71
“designed in the fi rst place with the return to the factory for remaking and reuse in
mind” (Wildermuth 2008 : 64; Committee on Pollution 1966 : 06). Spilhaus’ later
writings on the Experimental City recognized the dematerialization strategy of selling services rather than products: “Instead of owning things in the future, you will
own the services that the things will give you” (Wildermuth 2008 : 113). In an article
on the Experimental City, he also notes “There are examples of industrial symbiosis
where one industry feeds off, or at least neutralizes, the wastes of another…” and he
provides several examples (Spilhaus 1967 : 1131). Recognizing American cities to
be the hot spots for pollution, Spilhaus’ committee had at fi rst decided to conduct a
case study in the highly urbanized Delaware River Basin. Getting data on pollution
for the urban area proved, however, to be too challenging due to the myriad of state,
county and municipal governments involved (a common challenge for urban metabolism studies). It was this experience with the frustrating institutional structures
within existing cities that to a large extend encouraged Silhaus to pursue his vision
of a full-scale experimental new city.
There were other powerful actors supporting the Experimental City idea
(Wildermuth 2008 ). Back in Minneapolis, working in parallel to Spilhaus at fi rst,
newspaper executive Otto Silha had taken an interest in the idea of enclosed cities
that had been popularized by Buckminster Fuller. Silha had strong connections to
government and industry – including the US Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who
was a former mayor of Minneapolis. Keen to see Minnesota lead the country on
building new cities, Silha assembled a powerful steering committee and co-opted
Spilhaus to be the front man for the project. Other members of the steering committee included a retired four-star general, a former economic advisor to President
Kennedy, the personal physician of President Johnson, and further representatives
from government, industry, labour unions, foundations and academia, as well as
Buckminster Fuller. In May 1966, Silha’s committee received $248,000 in federal
funding to kick-start the planning of the city, with more to follow. Federal support
for the Experimental City later waned, but then the state government took a stronger
role. On June 4, 1971, Minnesota Governor Wendell Anderson even signed legislation to create a new state agency known as the Minnesota Experimental City
Authority.
The great plans for the Experimental City came to nothing, however, due to a
variety of reasons. First Spilhaus’ vision of the city was utopian, and he was infl exible with many details. The utopian aspects were not so much the ambitious technological features, although some no doubt still needed to be worked out but lay with
the social and cultural dimensions. Spilhaus argued that the city should be designed
for a fi xed population of 250,000 people, no more or less, and that potential residents would have to be screened to achieve the right balance of required professions. Spilhaus saw the city as being a perfectible machine and ignored the
aspirations of regular people. Even after Spilhaus withdrew from the implementation efforts, Silha’s committee continued to make mistakes. In choosing a possible
site for the Experimental City, they failed to suitably engage environmentalists or
local people, the majority of whom saw urbanization of their rural surroundings to
be deplorable. Ultimately, the effort failed on both cultural and environmental
4 Industrial Ecology and Cities
“designed in the fi rst place with the return to the factory for remaking and reuse in
mind” (Wildermuth 2008 : 64; Committee on Pollution 1966 : 06). Spilhaus’ later
writings on the Experimental City recognized the dematerialization strategy of selling services rather than products: “Instead of owning things in the future, you will
own the services that the things will give you” (Wildermuth 2008 : 113). In an article
on the Experimental City, he also notes “There are examples of industrial symbiosis
where one industry feeds off, or at least neutralizes, the wastes of another…” and he
provides several examples (Spilhaus 1967 : 1131). Recognizing American cities to
be the hot spots for pollution, Spilhaus’ committee had at fi rst decided to conduct a
case study in the highly urbanized Delaware River Basin. Getting data on pollution
for the urban area proved, however, to be too challenging due to the myriad of state,
county and municipal governments involved (a common challenge for urban metabolism studies). It was this experience with the frustrating institutional structures
within existing cities that to a large extend encouraged Silhaus to pursue his vision
of a full-scale experimental new city.
There were other powerful actors supporting the Experimental City idea
(Wildermuth 2008 ). Back in Minneapolis, working in parallel to Spilhaus at fi rst,
newspaper executive Otto Silha had taken an interest in the idea of enclosed cities
that had been popularized by Buckminster Fuller. Silha had strong connections to
government and industry – including the US Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who
was a former mayor of Minneapolis. Keen to see Minnesota lead the country on
building new cities, Silha assembled a powerful steering committee and co-opted
Spilhaus to be the front man for the project. Other members of the steering committee included a retired four-star general, a former economic advisor to President
Kennedy, the personal physician of President Johnson, and further representatives
from government, industry, labour unions, foundations and academia, as well as
Buckminster Fuller. In May 1966, Silha’s committee received $248,000 in federal
funding to kick-start the planning of the city, with more to follow. Federal support
for the Experimental City later waned, but then the state government took a stronger
role. On June 4, 1971, Minnesota Governor Wendell Anderson even signed legislation to create a new state agency known as the Minnesota Experimental City
Authority.
The great plans for the Experimental City came to nothing, however, due to a
variety of reasons. First Spilhaus’ vision of the city was utopian, and he was infl exible with many details. The utopian aspects were not so much the ambitious technological features, although some no doubt still needed to be worked out but lay with
the social and cultural dimensions. Spilhaus argued that the city should be designed
for a fi xed population of 250,000 people, no more or less, and that potential residents would have to be screened to achieve the right balance of required professions. Spilhaus saw the city as being a perfectible machine and ignored the
aspirations of regular people. Even after Spilhaus withdrew from the implementation efforts, Silha’s committee continued to make mistakes. In choosing a possible
site for the Experimental City, they failed to suitably engage environmentalists or
local people, the majority of whom saw urbanization of their rural surroundings to
be deplorable. Ultimately, the effort failed on both cultural and environmental
4 Industrial Ecology and Cities