235
Finally, in the case of eutrophication , while the basic causes of nutrient leakage
are easily identifi ed, the ecosystem and resulting socio-economic effects are far
more complex and long-lasting. The diffi culty to transform, for example, agricultural production around the Baltic Sea, a dominating source of nutrient leakage, to
generally lower levels of nutrient loss, taken together with the strong resistance to
do so amongst many farmers and their organisations, makes environmental governance in this case very diffi cult. This is further complicated by a set of other leakage
sources and ambiguity concerning which measures would be most cost effective.
Present policies in the EU, HELCOM and individual nation states are far from suffi cient to steer development steadily towards agreed targets, which points out a need
for both immediate policy-making and longer-term deep reform in the sectors contributing to the problems, as well as in society at large. In the near future, as we see
it, pricing externalities in line with the polluter pays principle set out in the EU
treaty (meaning, e.g. environmental taxes on fertilisers) and reforming subsidies,
steering away from incentivising production not compatible with agreed environmental targets, are examples of potential measures. In the longer run, we consider
that deep reforms of agricultural systems might be needed, for example, by improved
spatial coordination of crop production and husbandry in order to better control
fl ows of nutrients. At the same time, several of these potential reforms may require
an increased willingness to pay amongst consumers for environmental measures in
food production.
Evidently, the proposals that we have identifi ed above are not described and
evaluated in any detail, and before adopting or implementing such policies and
processes, potential consequences should be investigated, whether nationally, in the
EU or within HELCOM. We believe though that the ideas presented are motivated
to such an extent that they will stimulate discussion and further analysis and studies.
In the next section, we zoom out from the specifi c cases and take a look at governance issues on more of a system level.
10.3 Findings in the Three Cross-Case Studies
As shown in the previous chapters of this book, the governance structures in BSR
are complex and include formal as well as non-formal components (e.g. Boström
et al. 2016 ). The formal governance consists of institutions and regulatory frameworks at supranational, national and local levels.
At the highest level, both the EU and HELCOM are active in marine governance
but have different constellations of members, and while their activities overlap, the
policies often have diverging legal strengths
2 and objectives (e.g. concerning
improvements in water status) with differences in time plans, approaches (like EAM)
2 In the EU, binding qualifi ed majority decisions are the normal case, whereas decisions in
HELCOM usually presume unanimity and are nonbinding. EU decisions are thus likely to be
implemented nationally to a much greater extent than decisions under the Helsinki Convention.
10 Seeking Pathways Towards Improved Environmental Governance of the Baltic Sea
Finally, in the case of eutrophication , while the basic causes of nutrient leakage
are easily identifi ed, the ecosystem and resulting socio-economic effects are far
more complex and long-lasting. The diffi culty to transform, for example, agricultural production around the Baltic Sea, a dominating source of nutrient leakage, to
generally lower levels of nutrient loss, taken together with the strong resistance to
do so amongst many farmers and their organisations, makes environmental governance in this case very diffi cult. This is further complicated by a set of other leakage
sources and ambiguity concerning which measures would be most cost effective.
Present policies in the EU, HELCOM and individual nation states are far from suffi cient to steer development steadily towards agreed targets, which points out a need
for both immediate policy-making and longer-term deep reform in the sectors contributing to the problems, as well as in society at large. In the near future, as we see
it, pricing externalities in line with the polluter pays principle set out in the EU
treaty (meaning, e.g. environmental taxes on fertilisers) and reforming subsidies,
steering away from incentivising production not compatible with agreed environmental targets, are examples of potential measures. In the longer run, we consider
that deep reforms of agricultural systems might be needed, for example, by improved
spatial coordination of crop production and husbandry in order to better control
fl ows of nutrients. At the same time, several of these potential reforms may require
an increased willingness to pay amongst consumers for environmental measures in
food production.
Evidently, the proposals that we have identifi ed above are not described and
evaluated in any detail, and before adopting or implementing such policies and
processes, potential consequences should be investigated, whether nationally, in the
EU or within HELCOM. We believe though that the ideas presented are motivated
to such an extent that they will stimulate discussion and further analysis and studies.
In the next section, we zoom out from the specifi c cases and take a look at governance issues on more of a system level.
10.3 Findings in the Three Cross-Case Studies
As shown in the previous chapters of this book, the governance structures in BSR
are complex and include formal as well as non-formal components (e.g. Boström
et al. 2016 ). The formal governance consists of institutions and regulatory frameworks at supranational, national and local levels.
At the highest level, both the EU and HELCOM are active in marine governance
but have different constellations of members, and while their activities overlap, the
policies often have diverging legal strengths
2 and objectives (e.g. concerning
improvements in water status) with differences in time plans, approaches (like EAM)
2 In the EU, binding qualifi ed majority decisions are the normal case, whereas decisions in
HELCOM usually presume unanimity and are nonbinding. EU decisions are thus likely to be
implemented nationally to a much greater extent than decisions under the Helsinki Convention.
10 Seeking Pathways Towards Improved Environmental Governance of the Baltic Sea