cooperation platforms and mechanisms
to enhance energy cooperation and
security.
4. There are differences between energy
cooperation within BRI and mainstream
global energy governance mechanisms.
First, BRI has new requirements for
global energy governance, such as: a
top-level inclusive platform for negotiating win-win energy cooperation, a
relevant and professional platform for
promoting the interconnection of
energy infrastructure, and a platform for
flexible competition and coordination
that ensures long-term investment in
energy. Second, energy cooperation in
BRI makes the inadequacies of global
energy governance more obvious, such
as the low level of inclusiveness, lack
of multilateral negotiation mechanisms
to promote the interconnection of
energy, lack of rules and regulations
facilitating regional energy trade and
investment, lack of financial mechanisms to ensure long-term energy
investment, and lack of a dialogue
mechanism that covers political, economic and energy security.
5. The international community is cautious about the goals and energy cooperation proposed by BRI, especially
with regard to benefits that can be
achieved in energy supply and energy
demand. Some countries are concerned
about the goals of BRI, its ability to
implement projects sustainably and the
risk of using a market-oriented model.
Box 25: China should have a long-term
plan for global energy governance
1. China needs to clearly recognise how
future trends in global energy governance will positively or negatively
influence China and other emerging
economies, as this will affect China’s
willingness to participate in international governance and its strategies of
participation. This is related to the
compromises that can be made with
other participants and the conditions,
costs, benefits and risks of China’s
participation.
2. China should also recognise its unique
status as a large developing economy
that has an increasing need for energy,
while undergoing an energy transition.
China needs to understand correctly
how it differs from the core interests of
other participants (mainly developed
countries) in the global energy governance framework. And, China needs to
appreciate the complexity of, and
potential changes in, its relations with
other participants, as these are closely
tied to economic development and the
pressures of controlling climate change.
3. China must clearly recognise that
energy security is the main goal of its
participation in global energy governance and the driver of its external
energy relations. It is impossible to
convince China in the short term that
external markets alone can ensure
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W. Jigang and P. Webb
to enhance energy cooperation and
security.
4. There are differences between energy
cooperation within BRI and mainstream
global energy governance mechanisms.
First, BRI has new requirements for
global energy governance, such as: a
top-level inclusive platform for negotiating win-win energy cooperation, a
relevant and professional platform for
promoting the interconnection of
energy infrastructure, and a platform for
flexible competition and coordination
that ensures long-term investment in
energy. Second, energy cooperation in
BRI makes the inadequacies of global
energy governance more obvious, such
as the low level of inclusiveness, lack
of multilateral negotiation mechanisms
to promote the interconnection of
energy, lack of rules and regulations
facilitating regional energy trade and
investment, lack of financial mechanisms to ensure long-term energy
investment, and lack of a dialogue
mechanism that covers political, economic and energy security.
5. The international community is cautious about the goals and energy cooperation proposed by BRI, especially
with regard to benefits that can be
achieved in energy supply and energy
demand. Some countries are concerned
about the goals of BRI, its ability to
implement projects sustainably and the
risk of using a market-oriented model.
Box 25: China should have a long-term
plan for global energy governance
1. China needs to clearly recognise how
future trends in global energy governance will positively or negatively
influence China and other emerging
economies, as this will affect China’s
willingness to participate in international governance and its strategies of
participation. This is related to the
compromises that can be made with
other participants and the conditions,
costs, benefits and risks of China’s
participation.
2. China should also recognise its unique
status as a large developing economy
that has an increasing need for energy,
while undergoing an energy transition.
China needs to understand correctly
how it differs from the core interests of
other participants (mainly developed
countries) in the global energy governance framework. And, China needs to
appreciate the complexity of, and
potential changes in, its relations with
other participants, as these are closely
tied to economic development and the
pressures of controlling climate change.
3. China must clearly recognise that
energy security is the main goal of its
participation in global energy governance and the driver of its external
energy relations. It is impossible to
convince China in the short term that
external markets alone can ensure
678
W. Jigang and P. Webb