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M. Audouin and M. Finger
To answer this question, we present the cases of development of the same IoT solution,
being a smart transportation card, in Seoul (North) and Bogota (South), based on
archival data and data collected from semi-structured interviews with stakeholders
involved in the projects. We then conduct a comparative analysis of the two cases
using a conceptual framework building on co-evolution between technology and
institutions theory, to understand the extent to which technological innovation can
be a driver for institutional changes in urban transportation systems, and vice versa.
14.2 Seoul Case
Seoul, the economic and political capital of the Republic of Korea, is one of the most
populated urban areas in the world. In 1960, the Greater Seoul metropolitan area was
home to 5.2 million of inhabitants (Bae and Richardson 2011); it is estimated that
nowadays, about 23 million people live in Seoul Metropolitan Area, accounting for
approximately half of the South-Korean population (Cervero and Kang 2011).
Consequent transportation problems resulted from the exponential growth Seoul
experienced. Driven by strong industrial development, Seoul’s demographic growth
was followed by an impressive economic growth. The per capita income (in 2004 US
Dollars), that was about US$ 311 in 1970, rose to US$ 7378 in 1990, and finished
2002 at US$ 12,531 (Allen 2013). Automotive manufacturing became an especially
powerful sector (Samsung Motors, Hyundai, Kia Motors), and because of the rising
household economic power, more and more citizens started to buy private cars,
eventually leading vehicle ownership to rise from 2 cars per 1000 persons in 1970
to 215 per 1000 persons in 2003 (Pucher et al. 2005). Unfortunately, Seoul’s road
infrastructure did not adapt to this impressive increase in car ownership. As a result,
congestion became significant, leading to lower travel speeds and increased travel
times for all road vehicles, ultimately becoming synonymous of decreased efficiency
of the bus system, on which Seoul was heavily dependent at that time.
To tackle the congestion problem, Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) undertook the construction of an urban rail system, which was finally inaugurated in 1980.
The new Seoul metro system constituted an alternative mode of transportation for
Seoul citizens, who graciously welcomed its development. Unfortunately, this new
solution did not act in favor of the Seoul bus system (Pucher et al. 2005). Indeed,
due to the convenience and reliability of the new metro system, as well as the affordability of private cars, bus quickly became the less preferred means of transportation
in Seoul, leading to a rapid decline in bus usage. Because of the decreasing number
of passengers on buses having shifted to rail or private cars, bus companies operating under a license from SMG, also motivated by a lack of control from Seoul’s
authorities, started to do whatever was most profitable for them. Hence, it was not
unusual at that time to see bus-operating companies cancel their non-lucrative routes
without notice, or bus drivers drive recklessly to put as many passengers as possible
onboard in order to generate more revenues, flouting the safety and comfort of their
M. Audouin and M. Finger
To answer this question, we present the cases of development of the same IoT solution,
being a smart transportation card, in Seoul (North) and Bogota (South), based on
archival data and data collected from semi-structured interviews with stakeholders
involved in the projects. We then conduct a comparative analysis of the two cases
using a conceptual framework building on co-evolution between technology and
institutions theory, to understand the extent to which technological innovation can
be a driver for institutional changes in urban transportation systems, and vice versa.
14.2 Seoul Case
Seoul, the economic and political capital of the Republic of Korea, is one of the most
populated urban areas in the world. In 1960, the Greater Seoul metropolitan area was
home to 5.2 million of inhabitants (Bae and Richardson 2011); it is estimated that
nowadays, about 23 million people live in Seoul Metropolitan Area, accounting for
approximately half of the South-Korean population (Cervero and Kang 2011).
Consequent transportation problems resulted from the exponential growth Seoul
experienced. Driven by strong industrial development, Seoul’s demographic growth
was followed by an impressive economic growth. The per capita income (in 2004 US
Dollars), that was about US$ 311 in 1970, rose to US$ 7378 in 1990, and finished
2002 at US$ 12,531 (Allen 2013). Automotive manufacturing became an especially
powerful sector (Samsung Motors, Hyundai, Kia Motors), and because of the rising
household economic power, more and more citizens started to buy private cars,
eventually leading vehicle ownership to rise from 2 cars per 1000 persons in 1970
to 215 per 1000 persons in 2003 (Pucher et al. 2005). Unfortunately, Seoul’s road
infrastructure did not adapt to this impressive increase in car ownership. As a result,
congestion became significant, leading to lower travel speeds and increased travel
times for all road vehicles, ultimately becoming synonymous of decreased efficiency
of the bus system, on which Seoul was heavily dependent at that time.
To tackle the congestion problem, Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) undertook the construction of an urban rail system, which was finally inaugurated in 1980.
The new Seoul metro system constituted an alternative mode of transportation for
Seoul citizens, who graciously welcomed its development. Unfortunately, this new
solution did not act in favor of the Seoul bus system (Pucher et al. 2005). Indeed,
due to the convenience and reliability of the new metro system, as well as the affordability of private cars, bus quickly became the less preferred means of transportation
in Seoul, leading to a rapid decline in bus usage. Because of the decreasing number
of passengers on buses having shifted to rail or private cars, bus companies operating under a license from SMG, also motivated by a lack of control from Seoul’s
authorities, started to do whatever was most profitable for them. Hence, it was not
unusual at that time to see bus-operating companies cancel their non-lucrative routes
without notice, or bus drivers drive recklessly to put as many passengers as possible
onboard in order to generate more revenues, flouting the safety and comfort of their