330
S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
that criticality results can vary immensely based on how a facility’s function is characterized and most importantly based on where the boundaries of the system are
drawn. The transportation energy system vulnerability to climate change hazards in
California reinforces the current need to go beyond placed-based exposure and CI
physical interconnectivity through two different and complementary approaches: (1)
considering energy services “external” criticality, potentially different from traditional energy supply system criticality, and (2) to understanding CI organizational
topologies, which in the case of complex supply chain systems often characterized
with multi-stakeholders, can help identify issues of institutional fragmentation and
improve cross-boundary risk governance.
Keywords Vulnerability paradigm · Critical infrastructures · Complex system ·
Resilience · Climate change
18.1 Introduction
18.1.1 Historical Context of Climate Change Threats to CI
The institutionalization of CI and quantification of criticality powered by national
security issues.
The first official definition of CI comes from the Executive Order 13010, signed in
1996, after the Oklahoma City bombing of April 1995, establishing the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) that defines CI in 1998 as
the framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries,
institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a
reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the
United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a whole.
In the U.S., the first governmental guidelines on CI protection came from the
National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and originated from Presidential Decision
Directive 63. After the 9/11 terrorist act in 2001, Executive Order 13228 was signed
in October establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and responsibilities among which to protect an updated list of CI
1 (DHS 2013). Similarly, in
Europe, the development of CI policies are referenced to the Madrid (March 2004)
and London (July 2005) bombings from which the European Programme for CI
Protection (EPCIP) was institutionally established in 2005 (EC 2005).
1 The current list expands to 16 different critical sectors: Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Base; Emergency Service; Energy; Financial Services; Food
and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology;
Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste; Transportation; and Water and Wastewater Systems. Homeland Security also includes the concept of “key assets” as a subnational set to CI with destructive
potential due to their value to local communities. They include as key assets: national monuments,
symbols, and icons that represent the country’s heritage, traditions and values, and political power.
S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
that criticality results can vary immensely based on how a facility’s function is characterized and most importantly based on where the boundaries of the system are
drawn. The transportation energy system vulnerability to climate change hazards in
California reinforces the current need to go beyond placed-based exposure and CI
physical interconnectivity through two different and complementary approaches: (1)
considering energy services “external” criticality, potentially different from traditional energy supply system criticality, and (2) to understanding CI organizational
topologies, which in the case of complex supply chain systems often characterized
with multi-stakeholders, can help identify issues of institutional fragmentation and
improve cross-boundary risk governance.
Keywords Vulnerability paradigm · Critical infrastructures · Complex system ·
Resilience · Climate change
18.1 Introduction
18.1.1 Historical Context of Climate Change Threats to CI
The institutionalization of CI and quantification of criticality powered by national
security issues.
The first official definition of CI comes from the Executive Order 13010, signed in
1996, after the Oklahoma City bombing of April 1995, establishing the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) that defines CI in 1998 as
the framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries,
institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a
reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the
United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a whole.
In the U.S., the first governmental guidelines on CI protection came from the
National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and originated from Presidential Decision
Directive 63. After the 9/11 terrorist act in 2001, Executive Order 13228 was signed
in October establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and responsibilities among which to protect an updated list of CI
1 (DHS 2013). Similarly, in
Europe, the development of CI policies are referenced to the Madrid (March 2004)
and London (July 2005) bombings from which the European Programme for CI
Protection (EPCIP) was institutionally established in 2005 (EC 2005).
1 The current list expands to 16 different critical sectors: Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Base; Emergency Service; Energy; Financial Services; Food
and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology;
Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste; Transportation; and Water and Wastewater Systems. Homeland Security also includes the concept of “key assets” as a subnational set to CI with destructive
potential due to their value to local communities. They include as key assets: national monuments,
symbols, and icons that represent the country’s heritage, traditions and values, and political power.