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M. Svrˇ cek
adequate determinism as something indeterministic in principle, but unlike the laws
of microscopic physics, it must not be random. Doyle thinks that a macroscopic
ensemble, which statistically restrains randomness, fulfils this requirement. But our
decisions are not statistical in character, since we often have to decide in a binary
style such as “either—or”. Moreover, our decisions have teleological traits, while the
fortitude of macroscopic physics has nothing to do with it. One might think that Doyle
is not aware of the incompleteness of quantum theory and therefore tries to explain
free will at any cost, by only using the traditional understanding of quantum physics.
The issue of adequate determinism must be solved exclusively on the quantum level.
However, up till now, presently known interpretations of quantum theory are not
capable of dealing with phenomena, which are simultaneously non-deterministic
and non-random.
One notes that Compton’s discussion of the closeness between quantum indeterminism and randomness in free will finally did convince Popper, who originally
denied any influence of microphysical laws upon the psychological domain of free
will. Besides, the similarity of the two-stage models, used in Darwin theory and in
the concept of free will, caused a radical change of Popper’s attitude towards natural
selection, which he at first deemed to be a “tautology” making it unfalsifiable. In his
1977 Darwin Lecture, Darwin College Cambridge, Popper confessed his change of
mind [59] by stating: “The selection of a kind of behavior out of a randomly offered
repertoire may be an act of choice, even an act of free will. I am an indeterminist;
and in discussing indeterminism I have often regretfully pointed out that quantum
indeterminacy does not seem to help us; for the amplification of something like, say,
radioactive disintegration processes would not lead to human action or even animal
action, but only to random movements. This is now the leading two-stage model of
free will. I have changed my mind on this issue. A choice process may be a selection
process, and the selection may be from some repertoire of random events, without
being random in its turn. This seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of
our most vexing problems, and one by downward causation.”
This formulation anticipates the concept of unification of a single two-stage model
that holds both for Darwinism and free will. Eccles and Popper [60] formulate the
view as: “New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us
look for a moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by
quantum theoretical indeterminacy (including radiation effects). Accordingly, they
are also probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on
them there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate
mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas
and to free-will decisions, and similar things. That is to say, a range of possibilities
is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterised set of
proposals, as it were—of possibilities brought forward by the brain. On these there
then operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and
those possibilities which are not acceptable to the mind.”
Although one might, in such a way, achieve a unification of nature’s laws of
biology and psychology, there still remains a fundamental problem: There appears
a void or lack of a hitherto unravelled fundamental natural law in science in general
M. Svrˇ cek
adequate determinism as something indeterministic in principle, but unlike the laws
of microscopic physics, it must not be random. Doyle thinks that a macroscopic
ensemble, which statistically restrains randomness, fulfils this requirement. But our
decisions are not statistical in character, since we often have to decide in a binary
style such as “either—or”. Moreover, our decisions have teleological traits, while the
fortitude of macroscopic physics has nothing to do with it. One might think that Doyle
is not aware of the incompleteness of quantum theory and therefore tries to explain
free will at any cost, by only using the traditional understanding of quantum physics.
The issue of adequate determinism must be solved exclusively on the quantum level.
However, up till now, presently known interpretations of quantum theory are not
capable of dealing with phenomena, which are simultaneously non-deterministic
and non-random.
One notes that Compton’s discussion of the closeness between quantum indeterminism and randomness in free will finally did convince Popper, who originally
denied any influence of microphysical laws upon the psychological domain of free
will. Besides, the similarity of the two-stage models, used in Darwin theory and in
the concept of free will, caused a radical change of Popper’s attitude towards natural
selection, which he at first deemed to be a “tautology” making it unfalsifiable. In his
1977 Darwin Lecture, Darwin College Cambridge, Popper confessed his change of
mind [59] by stating: “The selection of a kind of behavior out of a randomly offered
repertoire may be an act of choice, even an act of free will. I am an indeterminist;
and in discussing indeterminism I have often regretfully pointed out that quantum
indeterminacy does not seem to help us; for the amplification of something like, say,
radioactive disintegration processes would not lead to human action or even animal
action, but only to random movements. This is now the leading two-stage model of
free will. I have changed my mind on this issue. A choice process may be a selection
process, and the selection may be from some repertoire of random events, without
being random in its turn. This seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of
our most vexing problems, and one by downward causation.”
This formulation anticipates the concept of unification of a single two-stage model
that holds both for Darwinism and free will. Eccles and Popper [60] formulate the
view as: “New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us
look for a moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by
quantum theoretical indeterminacy (including radiation effects). Accordingly, they
are also probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on
them there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate
mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas
and to free-will decisions, and similar things. That is to say, a range of possibilities
is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterised set of
proposals, as it were—of possibilities brought forward by the brain. On these there
then operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and
those possibilities which are not acceptable to the mind.”
Although one might, in such a way, achieve a unification of nature’s laws of
biology and psychology, there still remains a fundamental problem: There appears
a void or lack of a hitherto unravelled fundamental natural law in science in general