164
refl exivity within the stakeholder participation process will suffer if the dominant
participants guard too close their specifi c interests. For example, it was illustrated in
the case studies on eutrophication and overfi shing that sector interests ( agriculture
and fi sheries, respectively) made refl exivity, open-ended discussions and long-term
strategic thinking problematic. In other areas, where stakeholders do not have such
strong sectoral interests to defend, progress is more likely.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that a plurality of actors each can take
their own initiatives and a central place in the development of rules, policies and
guidelines. Examples of such initiatives include voluntary agreements between
public and private actors, codes of conduct that companies use in interaction with
suppliers, eco-certifi cation and labelling and guidelines for sustainable procurement
and other practices. The perspective of refl exive governance stresses that this role is
not limited to governmental actors (on either the national or international level).
Often there is a need for voluntary approaches initiated by non-governmental actors
(either for profi t or not for profi t) when the regulatory space is diffuse and relatively
unregulated. Some actors take initiatives and suggest templates (which the intergovernmental actor HELCOM also does). It is interesting to note that businesses
take their own initiatives and engage in risk assessments and research in order to
develop technical solutions. This cannot just be dismissed as greenwashing but
could indicate also instances of refl exivity, as it occurs as a response to the slow
implementation of existing regulations . In the case study of IAS, business actors
took own rule-making initiatives, and it was reported that companies encouraged
states to ratify the convention. As long as shipping companies can continue their
business in a technically and economically feasible way, there is no self-evident
reason for them to counteract environmentally sound regulation. As Young observes
( 2009 : 25), ‘corporate actors are frequently more concerned with the development
of stable rules and a uniform and predictable regulatory environment than with the
exact content of the resultant governance systems’. Voluntary rule-making can
sometimes, in effect, appear as strict and compelling as mandatory regulation (or
even more strict, because there can be considerable interpretative fl exibility and
room for manoeuvre within measures that are defi ned as mandatory). Delmas ( 2009 )
explains this observation by referring to March and Olsen’s well-known distinction
between ‘the logic of consequences’ and ‘the logic of appropriateness’. The fi rst
one relates to calculation of positive economic or noneconomic benefi ts for individual and collective actors, whereas the latter refers to when actors respond to
cognitive or normative pressures in order to establish legitimacy or avoid their reputations from being damaged. Soft approaches can very well relate to both these
types of logics. A combination of voluntary rule-making and mandatory regulation
is also necessary in the cases when global fl ows of raw material and products relate
to the regional risks and where effective global conventions are absent (Boström
and Karlsson 2013 ). The mix of hard and soft approaches should accordingly be
seen as context dependent and could thus be adjusted depending on the scale and
scope of the problem structure.
M. Boström et al.
refl exivity within the stakeholder participation process will suffer if the dominant
participants guard too close their specifi c interests. For example, it was illustrated in
the case studies on eutrophication and overfi shing that sector interests ( agriculture
and fi sheries, respectively) made refl exivity, open-ended discussions and long-term
strategic thinking problematic. In other areas, where stakeholders do not have such
strong sectoral interests to defend, progress is more likely.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that a plurality of actors each can take
their own initiatives and a central place in the development of rules, policies and
guidelines. Examples of such initiatives include voluntary agreements between
public and private actors, codes of conduct that companies use in interaction with
suppliers, eco-certifi cation and labelling and guidelines for sustainable procurement
and other practices. The perspective of refl exive governance stresses that this role is
not limited to governmental actors (on either the national or international level).
Often there is a need for voluntary approaches initiated by non-governmental actors
(either for profi t or not for profi t) when the regulatory space is diffuse and relatively
unregulated. Some actors take initiatives and suggest templates (which the intergovernmental actor HELCOM also does). It is interesting to note that businesses
take their own initiatives and engage in risk assessments and research in order to
develop technical solutions. This cannot just be dismissed as greenwashing but
could indicate also instances of refl exivity, as it occurs as a response to the slow
implementation of existing regulations . In the case study of IAS, business actors
took own rule-making initiatives, and it was reported that companies encouraged
states to ratify the convention. As long as shipping companies can continue their
business in a technically and economically feasible way, there is no self-evident
reason for them to counteract environmentally sound regulation. As Young observes
( 2009 : 25), ‘corporate actors are frequently more concerned with the development
of stable rules and a uniform and predictable regulatory environment than with the
exact content of the resultant governance systems’. Voluntary rule-making can
sometimes, in effect, appear as strict and compelling as mandatory regulation (or
even more strict, because there can be considerable interpretative fl exibility and
room for manoeuvre within measures that are defi ned as mandatory). Delmas ( 2009 )
explains this observation by referring to March and Olsen’s well-known distinction
between ‘the logic of consequences’ and ‘the logic of appropriateness’. The fi rst
one relates to calculation of positive economic or noneconomic benefi ts for individual and collective actors, whereas the latter refers to when actors respond to
cognitive or normative pressures in order to establish legitimacy or avoid their reputations from being damaged. Soft approaches can very well relate to both these
types of logics. A combination of voluntary rule-making and mandatory regulation
is also necessary in the cases when global fl ows of raw material and products relate
to the regional risks and where effective global conventions are absent (Boström
and Karlsson 2013 ). The mix of hard and soft approaches should accordingly be
seen as context dependent and could thus be adjusted depending on the scale and
scope of the problem structure.
M. Boström et al.