352
M. Svrˇ cek
a new feature—to be formulated by a new axiom—lies in the fact that such things
do not happen; all formulations of quantum mechanics hitherto given do not suffice
to exclude them. We are unable to make a clock with a hand which does not always
point to a definite figure on the dial. This is a well-known fact, but a fact of which
present theory gives no sufficient account.”
The suggested axiom above, is in our case relevant to describe quantum jumps
between the isolated and individual characteristics of the many-body system, and
provides a response to the request of Sutcliffe and Woolley. There is, however, one
main obstacle regarding the definition of an isolated system. Every finite isolated
system is subjectively defined and since transitions between isolated and individual
systems are in principle immeasurable, one must necessarily exclude the subjectivity of the observer. As a consequence the isolated system must be identical with
the whole Universe, with the individual systems then identical with its fragmentations. We have arrived at the problem of fragmentation and wholeness, cf. how
it was framed by Bohm in the 3rd statement quoted in Sect. 4. The second complementarity, embracing the whole Universe, is the megascopic mirror of the first
Bohr microscopic complementarity. We have just touched ancient knowledge, i.e.
presenting the Universe as a mosaic where the smallest one resembles the Greatest
One.
The new axiom presented here is necessary for the justification of quantum jumps
of the Universe. From its state of total wholeness to its total fragmented states and
vice versa, it certainly goes beyond the scope of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Yet it neither contradicts nor denies this interpretation, but rather appears to be its
natural extension. Then again, acceptance of this axiom implies the end of Everett’s
MWI (discussed in Sect. 7). The MWI was promoted as a deterministic theory for the
physical Universe and attempted to explain why a world appears to be indeterministic
for human observers. The basic stipulation of MWI was to represent the whole
Universe by a deterministic wave function. Although still popular, many physicists
now have doubts about the completeness of such a description. Vaidman comments
on this problem, i.e. whether the wave function is or not sufficient, in the following
way [135]: “As mentioned above, the gap between the mathematical formalism of the
MWI, namely the wave function of the Universe, and our experience is larger than
in other interpretations. This is the reason why many thought that the ontology of
the wave function is not enough. Bell 1987 (p.201) felt that either the wave function
is not everything, or it is not right. He was looking for a theory with local “beables”
[136].”
Surely, the ontology of the wave function is not enough. It does not mean that it is
not right, since no known experiment is in conflict with it. In fact the wave function
is an incomplete description of the Universe. Most probably the protagonists of the
MWI never gave a thought to the ontological problem of the B-O approximation, and
therefore do not realize that their wave function is unable to describe real objects like
molecules or solids, but only the subjectively defined isolated objects of different
ontological meanings, where, according to the language of Cafiero and Adamowitz,
instead of individual molecules one has only molecular atoms or atomic molecules,
and instead of crystals only crystalline atoms or atomic crystals.
M. Svrˇ cek
a new feature—to be formulated by a new axiom—lies in the fact that such things
do not happen; all formulations of quantum mechanics hitherto given do not suffice
to exclude them. We are unable to make a clock with a hand which does not always
point to a definite figure on the dial. This is a well-known fact, but a fact of which
present theory gives no sufficient account.”
The suggested axiom above, is in our case relevant to describe quantum jumps
between the isolated and individual characteristics of the many-body system, and
provides a response to the request of Sutcliffe and Woolley. There is, however, one
main obstacle regarding the definition of an isolated system. Every finite isolated
system is subjectively defined and since transitions between isolated and individual
systems are in principle immeasurable, one must necessarily exclude the subjectivity of the observer. As a consequence the isolated system must be identical with
the whole Universe, with the individual systems then identical with its fragmentations. We have arrived at the problem of fragmentation and wholeness, cf. how
it was framed by Bohm in the 3rd statement quoted in Sect. 4. The second complementarity, embracing the whole Universe, is the megascopic mirror of the first
Bohr microscopic complementarity. We have just touched ancient knowledge, i.e.
presenting the Universe as a mosaic where the smallest one resembles the Greatest
One.
The new axiom presented here is necessary for the justification of quantum jumps
of the Universe. From its state of total wholeness to its total fragmented states and
vice versa, it certainly goes beyond the scope of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Yet it neither contradicts nor denies this interpretation, but rather appears to be its
natural extension. Then again, acceptance of this axiom implies the end of Everett’s
MWI (discussed in Sect. 7). The MWI was promoted as a deterministic theory for the
physical Universe and attempted to explain why a world appears to be indeterministic
for human observers. The basic stipulation of MWI was to represent the whole
Universe by a deterministic wave function. Although still popular, many physicists
now have doubts about the completeness of such a description. Vaidman comments
on this problem, i.e. whether the wave function is or not sufficient, in the following
way [135]: “As mentioned above, the gap between the mathematical formalism of the
MWI, namely the wave function of the Universe, and our experience is larger than
in other interpretations. This is the reason why many thought that the ontology of
the wave function is not enough. Bell 1987 (p.201) felt that either the wave function
is not everything, or it is not right. He was looking for a theory with local “beables”
[136].”
Surely, the ontology of the wave function is not enough. It does not mean that it is
not right, since no known experiment is in conflict with it. In fact the wave function
is an incomplete description of the Universe. Most probably the protagonists of the
MWI never gave a thought to the ontological problem of the B-O approximation, and
therefore do not realize that their wave function is unable to describe real objects like
molecules or solids, but only the subjectively defined isolated objects of different
ontological meanings, where, according to the language of Cafiero and Adamowitz,
instead of individual molecules one has only molecular atoms or atomic molecules,
and instead of crystals only crystalline atoms or atomic crystals.