55
governed in a social contract where the government is elected by the people as a representation of the general will and is therefore accountable to
it. The social contract rests on an understanding of mutual recognition
between state and citizenry when the population is subject to the laws of
the state, and the state is subject to popular political franchise. This figure,
however, is as abstract as it is beautiful.
In actual societies, and maybe especially in post-colonial societies, the
number of institutions that operate in the name of the state approaches
the infinite, and citizenship itself is fraught with intersecting qualifications
derived from gender, race and caste, as well as class, creed and conviction
(Lund 2016). In terms of social contract, this raises the question: as what
are the contractual partners recognised? Who is visible to what institution,
and what institution commands authority in what domain? A way to access
the empirical complexity may be on offer from a broad philosophical tradition that takes recognition as a fundamental human expression of acknowledgement of the ‘other’ (Arendt 1973; Fraser 2001; Honneth 1996;
Taylor 1989, 1994). Honneth, in particular, talks about visibility among
and between actors, and I believe it can be extended to institutions. Social
contracts of recognition require mutual visibility between actors and institutions. Actors must have a social, legal, fiscal or cultural presence visible
and acknowledged by an institution, and the institution must legitimately
appear capable of providing the desired recognition of a claim (Weber
1958). What actors are therefore comprises not individual features but
relational, politically visible attributes. So, who is the actor? A tax payer, a
peasant, or a red troublemaker, an indigene, a businessman, or a person
without paper? And who defines the categories? And, similarly, we must
ask what is the specific institution? Executive, legislative or judiciary, or
can it be re-purposed to fit the task at hand?
This may seem a somewhat grandiose introduction to what is often seen
as a governance routine question. I, however, suggest that any granular
analysis of relations of accountability (Latour 2009; Strathern 2000) could
do worse than to focus on power, its separation, the mutual recognition of
claims and authority, and the representation of rights subjects (or citizens)
and government. In the following, I present a summary case from my
work in Indonesia to illustrate relations of mutual recognition (Lund
2020). While the case itself relates only indirectly to energy transitions, it
surfaces concerns of conflict over land and forest that are germane to any
discussion of energy transitions, not least given Indonesia’s participation
in a global carbon forestry programme (cf. Hein 2018).
5 A FEW REFLECTIONS ON ACCOUNTABILITY
governed in a social contract where the government is elected by the people as a representation of the general will and is therefore accountable to
it. The social contract rests on an understanding of mutual recognition
between state and citizenry when the population is subject to the laws of
the state, and the state is subject to popular political franchise. This figure,
however, is as abstract as it is beautiful.
In actual societies, and maybe especially in post-colonial societies, the
number of institutions that operate in the name of the state approaches
the infinite, and citizenship itself is fraught with intersecting qualifications
derived from gender, race and caste, as well as class, creed and conviction
(Lund 2016). In terms of social contract, this raises the question: as what
are the contractual partners recognised? Who is visible to what institution,
and what institution commands authority in what domain? A way to access
the empirical complexity may be on offer from a broad philosophical tradition that takes recognition as a fundamental human expression of acknowledgement of the ‘other’ (Arendt 1973; Fraser 2001; Honneth 1996;
Taylor 1989, 1994). Honneth, in particular, talks about visibility among
and between actors, and I believe it can be extended to institutions. Social
contracts of recognition require mutual visibility between actors and institutions. Actors must have a social, legal, fiscal or cultural presence visible
and acknowledged by an institution, and the institution must legitimately
appear capable of providing the desired recognition of a claim (Weber
1958). What actors are therefore comprises not individual features but
relational, politically visible attributes. So, who is the actor? A tax payer, a
peasant, or a red troublemaker, an indigene, a businessman, or a person
without paper? And who defines the categories? And, similarly, we must
ask what is the specific institution? Executive, legislative or judiciary, or
can it be re-purposed to fit the task at hand?
This may seem a somewhat grandiose introduction to what is often seen
as a governance routine question. I, however, suggest that any granular
analysis of relations of accountability (Latour 2009; Strathern 2000) could
do worse than to focus on power, its separation, the mutual recognition of
claims and authority, and the representation of rights subjects (or citizens)
and government. In the following, I present a summary case from my
work in Indonesia to illustrate relations of mutual recognition (Lund
2020). While the case itself relates only indirectly to energy transitions, it
surfaces concerns of conflict over land and forest that are germane to any
discussion of energy transitions, not least given Indonesia’s participation
in a global carbon forestry programme (cf. Hein 2018).
5 A FEW REFLECTIONS ON ACCOUNTABILITY