47
inertia’ (Wilson 2009 : 93). This institutional inertia is the central concern of this
chapter.
Besides the problems with the TAC management approach, our case study also
deals with the shift towards results-based fi sheries management and the role of
marine regions, Member States and stakeholders in such outcome-oriented management systems. Results-based management has been intensively discussed in the
context of the recent reform of CFP, fi nalised in 2013. The European Commission’s
2009 Green Paper on CFP reform suggested an approach where strategic decisions
on principles and standards should remain at Community level (CEC 2009b ), whilst
decisions relating to technical implementation be delegated to Member States ideally organising themselves at the level of marine regions such as the Baltic Sea
region (CEC 2009a ). However, it is still unclear how the concepts of results-based
management and a shifting burden of proof will be implemented through a regional
approach under the new post-2013 CFP (Linke and Jentoft 2013 ; Nielsen et al.
2015 ).
In Wilson’s publication The Paradoxes of Transparency, Science and the
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management in Europe , he highlights the importance of changing future fi sheries management (Wilson 2009 ). Results-based management is identifi ed as a promising alternative to current regulatory processes,
which are overcentralised and top-down: ‘The CFP can in many ways be argued to
take the form of a classical intergovernmentalist, state-centric command-andcontrol , top-down management system’ (Hegland 2009 : 8). The European
Commission’s Green Paper (CEC 2009b ) also recognised that the current CFP takes
a top-down approach and needs to give the fi shing industry more incentives to
behave responsibly. In Wilson’s and other’s views, a ‘nested results-based system,
organised around both sets of economic activities and geographical areas’ (Wilson
2009 : 276; cf. Raakjaer and Tatenhove 2014 ), is better suited for governing an
unpredictable and complex system such as the Baltic Sea’s fi sheries and essential
for the implementation of EAFM. The role of stakeholders in CFP over the last 15
years is the other important topic taken up in this chapter. In particular, we look at
how two main structures for stakeholder interaction within CFP – the Advisory
Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA), set up in 1971 and now replaced
by several specialised advisory councils, and the more recent Regional Advisory
Councils (RACs) – inform CFP. The key research questions dealt with in this chapter with respect to the governance changes described here are: How is uncertainty
dealt with in the governance interactions between risk assessment and risk management (science and policy)? And how does communication between different actors
address differences in the framing of the central issues in today’s fi sheries governance structures? These fundamental governance issues are analysed and discussed.
Our case study does not however deal with how external factors such as climate
change, eutrophication (e.g. hypoxic bottoms), environmental pollution , invasive
species or spreading diseases might contribute to decreasing fi sh stocks. Although
these external pressures do exist, we do not treat them as part of the ‘risk of
overfi shing’ .
3 Fisheries: A Case Study of Baltic Sea Environmental Governance
inertia’ (Wilson 2009 : 93). This institutional inertia is the central concern of this
chapter.
Besides the problems with the TAC management approach, our case study also
deals with the shift towards results-based fi sheries management and the role of
marine regions, Member States and stakeholders in such outcome-oriented management systems. Results-based management has been intensively discussed in the
context of the recent reform of CFP, fi nalised in 2013. The European Commission’s
2009 Green Paper on CFP reform suggested an approach where strategic decisions
on principles and standards should remain at Community level (CEC 2009b ), whilst
decisions relating to technical implementation be delegated to Member States ideally organising themselves at the level of marine regions such as the Baltic Sea
region (CEC 2009a ). However, it is still unclear how the concepts of results-based
management and a shifting burden of proof will be implemented through a regional
approach under the new post-2013 CFP (Linke and Jentoft 2013 ; Nielsen et al.
2015 ).
In Wilson’s publication The Paradoxes of Transparency, Science and the
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management in Europe , he highlights the importance of changing future fi sheries management (Wilson 2009 ). Results-based management is identifi ed as a promising alternative to current regulatory processes,
which are overcentralised and top-down: ‘The CFP can in many ways be argued to
take the form of a classical intergovernmentalist, state-centric command-andcontrol , top-down management system’ (Hegland 2009 : 8). The European
Commission’s Green Paper (CEC 2009b ) also recognised that the current CFP takes
a top-down approach and needs to give the fi shing industry more incentives to
behave responsibly. In Wilson’s and other’s views, a ‘nested results-based system,
organised around both sets of economic activities and geographical areas’ (Wilson
2009 : 276; cf. Raakjaer and Tatenhove 2014 ), is better suited for governing an
unpredictable and complex system such as the Baltic Sea’s fi sheries and essential
for the implementation of EAFM. The role of stakeholders in CFP over the last 15
years is the other important topic taken up in this chapter. In particular, we look at
how two main structures for stakeholder interaction within CFP – the Advisory
Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA), set up in 1971 and now replaced
by several specialised advisory councils, and the more recent Regional Advisory
Councils (RACs) – inform CFP. The key research questions dealt with in this chapter with respect to the governance changes described here are: How is uncertainty
dealt with in the governance interactions between risk assessment and risk management (science and policy)? And how does communication between different actors
address differences in the framing of the central issues in today’s fi sheries governance structures? These fundamental governance issues are analysed and discussed.
Our case study does not however deal with how external factors such as climate
change, eutrophication (e.g. hypoxic bottoms), environmental pollution , invasive
species or spreading diseases might contribute to decreasing fi sh stocks. Although
these external pressures do exist, we do not treat them as part of the ‘risk of
overfi shing’ .
3 Fisheries: A Case Study of Baltic Sea Environmental Governance