306
M. Svrˇ cek
philosophers and scientists on the topic of free will. He maintains that there prevails a
sceptical view regarding possible satisfactory free will explanations, which he calls
the “standard argument against free will” [53]: “The standard argument has two
parts. (1) If determinism is the case, the will is not free. We call this the Determinism
Objection. (2) If indeterminism and real chance exist, our will would not be in our
control. We could not be responsible for our actions if they are random. We call this
the Randomness Objection. Together, these objections can be combined as a single
Responsibility Objection, namely that no Free Will model has yet provided us an
intelligible account of the agent control needed for moral responsibility.”
From the standpoint of a historical retrospective analysis, it seems that only the
two-stage model could be a true candidate for the explanation of free will. This twostage model consists of two processes: the process of random alternatives followed by
the selection process of one choice. Doyle writes in his book that this idea appeared for
the first time in 1884 and that it was formulated by William James. As a psychologist
he felt no problem in denying determinism in the psychological domain of free will:
“The stronghold of the determinist argument is the antipathy to the idea of chance…
This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one of several things
may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance” [54].
It is interesting to note how physicists in general accepted the two-stage model.
The first reaction came from Poincaré, at the time when quantum indeterminism
had not yet arrived. Hence he does not refer to the laws of physics, concentrating
mostly on the role of our unconscious mind as a source of random combinations and
possibilities, but also on our conscious mind where the definite process of validation
occurs [55]: “It is certain that the combinations which present themselves to the mind
in a kind of sudden illumination after a somewhat prolonged period of unconscious
work are generally useful and fruitful combinations… All the combinations are
formed as a result of the automatic action of the subliminal ego, but those only
which are interesting find their way into the field of consciousness… A few only
are harmonious, and consequently at once useful and beautiful, and they will be
capable of affecting the geometrician’s special sensibility I have been speaking of;
which, once aroused, will direct our attention upon them, and will thus give them the
opportunity of becoming conscious… In the subliminal ego, on the contrary, there
reigns what I would call liberty, if one could give this name to the mere absence of
discipline and to disorder born of chance.”
The physicist Sir Roger Penrose shares the synoptical view of the two-stage model
with Poincaré, particularly as concerns the role of our unconscious and conscious
minds [56]: “In relation to this, the question of what constitutes genuine originality
should be raised. It seems to me that there are two factors involved, namely a ‘puttingup’ and a ‘shooting-down’ process. I imagine that the putting-up could be largely
unconscious and the shooting-down largely conscious. Without an effective puttingup process, one would have no new ideas at all. But, just by itself, this procedure
would have little value. One needs an effective procedure for forming judgements,
so that only those ideas with a reasonable chance of success will survive. In dreams,
for example, unusual ideas may easily come to mind, but only very rarely do they
survive the critical judgements of the wakeful consciousness. In my opinion, it is the
M. Svrˇ cek
philosophers and scientists on the topic of free will. He maintains that there prevails a
sceptical view regarding possible satisfactory free will explanations, which he calls
the “standard argument against free will” [53]: “The standard argument has two
parts. (1) If determinism is the case, the will is not free. We call this the Determinism
Objection. (2) If indeterminism and real chance exist, our will would not be in our
control. We could not be responsible for our actions if they are random. We call this
the Randomness Objection. Together, these objections can be combined as a single
Responsibility Objection, namely that no Free Will model has yet provided us an
intelligible account of the agent control needed for moral responsibility.”
From the standpoint of a historical retrospective analysis, it seems that only the
two-stage model could be a true candidate for the explanation of free will. This twostage model consists of two processes: the process of random alternatives followed by
the selection process of one choice. Doyle writes in his book that this idea appeared for
the first time in 1884 and that it was formulated by William James. As a psychologist
he felt no problem in denying determinism in the psychological domain of free will:
“The stronghold of the determinist argument is the antipathy to the idea of chance…
This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one of several things
may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance” [54].
It is interesting to note how physicists in general accepted the two-stage model.
The first reaction came from Poincaré, at the time when quantum indeterminism
had not yet arrived. Hence he does not refer to the laws of physics, concentrating
mostly on the role of our unconscious mind as a source of random combinations and
possibilities, but also on our conscious mind where the definite process of validation
occurs [55]: “It is certain that the combinations which present themselves to the mind
in a kind of sudden illumination after a somewhat prolonged period of unconscious
work are generally useful and fruitful combinations… All the combinations are
formed as a result of the automatic action of the subliminal ego, but those only
which are interesting find their way into the field of consciousness… A few only
are harmonious, and consequently at once useful and beautiful, and they will be
capable of affecting the geometrician’s special sensibility I have been speaking of;
which, once aroused, will direct our attention upon them, and will thus give them the
opportunity of becoming conscious… In the subliminal ego, on the contrary, there
reigns what I would call liberty, if one could give this name to the mere absence of
discipline and to disorder born of chance.”
The physicist Sir Roger Penrose shares the synoptical view of the two-stage model
with Poincaré, particularly as concerns the role of our unconscious and conscious
minds [56]: “In relation to this, the question of what constitutes genuine originality
should be raised. It seems to me that there are two factors involved, namely a ‘puttingup’ and a ‘shooting-down’ process. I imagine that the putting-up could be largely
unconscious and the shooting-down largely conscious. Without an effective puttingup process, one would have no new ideas at all. But, just by itself, this procedure
would have little value. One needs an effective procedure for forming judgements,
so that only those ideas with a reasonable chance of success will survive. In dreams,
for example, unusual ideas may easily come to mind, but only very rarely do they
survive the critical judgements of the wakeful consciousness. In my opinion, it is the