Safety of 5G Network Physical Infrastructures 187
for example, adjacent civil engineering works having an adverse effect on the stability of
the structure in question [6]. But of most concern are the higher‐risk activities such as
true vandalism or terrorism. In both cases there is a conscious intention to cause
damage. For example, in May 2016, two communications guyed masts, key parts of
Sweden’s infrastructure, collapsed, on suspicion of sabotage.
Although the main responsibility for setting goals for the protection of critical infrastructure rests primarily with the governments, the application of the necessary
measures to reduce the vulnerability of privately owned assets depends mainly on the
private‐sector action. Though the private sector surely understands their operations
and the hazards they entail, it is clear that there is not currently an adequate incentive
to fund vulnerability reduction, that is, the cost of reducing vulnerabilities outweighs
the benefit of reduced risk from terrorist attacks as well as from natural or any other
disasters [61]. In addition, risks to critical infrastructure industries are becoming more
interdependent as the economic, technological and social processes of globalization
continue to intensify.
With regard to terrorist threats, the policy goal should be to build capabilities for
prevention of attacks that interrupt such services and for effective response and rapid
recovery – if and when – such attacks do occur. As the scale and reach of these large
technological systems have increased and certainly will continue to increase, the potential economic and social damage of failures has increased also. and will continue
increasing. The sources of such major disruptions lie in technical and managerial failures as well as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, as demonstrated in the Northeast
Blackout of August 2003 [61].
Also, economic and social activities are becoming more interdependent, so that the
actions taken by one sector will affect others. As terrorist attacks have emerged as potential
threats to critical infrastructure, private‐sector executives and policymakers must face far
greater uncertainties than ever before. In contrast, actions can be taken to reduce damage
from future natural disasters with the knowledge that the probability associated with the
hazard will not be affected by the adoption of these protective measures. The likelihood of
an earthquake will not change if the structural design is focused on more quake‐resistant
structures. But the likelihood and consequences of a terrorist attack are determined by a
mingling of strategies and counter-strategies developed by a range of stakeholders and
always changing over time. This dynamic uncertainty makes the likelihood of future terrorist events extremely difficult to estimate and increases the difficulty of measuring the
economic efficiency of both public policies and private strategies.
In that context, even if private‐sector actors reduce system vulnerability by reducing
dependence on vulnerable external services, for example decentralizing critical assets,
decentralizing core operational functions, and adopting organization practices to
improve resiliency, these organizations may face sanctions from the markets for taking
such actions if they reduce efficiency, raise costs and/or reduce profits [61].
Codes of Practice for communication structures should be extended to include a risk
assessment considering factors relating to vandalism, sabotage or dangerous trespass.
The owner needs to consider carefully the likelihood of hazards occurring at the chosen
site. The designer needs to minimize elements of the structure that are worth stealing
and/or are accessible. The severity of any attack needs to be considered on both economic
and risk to life terms. As our dependency on communication structures increases, more
attention will need to be given to the risk of failures due to vandalism or terrorism.
for example, adjacent civil engineering works having an adverse effect on the stability of
the structure in question [6]. But of most concern are the higher‐risk activities such as
true vandalism or terrorism. In both cases there is a conscious intention to cause
damage. For example, in May 2016, two communications guyed masts, key parts of
Sweden’s infrastructure, collapsed, on suspicion of sabotage.
Although the main responsibility for setting goals for the protection of critical infrastructure rests primarily with the governments, the application of the necessary
measures to reduce the vulnerability of privately owned assets depends mainly on the
private‐sector action. Though the private sector surely understands their operations
and the hazards they entail, it is clear that there is not currently an adequate incentive
to fund vulnerability reduction, that is, the cost of reducing vulnerabilities outweighs
the benefit of reduced risk from terrorist attacks as well as from natural or any other
disasters [61]. In addition, risks to critical infrastructure industries are becoming more
interdependent as the economic, technological and social processes of globalization
continue to intensify.
With regard to terrorist threats, the policy goal should be to build capabilities for
prevention of attacks that interrupt such services and for effective response and rapid
recovery – if and when – such attacks do occur. As the scale and reach of these large
technological systems have increased and certainly will continue to increase, the potential economic and social damage of failures has increased also. and will continue
increasing. The sources of such major disruptions lie in technical and managerial failures as well as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, as demonstrated in the Northeast
Blackout of August 2003 [61].
Also, economic and social activities are becoming more interdependent, so that the
actions taken by one sector will affect others. As terrorist attacks have emerged as potential
threats to critical infrastructure, private‐sector executives and policymakers must face far
greater uncertainties than ever before. In contrast, actions can be taken to reduce damage
from future natural disasters with the knowledge that the probability associated with the
hazard will not be affected by the adoption of these protective measures. The likelihood of
an earthquake will not change if the structural design is focused on more quake‐resistant
structures. But the likelihood and consequences of a terrorist attack are determined by a
mingling of strategies and counter-strategies developed by a range of stakeholders and
always changing over time. This dynamic uncertainty makes the likelihood of future terrorist events extremely difficult to estimate and increases the difficulty of measuring the
economic efficiency of both public policies and private strategies.
In that context, even if private‐sector actors reduce system vulnerability by reducing
dependence on vulnerable external services, for example decentralizing critical assets,
decentralizing core operational functions, and adopting organization practices to
improve resiliency, these organizations may face sanctions from the markets for taking
such actions if they reduce efficiency, raise costs and/or reduce profits [61].
Codes of Practice for communication structures should be extended to include a risk
assessment considering factors relating to vandalism, sabotage or dangerous trespass.
The owner needs to consider carefully the likelihood of hazards occurring at the chosen
site. The designer needs to minimize elements of the structure that are worth stealing
and/or are accessible. The severity of any attack needs to be considered on both economic
and risk to life terms. As our dependency on communication structures increases, more
attention will need to be given to the risk of failures due to vandalism or terrorism.