. Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (Viking/Penguin, 2011).
8 How Society Works
community-based way. Therefore, only a few cases will require legal mediation.
Most activities would be self-governed through a system of sanctions and rewards
by peers. In the following chapters, I will explain in more detail how information
technology will enable people and companies to coordinate their interests in entirely
new ways.
References
1. G.R. Price, Selection and covariance, Nature 227, 520–521 (1970).
2. R. Axelrod and W.D. Hamilton, The evolution of cooperation, Science 211, 1390–1396 (1981).
3. E. Fehr and S. Gächter, Altrustic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137–140 (2002).
4. Ö. Gürerk, B. Irlenbusch and B. Rockenbach, The competitive advantage of sanctioning
institutions. Science 312, 108–111 (2006).
5. D. Helbing, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, and G. Szabó (2010) Evolutionary establishment of moral
and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PLoS Computational Biology 6(4),
e1000758.
6. D. Helbing, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc and G. Szabo (2010) Evolutionary establishment of moral
and double moral standards through spatial interactions, PLoS Comput. Biol. 6(4): e1000758.
7. M. Perc, K. Donnay and D. Helbing (2013) Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent
collective behavior. PLOS ONE 8(10), e76063.
8. F. Winter, H. Rauhut and D. Helbing (2012) How norms can generate conflict: an experiment
on the failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level. Social Forces 90(3),919946.
9. V.C. Wynne-Edwards, Evolution Through Group Selection (Blackwell, 1986).
10. D. Helbing and W. Yu (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals
under noisy conditions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA (PNAS) 106(8),
3680–3685.
11. D. Helbing and W. Yu (2008) Migration as a mechanism to promote cooperation. Advances in
Complex Systems 11(4), 641–652.
12. C. P. Roca and D. Helbing (2011) Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy,
mobile individuals. PNAS 108(28), 11370–11374.
13. C. Efferson, C.P. Roca, S. Vogt and D. Helbing, Sustained cooperation by running away from
bad behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/art
icle/pii/S1090513815000574.
14. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner and J. Walker, Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources (Michigan,
1994).
15. T. Vinko et al., Sharing in BitTorrent communities, see http://www.researchgate.net/profile/
Stefano_Balietti/publication/270615664_QLectives_Ebook_Quality_Collectives/links/54b
975b90cf253b50e2a807e.pdf.
16. D. Helbing (2013): Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature 497, 51–59.
17. A.G. Haldane and R.M. May, Systemic risk in banking ecosystems. Nature 469, 351–355
(2011).
18. M. Mäs and D. Helbing (2015) The competitive advantage of wasteful cultural institutions, preprint, see also https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/nl/publications/the-competitive-adv
antage-of-wasteful-cultural-institutions(5d62bd50-21a4-46e0-8ccf-5f5126a2731f).html.
19. W. Przepiorka, Buyers pay for and sellers invest in a good reputation: More evidence from
eBay, The Journal of Socio-Economics 42, 31–42 (2013).
20. J. Lorenz, H. Rauhut, F. Schweitzer, and D. Helbing (2011) How social influence can undermine
the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA (PNAS)
108(28), 9020–9025.
21. E. Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (Viking/Penguin, 2011).