Design Principles for 5G Security 95
constrained IoT devices. However, these devices can also easily become potential weak
points for the networks. It is important to keep this limitation in mind while integrating
networks of vulnerable IoT devices to the mainstream cellular or communication networks. Since these devices can easily be compromised to launch a DoS attack, it is necessary to either segregate them or use virtualization technologies so that they do not
induce security vulnerabilities into the main network.
4.6 Acknowledgement
This work has been carried out under the projects SECURE‐Connect (Secure Connectivity
of Future Cyber‐Physical Systems) and the Naked Approach Project (The Naked
Approach Nordic perspective to gadget‐free hyper connected environments).
References
1 Agiwal, M., Roy, A. and Saxena, N. (2016) Next generation 5G wireless networks: A
comprehensive survey. In: IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 18(3), 1617–1655.
2 Kutscher, D. (2016) I’s the network: Towards better security and transport performance
in 5G. IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM
WKSHPS), San Francisco, CA, pp. 656–661.
3 Ahmad, I., Kumar, T., Liyanage, M., Okwuibe, J., Ylianttila, M. and Gurtov, A. (2017)
5G security: Analysis of threats and solutions. 2017 IEEE Conference on Standards for
Communications and Networking (CSCN), Helsinki, pp. 193–199.
4 Alliance, N.G.M.N. (2015) 5G white paper. Next Generation Mobile Networks.
5 Liyanage, M., Ylianttila, M. and Gurtov, A. (eds) (2015) Software Defined Mobile
Networks (SDMN): Beyond LTE Network Architecture. John Wiley & Sons, USA.
6 ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (2003) Security Architecture for
Systems Providing End‐to‐end Communications. Geneva, Switzerland.
7 Alliance, N.G.M.N. (2016) 5G security recommendations Package, White paper.
8 Casado, M., Koponen, T., Ramanathan, R. and Shenker, S. (2010) Virtualizing the
network forwarding plane. Proceedings of the Workshop Programme. Routers Extensible
Serv. Tomorrow, p. 8.
9 van Cleeff, A., Pieters, W. and Wieringa, R. (2009) Security implications of virtualization:
A literature study. Proceedings of the International Conference CSE, 3, 353–358.
10 Vaughan‐Nichols, S. (2008) Virtualization sparks security concerns. Computer, 41(8),
pp. 13–15.
11 Sherwood, R. et al. (2009) Flowvisor: A network virtualization layer. OpenFlow Switch
Consortium, Technical Report OPENFLOW‐TR‐2009‐1, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA.
12 Chung, C.‐J., Khatkar, P., Xing, T., Lee, J. and Huang, D. (2013) NICE: Network
intrusion detection and countermeasure selection in virtual network systems.
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure Computing, 10(4), 198–211.
13 Kreutz, D., Ramos, F. and Verissimo, P. (2013) Towards secure and dependable
software‐defined networks. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop. Hot
Topics Software Defined Networks, pp. 55–60.
constrained IoT devices. However, these devices can also easily become potential weak
points for the networks. It is important to keep this limitation in mind while integrating
networks of vulnerable IoT devices to the mainstream cellular or communication networks. Since these devices can easily be compromised to launch a DoS attack, it is necessary to either segregate them or use virtualization technologies so that they do not
induce security vulnerabilities into the main network.
4.6 Acknowledgement
This work has been carried out under the projects SECURE‐Connect (Secure Connectivity
of Future Cyber‐Physical Systems) and the Naked Approach Project (The Naked
Approach Nordic perspective to gadget‐free hyper connected environments).
References
1 Agiwal, M., Roy, A. and Saxena, N. (2016) Next generation 5G wireless networks: A
comprehensive survey. In: IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 18(3), 1617–1655.
2 Kutscher, D. (2016) I’s the network: Towards better security and transport performance
in 5G. IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM
WKSHPS), San Francisco, CA, pp. 656–661.
3 Ahmad, I., Kumar, T., Liyanage, M., Okwuibe, J., Ylianttila, M. and Gurtov, A. (2017)
5G security: Analysis of threats and solutions. 2017 IEEE Conference on Standards for
Communications and Networking (CSCN), Helsinki, pp. 193–199.
4 Alliance, N.G.M.N. (2015) 5G white paper. Next Generation Mobile Networks.
5 Liyanage, M., Ylianttila, M. and Gurtov, A. (eds) (2015) Software Defined Mobile
Networks (SDMN): Beyond LTE Network Architecture. John Wiley & Sons, USA.
6 ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (2003) Security Architecture for
Systems Providing End‐to‐end Communications. Geneva, Switzerland.
7 Alliance, N.G.M.N. (2016) 5G security recommendations Package, White paper.
8 Casado, M., Koponen, T., Ramanathan, R. and Shenker, S. (2010) Virtualizing the
network forwarding plane. Proceedings of the Workshop Programme. Routers Extensible
Serv. Tomorrow, p. 8.
9 van Cleeff, A., Pieters, W. and Wieringa, R. (2009) Security implications of virtualization:
A literature study. Proceedings of the International Conference CSE, 3, 353–358.
10 Vaughan‐Nichols, S. (2008) Virtualization sparks security concerns. Computer, 41(8),
pp. 13–15.
11 Sherwood, R. et al. (2009) Flowvisor: A network virtualization layer. OpenFlow Switch
Consortium, Technical Report OPENFLOW‐TR‐2009‐1, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA.
12 Chung, C.‐J., Khatkar, P., Xing, T., Lee, J. and Huang, D. (2013) NICE: Network
intrusion detection and countermeasure selection in virtual network systems.
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure Computing, 10(4), 198–211.
13 Kreutz, D., Ramos, F. and Verissimo, P. (2013) Towards secure and dependable
software‐defined networks. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop. Hot
Topics Software Defined Networks, pp. 55–60.