snow disaster in south China, conflicts between
the coal and power sectors, and regional oil and
gas shortages.
3.2.2 Analysis of Existing Problems
China’s existing administrative system lacks
consistency and the level is low. Problems such
as decentralised administration, unclear rights
and liabilities, and overlapping functions remain.
Administrative coordination between various
departments regarding strategy, planning and
policy is poor. The culture of putting approval
ahead of public service has not fundamentally
changed. In addition, the management of
energy reserves and emergencies lacks public
engagement.
(1) Inconsistent administrative oversight and
no independent high-level institution
There are many agencies that have some
responsibility for energy administration, but they
lack a centralised organisation. In many places
they suffer from overlapping remits, where different departments have joint administrative
responsibility for specific areas, which can be
highly problematic. The National Energy Commission was established to improve energy
strategy and overall coordination, but its role has
been restricted by the way its organisational
structure was set up, and it does not coordinate the
administrative activities of the various departments effectively. The National Energy Administration (NEA) is responsible for overall energy
planning and development, as well as for supervising the energy industry as a whole, but the
administrative functions for specific energy sectors are decentralised to the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology, the Ministry of
Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the
State Administration of Work Safety, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Commerce. This administrative approach
of “divided policies from various sources” not
only increases the cost of coordination, but also
results in unclear responsibilities, conflicting
authorities and inefficient administration.
Definitions of rights and liabilities in the
energy sector are unclear, both horizontally (between departments of the central government)
and vertically (between central and local government). The first problem is that China’s
energy-related administrative institutions perform their functions in accordance with the Plan
on Defining Functions, Internal Organisation and
Staffing, and therefore the power granted to them
is not based on law. The absence of a fundamental energy law means that the rights and
liabilities of energy administrative institutions
also lack a legal basis. The next difficulty is that
the body framing energy regulation is a subsidiary of the institution that administers those
same regulations, and this non-independent
approach, which bundles administration and
regulation together, hinders effective energy law
enforcement. Another problem is that local
energy regulation is vulnerable to pressure from
local government. Finally, the administrative
systems in various energy sectors have their own
specific features (except for oil and gas). In those
energy sectors that adopt a hierarchical administrative approach, there is a clear lack of coordination between central and local administrative
institutions.
The NEA is a vice-ministerial department. It
therefore ranks below other resource administration departments that are ministries, such as
the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Land and Resources. For some major
energy decisions, the NEA still needs to seek
approval from the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC). All this makes it
difficult for the NEA to play its coordinating role
effectively. A typical example where overall
oversight is needed is regulating energy volume
and energy prices. The NEA is mainly responsible for energy volume and the NDRC controls
the administration of energy pricing, and this
separation does not sit well with the strong link
between the two areas. Inevitably, conflicts arise
between the measures for adjusting volume and
those for adjusting price, and as a result the
policies introduced by both departments tend not
to deliver good results.
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the coal and power sectors, and regional oil and
gas shortages.
3.2.2 Analysis of Existing Problems
China’s existing administrative system lacks
consistency and the level is low. Problems such
as decentralised administration, unclear rights
and liabilities, and overlapping functions remain.
Administrative coordination between various
departments regarding strategy, planning and
policy is poor. The culture of putting approval
ahead of public service has not fundamentally
changed. In addition, the management of
energy reserves and emergencies lacks public
engagement.
(1) Inconsistent administrative oversight and
no independent high-level institution
There are many agencies that have some
responsibility for energy administration, but they
lack a centralised organisation. In many places
they suffer from overlapping remits, where different departments have joint administrative
responsibility for specific areas, which can be
highly problematic. The National Energy Commission was established to improve energy
strategy and overall coordination, but its role has
been restricted by the way its organisational
structure was set up, and it does not coordinate the
administrative activities of the various departments effectively. The National Energy Administration (NEA) is responsible for overall energy
planning and development, as well as for supervising the energy industry as a whole, but the
administrative functions for specific energy sectors are decentralised to the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology, the Ministry of
Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the
State Administration of Work Safety, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Commerce. This administrative approach
of “divided policies from various sources” not
only increases the cost of coordination, but also
results in unclear responsibilities, conflicting
authorities and inefficient administration.
Definitions of rights and liabilities in the
energy sector are unclear, both horizontally (between departments of the central government)
and vertically (between central and local government). The first problem is that China’s
energy-related administrative institutions perform their functions in accordance with the Plan
on Defining Functions, Internal Organisation and
Staffing, and therefore the power granted to them
is not based on law. The absence of a fundamental energy law means that the rights and
liabilities of energy administrative institutions
also lack a legal basis. The next difficulty is that
the body framing energy regulation is a subsidiary of the institution that administers those
same regulations, and this non-independent
approach, which bundles administration and
regulation together, hinders effective energy law
enforcement. Another problem is that local
energy regulation is vulnerable to pressure from
local government. Finally, the administrative
systems in various energy sectors have their own
specific features (except for oil and gas). In those
energy sectors that adopt a hierarchical administrative approach, there is a clear lack of coordination between central and local administrative
institutions.
The NEA is a vice-ministerial department. It
therefore ranks below other resource administration departments that are ministries, such as
the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Land and Resources. For some major
energy decisions, the NEA still needs to seek
approval from the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC). All this makes it
difficult for the NEA to play its coordinating role
effectively. A typical example where overall
oversight is needed is regulating energy volume
and energy prices. The NEA is mainly responsible for energy volume and the NDRC controls
the administration of energy pricing, and this
separation does not sit well with the strong link
between the two areas. Inevitably, conflicts arise
between the measures for adjusting volume and
those for adjusting price, and as a result the
policies introduced by both departments tend not
to deliver good results.
432
S. Yaodong and A. Gillespie