Strategic Action Plan on Energy Development
(2014–20), national energy strategies are unclear.
Local and national energy strategies are not
coordinated, and the guidance provided by
energy strategies lacks relevance for energy
plans. In addition, there is no strategy implementation mechanism or policy support.
The energy revolution needs clear goals and a
roadmap, coordinated safety measures and relatively stable policies. The energy revolution and
medium- and long-term energy strategies are
carried out by means of dynamic economic and
social development and synchronised reforms,
including those of government, finance, science
and technology. Some of these dynamically
developing reforms are interdependent.
(5) The energy reserve and emergency
response systems need to be updated
China’s energy reserves commonly suffer from
several problems, exemplified by oil and coal
reserves. These problems are: (i) a powerful
legislative guarantee for strategic reserves is
lacking—there is no clear legal definition of the
boundary between government and market, or of
the rights and liabilities of the various energy
industry participants, regarding levels of reserves
of different energy sources; (ii) an incomplete
administration system—the storage and release
conditions for energy reserves need to be
improved: price is the key, but the necessary
supervisory system is absent; (iii) the method for
holding reserves needs to be improved—static
energy reserves result in excessively high costs
and relatively limited reserve size; (iv) poor
levels of IT functionality in energy reserve
administration, leading to insufficient disclosure
of information, especially on reserve capacity
and volume; (v) inefficient reserve storage facilities—the logistics of energy reserves still need
to be improved; and (vi) physical reserves are
concentrated in large central energy enterprises,
while commercial oil and gas reserves are
growing slowly.
China’s energy emergency management is
designed mainly for domestic, local and
short-lived, unexpected energy incidents; it
would have great difficulty responding effectively to global energy events that had wider or
deeper implications. First, China’s energy emergency management is limited to guaranteeing
supply in the case of an emergency. Second,
China’s energy emergency management is
decentralised and lacks consistent national management and coordination. It is very much set up
for emergencies involving a specific energy
source or a particular part of the energy value
chain and is inadequate for responding to global
energy events that involve several energy sources. Moreover, the geographical scope of energy
emergency response is limited to China, and no
international energy emergency management has
been set up. Third, the development of an energy
emergency material guarantee system is inadequate. China’s oil reserves still have some way to
go to meet the International Energy Agency’s
90-day oil stock security criteria, and the size and
capacity of the power grids and the natural gas
pipeline network do not meet emergency demand
levels. Fourth, energy reserve and emergencyrelated legislation is still lacking, and related
systems need to be improved, including the use
and storage of energy reserves, supervision,
evaluation, IT-based administration and funding
systems.
China’s energy reserve and emergency management suffer from poor information disclosure
and public engagement. As there is no information disclosure system, participants in the energy
sector have difficulty obtaining information in a
timely fashion. Since commercial energy
reserves are not mandatory and a reasonable
pricing mechanism for energy reserves has yet to
be established, private capital is not motivated to
enter the field.
3.3 Energy Market and Circulation
System
3.3.1 Current Developments
China’s energy market and circulation system are
still very much a monopoly. This is rooted in the
energy system and institutions and is reflected in
network facilities. China’s energy market system
434
S. Yaodong and A. Gillespie
(2014–20), national energy strategies are unclear.
Local and national energy strategies are not
coordinated, and the guidance provided by
energy strategies lacks relevance for energy
plans. In addition, there is no strategy implementation mechanism or policy support.
The energy revolution needs clear goals and a
roadmap, coordinated safety measures and relatively stable policies. The energy revolution and
medium- and long-term energy strategies are
carried out by means of dynamic economic and
social development and synchronised reforms,
including those of government, finance, science
and technology. Some of these dynamically
developing reforms are interdependent.
(5) The energy reserve and emergency
response systems need to be updated
China’s energy reserves commonly suffer from
several problems, exemplified by oil and coal
reserves. These problems are: (i) a powerful
legislative guarantee for strategic reserves is
lacking—there is no clear legal definition of the
boundary between government and market, or of
the rights and liabilities of the various energy
industry participants, regarding levels of reserves
of different energy sources; (ii) an incomplete
administration system—the storage and release
conditions for energy reserves need to be
improved: price is the key, but the necessary
supervisory system is absent; (iii) the method for
holding reserves needs to be improved—static
energy reserves result in excessively high costs
and relatively limited reserve size; (iv) poor
levels of IT functionality in energy reserve
administration, leading to insufficient disclosure
of information, especially on reserve capacity
and volume; (v) inefficient reserve storage facilities—the logistics of energy reserves still need
to be improved; and (vi) physical reserves are
concentrated in large central energy enterprises,
while commercial oil and gas reserves are
growing slowly.
China’s energy emergency management is
designed mainly for domestic, local and
short-lived, unexpected energy incidents; it
would have great difficulty responding effectively to global energy events that had wider or
deeper implications. First, China’s energy emergency management is limited to guaranteeing
supply in the case of an emergency. Second,
China’s energy emergency management is
decentralised and lacks consistent national management and coordination. It is very much set up
for emergencies involving a specific energy
source or a particular part of the energy value
chain and is inadequate for responding to global
energy events that involve several energy sources. Moreover, the geographical scope of energy
emergency response is limited to China, and no
international energy emergency management has
been set up. Third, the development of an energy
emergency material guarantee system is inadequate. China’s oil reserves still have some way to
go to meet the International Energy Agency’s
90-day oil stock security criteria, and the size and
capacity of the power grids and the natural gas
pipeline network do not meet emergency demand
levels. Fourth, energy reserve and emergencyrelated legislation is still lacking, and related
systems need to be improved, including the use
and storage of energy reserves, supervision,
evaluation, IT-based administration and funding
systems.
China’s energy reserve and emergency management suffer from poor information disclosure
and public engagement. As there is no information disclosure system, participants in the energy
sector have difficulty obtaining information in a
timely fashion. Since commercial energy
reserves are not mandatory and a reasonable
pricing mechanism for energy reserves has yet to
be established, private capital is not motivated to
enter the field.
3.3 Energy Market and Circulation
System
3.3.1 Current Developments
China’s energy market and circulation system are
still very much a monopoly. This is rooted in the
energy system and institutions and is reflected in
network facilities. China’s energy market system
434
S. Yaodong and A. Gillespie