49
was the campaign launched by the Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht
against the foreign loans used to fund much of Berlin’s new energy infrastructure. By 1931, this culminated in the forced sale of most of the city’s
shares in Bewag to national and international energy conglomerates as a
stop-gap measure to reduce the city’s burgeoning debt.
In West Berlin during the Cold War, security was the overriding argument used to legitimise urban energy policy. Successive city governments
and utility directors proclaimed, when any network expansion was planned,
that failing to act would jeopardise the local economy and undermine
West Berlin’s capacity to provide its own electricity and gas. With the
backing of the three Western Allied powers, high security standards were
built into West Berlin’s energy systems. These were epitomised by two
core practices: first, storing sufficient reserves of primary energy (coal and
oil) to power the city for at least three months and, second, creating a
cascade of generating capacity capable of avoiding power outages even in
the event that the largest generating block failed. The massive capital
investments required for this security-oriented strategy did not need legitimising locally as they were heavily subsidised by the West German government. It was only in the 1970s, when fresh expansionist plans confronted
an emergent environmentalist movement, that these practices of legitimation for West Berlin as an ‘electricity island’ were challenged seriously. For
the first time, alternative models for energy provision in West Berlin were
advanced by academics, activists and consultants. These revolved around
reducing the need for new generating plant by promoting energy saving,
using energy more efficiently (e.g., with small-scale co-generation), and,
latterly, importing electricity from East German power plants upgraded
with West German technology. These measures were deliberately framed
to delegitimise the dominant narrative of build-and-supply.
The current conflict over Berlin’s energy future is characterised by competing claims to legitimacy. On the one hand, the incumbent energy utilities (primarily Vattenfall, but also Gasag) present themselves to the public
as the experts who, by virtue of their long-standing experience in running
Berlin’s energy systems, are the sole actors capable of managing the power
grid and gas network. Technical expertise, track record and financial viability are the arguments they mobilise to justify their claims and belittle
their competitors. On the other hand, the social movements campaigning
for their kind of accountable remunicipalisation argue that it is precisely
this reliance on traditional management criteria that is blocking attempts
in the city to reduce energy use, cut carbon emissions and promote renew4 HISTORICISING ACCOUNTABILITY: BERLIN’S ENERGY TRANSITIONS
was the campaign launched by the Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht
against the foreign loans used to fund much of Berlin’s new energy infrastructure. By 1931, this culminated in the forced sale of most of the city’s
shares in Bewag to national and international energy conglomerates as a
stop-gap measure to reduce the city’s burgeoning debt.
In West Berlin during the Cold War, security was the overriding argument used to legitimise urban energy policy. Successive city governments
and utility directors proclaimed, when any network expansion was planned,
that failing to act would jeopardise the local economy and undermine
West Berlin’s capacity to provide its own electricity and gas. With the
backing of the three Western Allied powers, high security standards were
built into West Berlin’s energy systems. These were epitomised by two
core practices: first, storing sufficient reserves of primary energy (coal and
oil) to power the city for at least three months and, second, creating a
cascade of generating capacity capable of avoiding power outages even in
the event that the largest generating block failed. The massive capital
investments required for this security-oriented strategy did not need legitimising locally as they were heavily subsidised by the West German government. It was only in the 1970s, when fresh expansionist plans confronted
an emergent environmentalist movement, that these practices of legitimation for West Berlin as an ‘electricity island’ were challenged seriously. For
the first time, alternative models for energy provision in West Berlin were
advanced by academics, activists and consultants. These revolved around
reducing the need for new generating plant by promoting energy saving,
using energy more efficiently (e.g., with small-scale co-generation), and,
latterly, importing electricity from East German power plants upgraded
with West German technology. These measures were deliberately framed
to delegitimise the dominant narrative of build-and-supply.
The current conflict over Berlin’s energy future is characterised by competing claims to legitimacy. On the one hand, the incumbent energy utilities (primarily Vattenfall, but also Gasag) present themselves to the public
as the experts who, by virtue of their long-standing experience in running
Berlin’s energy systems, are the sole actors capable of managing the power
grid and gas network. Technical expertise, track record and financial viability are the arguments they mobilise to justify their claims and belittle
their competitors. On the other hand, the social movements campaigning
for their kind of accountable remunicipalisation argue that it is precisely
this reliance on traditional management criteria that is blocking attempts
in the city to reduce energy use, cut carbon emissions and promote renew4 HISTORICISING ACCOUNTABILITY: BERLIN’S ENERGY TRANSITIONS