336
S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
the satellite era. Four of these hurricanes were Category 4 and above in the SaffirSimpson scale.
5 Harvey, category 4 hurricane, advanced toward Texas on August
25 and produced the highest total rainfall for any recorded tropical cyclone in the
U.S (NOAA 2018a). Ten days later, hurricane Irma, category 5, advanced toward
Florida as the strongest storm in terms of absolute and sustained peak winds in the
open Atlantic Ocean, marking the only time when two consecutive major hurricanes
made landfall on the continental U.S (NOAA 2018b). Hurricane Jose, category 4, in
September 9 marked the first simultaneous occurrences of major hurricanes in the
Atlantic basin. Finally, Maria, category 5 hurricane in September 19 caused over
4,600 deaths
6 in the Caribbean, with concentrated impact in Puerto Rico, Dominica
Republic, and U.S. Virgin Islands. Hurricane Maria caused the worst power outage
in U.S. history (Belles 2017) and is among the deadliest hurricanes of the country
(Fleigh 2018).
The concurrence of large-scale impacts from extreme wet and extreme dry hazardrelated disasters presented a complex and novel scope of challenges to the U.S.
disaster response system. According to FEMA’s After-Action Report of 2017, the
nation faced unprecedented force strength shortages, both in staffing and commodities (FEMA 2017). Specified challenges in the case of Puerto Rico were related to
serious assumptions on the state of CI presented on the most up-to-date disaster operation plan from 2012. Insufficiently maintained electrical grid and telecommunication
network, together with massive pressure on the fuel supply chain, that suffered from
highly disrupted transportation networks and fuel truck driver’s shortage, caused
cascading impacts across lifelines and severe capacity reduction of the emergency
medical services.
An epidemiology study on Hurricane Maria (Kishore et al. 2018) shows that
the official death count of 64 (EM-DAT 2017) substantially underestimates the true
impact on human loss from the disaster. The final count from the excess death three
months after the event is 70 times larger than the official estimate. This gap between
the official count and the sur-mortality rate is mostly explained by the inefficiency of
the legal procedures in registering a disaster-related death and the limitations of death
certificates to capture conditioning circumstances of death. These circumstances
would reflect worsening chronic health conditions from delayed medical treatments
because of failing CI. Five weeks after the hurricane, only 8% of Puerto Rico’s
roads were open, and three months later, only 45% of the population had regained
access to the power grid. The power failure in Puerto Rico was categorized as the
worst blackout in the U.S. history. The difficulty of recovering lifeline functionality
5 The Saffir Simpson hurricane scale is based on maximum sustained wind over one-minute. A
category 4 covers 209–251 km/h (130–156 mph) and category 5 covers 252 k/h (137 mph) or
higher.
6 This death toll is based on deaths and sur-mortality rates measured three months after Maria made
landfall in Puerto Rico (Kishore et al. 2018).
Précédent

- 332/353

Suivant