23
2016). An important but relatively easy to resolve example is that of the
debate between 80 and 100 per cent renewable energy-based systems.
While there is still some disagreement on the possibility of complete decarbonisation despite highly detailed analyses of an impressive number of
actual contexts in which this should work, it does not complicate too
many current decisions, as most energy systems are well short of even 80
per cent renewable energy sources; hence, decisions can be made to decarbonise rapidly, and the question of the final 20 per cent can be resolved
later in the energy transition (Jacobson and Delucchi 2009). A more complicated question and one that does require technocratic legitimation is
whether a given quantum of new renewable energy capacity can be
installed in a decentralised manner and added to an existing electric grid
infrastructure. It is important not to overload transmission capacity
beyond what the grid can withstand to ensure reliable energy supply and
to consider the basis for ‘curtailment’, which refers to letting surplus
power generation simply go unused, or to shutting it down when it runs
into grid capacity constraints. Before giving the go-ahead to a number of
solar projects, an energy regulator or national ministry would be keen to
ensure that the terms on which this new capacity is installed are clear to
everyone concerned, marking a clear instance of a case for technocratic
legitimation. This is crucial not only to enable energy transitions, but to
safeguard citizens against unreliable energy services and debt burdens in
case support schemes are not designed to have equitable effects, as well as
to prevent losses to the public exchequer, utilities and developers due to
inadequate attention to aspects like grid stability and coordination.
This presents an interesting challenge for accountability in energy transitions. When matters are technical, they can hardly be left up to some sort
of popular vote, as the public is rarely sufficiently knowledgeable to weigh
in usefully on matters of such sophistication. But simply entrusting them
to experts risks eventual public backlash, especially in contemporary contexts of rising distrust against authority and the rule of experts; history
also bears evidence to the risk of elite capture and large-scale corruption
under such conditions (cf. Lennon 2017). Practices of technocratic legitimation present a reasonable compromise—devising a relatively sophisticated system to secure technically appropriate decisions, but with an
element of checks and balances and the participation of multiple types of
actors who can hold each other accountable. Examples include standing
committees, special taskforces and other such ad hoc measures; also more
institutionalised mechanisms such as stringent public procurement rules,
2 A TYPOLOGY OF PRACTICES OF LEGITIMATION TO CATEGORISE…
2016). An important but relatively easy to resolve example is that of the
debate between 80 and 100 per cent renewable energy-based systems.
While there is still some disagreement on the possibility of complete decarbonisation despite highly detailed analyses of an impressive number of
actual contexts in which this should work, it does not complicate too
many current decisions, as most energy systems are well short of even 80
per cent renewable energy sources; hence, decisions can be made to decarbonise rapidly, and the question of the final 20 per cent can be resolved
later in the energy transition (Jacobson and Delucchi 2009). A more complicated question and one that does require technocratic legitimation is
whether a given quantum of new renewable energy capacity can be
installed in a decentralised manner and added to an existing electric grid
infrastructure. It is important not to overload transmission capacity
beyond what the grid can withstand to ensure reliable energy supply and
to consider the basis for ‘curtailment’, which refers to letting surplus
power generation simply go unused, or to shutting it down when it runs
into grid capacity constraints. Before giving the go-ahead to a number of
solar projects, an energy regulator or national ministry would be keen to
ensure that the terms on which this new capacity is installed are clear to
everyone concerned, marking a clear instance of a case for technocratic
legitimation. This is crucial not only to enable energy transitions, but to
safeguard citizens against unreliable energy services and debt burdens in
case support schemes are not designed to have equitable effects, as well as
to prevent losses to the public exchequer, utilities and developers due to
inadequate attention to aspects like grid stability and coordination.
This presents an interesting challenge for accountability in energy transitions. When matters are technical, they can hardly be left up to some sort
of popular vote, as the public is rarely sufficiently knowledgeable to weigh
in usefully on matters of such sophistication. But simply entrusting them
to experts risks eventual public backlash, especially in contemporary contexts of rising distrust against authority and the rule of experts; history
also bears evidence to the risk of elite capture and large-scale corruption
under such conditions (cf. Lennon 2017). Practices of technocratic legitimation present a reasonable compromise—devising a relatively sophisticated system to secure technically appropriate decisions, but with an
element of checks and balances and the participation of multiple types of
actors who can hold each other accountable. Examples include standing
committees, special taskforces and other such ad hoc measures; also more
institutionalised mechanisms such as stringent public procurement rules,
2 A TYPOLOGY OF PRACTICES OF LEGITIMATION TO CATEGORISE…