6.3.6 Adjusting the Powers
and Responsibilities of Coal
Mine Safety Management
Minimising safety risks is a key part of the
government’s macro-control. Safety management
of coal mines is special. The coal mines of many
large and medium-sized coal companies and
groups are owned by subsidiaries. The
state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission administers the rights of
investors in state-owned coal companies. Coal
mine safety management responsibilities in the
Production Safety Law conflict with those in the
Company Law. According to the latter, the main
responsibility of shareholders is not safety management. The direction of coal industry reform is
towards marketisation and legalisation. Another
priority for coal industry reform is to align the
Production Safety Law with market law. Current
legislation on the powers and responsibilities of
coal mine safety management are not consistent
with China’s ongoing state-owned capital management system reform. In the long term, the
powers and responsibilities of coal mine safety
management need to be redefined. They could be
adjusted moderately to alleviate investors’
administrative management burden.
6.3.7 The Role of State-Owned Capital
Is to Optimise the Coal
Industry
Improving the state-owned capital management
system is a priority for China’s reform of
state-owned enterprises. Many state-owned coal
companies are now defined as state-owned capital investment corporations. This redefines asset
management as capital management, and industrial asset operation as industrial capital investment. These changes will have a significant
impact on the future structure of the coal industry, leading to two major reform tasks: standardisation of corporate governance and the
introduction of mixed ownership. Adjusting the
powers and responsibilities of coal mine safety
management is one way to standardise corporate
governance. Mixed ownership reform and the
flow of state-owned capital are complementary.
In the future, the state-owned capital of
state-owned coal companies will optimise and
improve coal industry operations.
6.4 Policy Suggestions for Deepening
Coal Industry Reform
6.4.1 Optimise Macro-Regulatory
Institutions
China’s reform of the coal industry relies on
effecting change in government functions. Only
through administrative streamlining and decentralisation, a combination of deregulation and
regulation, and service optimisation, can government authorities achieve the institutional objectives of reform. Government functions should
focus on guidance and services, which are closely
related to the basic functions of the coal market.
Guidance can be used in two ways: to guide
government regulators on the strategic frontline
of ensuring economic growth; and to help optimise the coal market by constraining and stimulating the regulatory system. The market, which
is a bridge between upstream and downstream,
should guide the transformation of coal production and consumption.
Service has several purposes: to help government regulators integrate decision-making
and public services into a macro-control platform for the coal market; to facilitate
macro-control by the central government; and to
ensure that production and consumption develop
harmoniously and that circulated resources are
shared.
Related policy suggestions include: (i) harnessing the promising opportunities unearthed by
the reform of party and state institutions to reorganise government’s macro-regulatory authority
and optimise its functions; (ii) enhancing the
government’s macro-strategies for the energy
industry (including coal), and the functions of
monitoring, forecasting, early warning and
law-related regulation of the coal market; and
(iii) reducing administrative micro-management.
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S. Yaodong and A. Gillespie
and Responsibilities of Coal
Mine Safety Management
Minimising safety risks is a key part of the
government’s macro-control. Safety management
of coal mines is special. The coal mines of many
large and medium-sized coal companies and
groups are owned by subsidiaries. The
state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission administers the rights of
investors in state-owned coal companies. Coal
mine safety management responsibilities in the
Production Safety Law conflict with those in the
Company Law. According to the latter, the main
responsibility of shareholders is not safety management. The direction of coal industry reform is
towards marketisation and legalisation. Another
priority for coal industry reform is to align the
Production Safety Law with market law. Current
legislation on the powers and responsibilities of
coal mine safety management are not consistent
with China’s ongoing state-owned capital management system reform. In the long term, the
powers and responsibilities of coal mine safety
management need to be redefined. They could be
adjusted moderately to alleviate investors’
administrative management burden.
6.3.7 The Role of State-Owned Capital
Is to Optimise the Coal
Industry
Improving the state-owned capital management
system is a priority for China’s reform of
state-owned enterprises. Many state-owned coal
companies are now defined as state-owned capital investment corporations. This redefines asset
management as capital management, and industrial asset operation as industrial capital investment. These changes will have a significant
impact on the future structure of the coal industry, leading to two major reform tasks: standardisation of corporate governance and the
introduction of mixed ownership. Adjusting the
powers and responsibilities of coal mine safety
management is one way to standardise corporate
governance. Mixed ownership reform and the
flow of state-owned capital are complementary.
In the future, the state-owned capital of
state-owned coal companies will optimise and
improve coal industry operations.
6.4 Policy Suggestions for Deepening
Coal Industry Reform
6.4.1 Optimise Macro-Regulatory
Institutions
China’s reform of the coal industry relies on
effecting change in government functions. Only
through administrative streamlining and decentralisation, a combination of deregulation and
regulation, and service optimisation, can government authorities achieve the institutional objectives of reform. Government functions should
focus on guidance and services, which are closely
related to the basic functions of the coal market.
Guidance can be used in two ways: to guide
government regulators on the strategic frontline
of ensuring economic growth; and to help optimise the coal market by constraining and stimulating the regulatory system. The market, which
is a bridge between upstream and downstream,
should guide the transformation of coal production and consumption.
Service has several purposes: to help government regulators integrate decision-making
and public services into a macro-control platform for the coal market; to facilitate
macro-control by the central government; and to
ensure that production and consumption develop
harmoniously and that circulated resources are
shared.
Related policy suggestions include: (i) harnessing the promising opportunities unearthed by
the reform of party and state institutions to reorganise government’s macro-regulatory authority
and optimise its functions; (ii) enhancing the
government’s macro-strategies for the energy
industry (including coal), and the functions of
monitoring, forecasting, early warning and
law-related regulation of the coal market; and
(iii) reducing administrative micro-management.
486
S. Yaodong and A. Gillespie