296
M. Svrˇ cek
are also somewhat vague and require classical physics to be assumed. For those who
are satisfied with epistemology, the decoherent histories approach admirably ties
down any ambiguity or vagueness. It may be used to recover classical physics. Those
who would like to see an ontological model of the world must look elsewhere. Neither
many-world nor many-minds provide such models. The idea that the mind causes
collapse does but the model is problematic. Bohm’s interpretation does seem to work
although it is rather awkward, especially in the context of quantum field theory. The
best hope at the moment for an ontological theory is that the world’s state collapses
according to some fixed set of consistent histories. However, no clear criterion has
emerged for the appropriate set of histories. Finally, there are approaches which
involve not interpretation of quantum mechanics but modification. These approaches
have not been considered here. The most successful of these is the stochastic scheme
of ‘GRW’ (this scheme was put in a very nice form by Bell) although it is not without
its problems. Several other attempts have involved introducing non-linear terms in
the Schrödinger equation but none of these seems to work.”
Schreiber then ends with his final anticipation—what should be done, but it never
was: “Final word: Quantum mechanics is a theory lacking an ontological picture of
the world. The search for such an ontology has been long, hard and appallingly haphazard. It is time that the entire programme was defined and analysed in a systematic
and uniform mathematical way. Strange as this idea may seem, I am convinced that
it is possible. When this programme is completed, theoretical physicists will finally
be able to put the cat out and take a well-earned rest.”
For Norton as well as for Schreiber, none of the present known interpretations is
fully acceptable [18]: “My own feeling is that none of these responses is satisfactory… However, if there are new physical laws that would resolve the measurement
problem, we can be pretty sure that they are quite exotic and not produced by a small
adjustment in our existing theories. For, if these small adjustments are there to be
found, eight decades of work by many of the brightest minds in quantum physics has
failed to find them. Nonetheless, this “new, as yet unknown, physics” response is the
one that all the other responses have to beat. Ask each of them, is this response more
plausible than the “new physics” response? In each case, I answer no.”
The two aforementioned conclusions suggest that we have to take on an apparent
challenge searching for a radical new ontology and a new physics, based on deductive reasoning and rigorous mathematics. As we will show in this paper, this “new
physics” imparts neither some new artificial topological spaces beyond the Hilbert
space, nor some speculative multidimensional superstring proposals. All we need,
should be to find nature’s hidden laws, which have not yet been discovered and not
yet revealed.
6 What Is the Copenhagen Interpretation?
The Copenhagen interpretation reflects a standard reference of our philosophical and
physical views of quantum theory, yet there are remarkable differences of perspectives regarding the perception and understandings between the actual founders of
M. Svrˇ cek
are also somewhat vague and require classical physics to be assumed. For those who
are satisfied with epistemology, the decoherent histories approach admirably ties
down any ambiguity or vagueness. It may be used to recover classical physics. Those
who would like to see an ontological model of the world must look elsewhere. Neither
many-world nor many-minds provide such models. The idea that the mind causes
collapse does but the model is problematic. Bohm’s interpretation does seem to work
although it is rather awkward, especially in the context of quantum field theory. The
best hope at the moment for an ontological theory is that the world’s state collapses
according to some fixed set of consistent histories. However, no clear criterion has
emerged for the appropriate set of histories. Finally, there are approaches which
involve not interpretation of quantum mechanics but modification. These approaches
have not been considered here. The most successful of these is the stochastic scheme
of ‘GRW’ (this scheme was put in a very nice form by Bell) although it is not without
its problems. Several other attempts have involved introducing non-linear terms in
the Schrödinger equation but none of these seems to work.”
Schreiber then ends with his final anticipation—what should be done, but it never
was: “Final word: Quantum mechanics is a theory lacking an ontological picture of
the world. The search for such an ontology has been long, hard and appallingly haphazard. It is time that the entire programme was defined and analysed in a systematic
and uniform mathematical way. Strange as this idea may seem, I am convinced that
it is possible. When this programme is completed, theoretical physicists will finally
be able to put the cat out and take a well-earned rest.”
For Norton as well as for Schreiber, none of the present known interpretations is
fully acceptable [18]: “My own feeling is that none of these responses is satisfactory… However, if there are new physical laws that would resolve the measurement
problem, we can be pretty sure that they are quite exotic and not produced by a small
adjustment in our existing theories. For, if these small adjustments are there to be
found, eight decades of work by many of the brightest minds in quantum physics has
failed to find them. Nonetheless, this “new, as yet unknown, physics” response is the
one that all the other responses have to beat. Ask each of them, is this response more
plausible than the “new physics” response? In each case, I answer no.”
The two aforementioned conclusions suggest that we have to take on an apparent
challenge searching for a radical new ontology and a new physics, based on deductive reasoning and rigorous mathematics. As we will show in this paper, this “new
physics” imparts neither some new artificial topological spaces beyond the Hilbert
space, nor some speculative multidimensional superstring proposals. All we need,
should be to find nature’s hidden laws, which have not yet been discovered and not
yet revealed.
6 What Is the Copenhagen Interpretation?
The Copenhagen interpretation reflects a standard reference of our philosophical and
physical views of quantum theory, yet there are remarkable differences of perspectives regarding the perception and understandings between the actual founders of