304
M. Svrˇ cek
Only a few biologists seem at present to be aware of the true meaning of teleology, at least to the extent that was understood and expressed by Darwin. Today
the majority of them appears quite confused. We can find many absurd propositions,
such as “artificial selection is teleological and natural selection is not, since in the
latter there is no intentional choice.” Teleology is defined as downward causation or
the final cause, and is quite independent of the fact whether there are some intentions
behind or not. As examples one might mention statements of two prominent biologists: (a) the famous evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr, although introducing a more
explicit terminology, e.g. teleonomic processes as those owing its goal-directedness
to the influence of an evolved program, expressed [49]: “adaptedness… is an a posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking”, (b) Madrell [50]: “the proper but
cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation may be substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements for the sake of saving space, but this
should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from
mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained
by natural selection.” One might wonder how much these attitudes of teleology of
contemporary biologists really agree with Darwin’s original view.
The opinions and attitudes of most physicists regarding teleology are both negative
and ignorant. In contrast Bohm (cf. the first objection mentioned in Sect. 4) warns us
that disrespecting teleological principles prevent the construction of a full quantum
theory. What is most surprising indeed, is that the teleology problem appeared for
the first time already in classical physics. For instance Maxwell became immediately
aware of it, when he studied the work of Boussinesq, Cournot, and St Venant dealing with the solution of hydrodynamic equations. Maxwell was fascinated by the
occurrence of singular points leading to complete unpredictability of future states.
On 26 February 1879, he wrote a letter to Charles Darwin’s half-cousin Francis
Galton [51]: “Do you take any interest in Fixed Fate, Free Will etc. If so Boussinesq
[of hydrodynamic reputation] ‘Conciliation du véritable déterminisme mécanique
avec l’existence de la vie et de la liberté morale’ (Paris 1878) does the whole business
by the theory of singular solutions of the differential equations of motion… There
are certain cases in which a material system, when it comes to a phase in which the
particular path which it is describing coincides with the envelope of all such paths
may either continue in the particular path or take to the envelope (which in these cases
is also a possible path) and which course it takes is not determined by the forces of the
system (which are the same for both cases) but when the bifurcation of path occurs,
the system, ipso facto, invokes some determining principle which is extra physical
(but not extra natural) to determine which of the two paths it is to follow. When it is
on the enveloping path it may at any instant, at its own sweet will, without exerting
any force or spending any energy, go off along that one of the particular paths which
happens to coincide with the actual condition of the system at that instant… But I
think Boussinesq’s method is a very powerful one against metaphysical arguments
about cause and effect and much better than the insinuation that there is something
loose about the laws of nature, not of sensible magnitude but enough to bring her
round in time.”
M. Svrˇ cek
Only a few biologists seem at present to be aware of the true meaning of teleology, at least to the extent that was understood and expressed by Darwin. Today
the majority of them appears quite confused. We can find many absurd propositions,
such as “artificial selection is teleological and natural selection is not, since in the
latter there is no intentional choice.” Teleology is defined as downward causation or
the final cause, and is quite independent of the fact whether there are some intentions
behind or not. As examples one might mention statements of two prominent biologists: (a) the famous evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr, although introducing a more
explicit terminology, e.g. teleonomic processes as those owing its goal-directedness
to the influence of an evolved program, expressed [49]: “adaptedness… is an a posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking”, (b) Madrell [50]: “the proper but
cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation may be substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements for the sake of saving space, but this
should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from
mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained
by natural selection.” One might wonder how much these attitudes of teleology of
contemporary biologists really agree with Darwin’s original view.
The opinions and attitudes of most physicists regarding teleology are both negative
and ignorant. In contrast Bohm (cf. the first objection mentioned in Sect. 4) warns us
that disrespecting teleological principles prevent the construction of a full quantum
theory. What is most surprising indeed, is that the teleology problem appeared for
the first time already in classical physics. For instance Maxwell became immediately
aware of it, when he studied the work of Boussinesq, Cournot, and St Venant dealing with the solution of hydrodynamic equations. Maxwell was fascinated by the
occurrence of singular points leading to complete unpredictability of future states.
On 26 February 1879, he wrote a letter to Charles Darwin’s half-cousin Francis
Galton [51]: “Do you take any interest in Fixed Fate, Free Will etc. If so Boussinesq
[of hydrodynamic reputation] ‘Conciliation du véritable déterminisme mécanique
avec l’existence de la vie et de la liberté morale’ (Paris 1878) does the whole business
by the theory of singular solutions of the differential equations of motion… There
are certain cases in which a material system, when it comes to a phase in which the
particular path which it is describing coincides with the envelope of all such paths
may either continue in the particular path or take to the envelope (which in these cases
is also a possible path) and which course it takes is not determined by the forces of the
system (which are the same for both cases) but when the bifurcation of path occurs,
the system, ipso facto, invokes some determining principle which is extra physical
(but not extra natural) to determine which of the two paths it is to follow. When it is
on the enveloping path it may at any instant, at its own sweet will, without exerting
any force or spending any energy, go off along that one of the particular paths which
happens to coincide with the actual condition of the system at that instant… But I
think Boussinesq’s method is a very powerful one against metaphysical arguments
about cause and effect and much better than the insinuation that there is something
loose about the laws of nature, not of sensible magnitude but enough to bring her
round in time.”