66
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
HNoMS Helge Ingstad. These vessels had been observed visually and tracked in the
bridge system. Of those present, only the helmsman had identified the lights ahead on
starboard side as belonging to a moving vessel. However, he did not disseminate this
observation; he assumed that the OOW and the rest of the bridge team were aware
of it being a vessel, since it should be observable on both AIS and radar. A minute
before the collision, the pilot on board Sola TS made a direct call on VHF requesting
HNoMS Helge Ingstad to alter course to starboard. The OOWs understanding was
that there was not enough room to pass on the shore side of the “ object” and assumed
that the call was from one of the three northbound vessels approaching on port side.
He responded by saying that they could not turn to starboard. By the time the OOW
understood that the “ object” giving off light was moving and on direct course to collide it was too late, and at 04:01:15, HNoMS Helge Ingstad collided with the tanker
Sola TS ( AIBN, 2019).
In hindsight it is easy to see that the cues and the weak signals of danger were
there: the AIS signal, the radar echo, information on VHF and the visual information. However, at the time the selected mental frame of the OOW and the rest of the
bridge team were used to guide information seeking. According to the data/ frame
theory of sensemaking ( Klein et al., 2007), a surprise or an inadequacy in an existing
frame will lead individuals to either actively obtain more relevant data to improve the
frame, replace the frame with a more relevant one, construct a new frame or preserve
the frame by explaining away or distorting the data. In this case the frame was preserved, and it directed expectations and what counted as data. The one team member
that had made sense of the visual information was not able to share this information
with the team and as such the team was “ less sensitive to the weak signals than the
most sensitive of their individual members” ( Klein et al., 2010).
aDaPtive SenSemaking
As we have seen, sensemaking can be both helpful and harmful in safety-critical situations. Maitlis and Sonenshein ( 2010) argue that adaptive sensemaking is necessary
for sensemaking to be helpful especially in crisis. Adaptive sensemaking is enabled
when emotions are moderately intense, not too negative but not too positive either.
Emotions can provide valuable information to a sensemaker and should be intense
enough to be noticed. However, the capacity for anxiety toleration is important for
the ability to make sense of a situation ( Stein, 2004).
According to Maitlis and Sonenshein ( 2010), another enabler of adaptive sensemaking is the two processes of updating and doubting. Updating has to do with
gathering new information and revising interpretations while doubt is a reminder of
constantly generating new understandings. A finite sense of a situation is never made
as things are always changing ( Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).
Adaptive sensemaking is related to improvisation. The ability to improvise has
been connected to resilience ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Skill in improvisation, as
well as having the flexibility to use it, increases the potential actions available in
people’s repertoire, meaning they can act on a greater variety of situations and surprises as well as broaden the range of cues that can be noticed ( Ibid). The connection
between sensemaking and resilience has been made by several scholars, in the sense
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
HNoMS Helge Ingstad. These vessels had been observed visually and tracked in the
bridge system. Of those present, only the helmsman had identified the lights ahead on
starboard side as belonging to a moving vessel. However, he did not disseminate this
observation; he assumed that the OOW and the rest of the bridge team were aware
of it being a vessel, since it should be observable on both AIS and radar. A minute
before the collision, the pilot on board Sola TS made a direct call on VHF requesting
HNoMS Helge Ingstad to alter course to starboard. The OOWs understanding was
that there was not enough room to pass on the shore side of the “ object” and assumed
that the call was from one of the three northbound vessels approaching on port side.
He responded by saying that they could not turn to starboard. By the time the OOW
understood that the “ object” giving off light was moving and on direct course to collide it was too late, and at 04:01:15, HNoMS Helge Ingstad collided with the tanker
Sola TS ( AIBN, 2019).
In hindsight it is easy to see that the cues and the weak signals of danger were
there: the AIS signal, the radar echo, information on VHF and the visual information. However, at the time the selected mental frame of the OOW and the rest of the
bridge team were used to guide information seeking. According to the data/ frame
theory of sensemaking ( Klein et al., 2007), a surprise or an inadequacy in an existing
frame will lead individuals to either actively obtain more relevant data to improve the
frame, replace the frame with a more relevant one, construct a new frame or preserve
the frame by explaining away or distorting the data. In this case the frame was preserved, and it directed expectations and what counted as data. The one team member
that had made sense of the visual information was not able to share this information
with the team and as such the team was “ less sensitive to the weak signals than the
most sensitive of their individual members” ( Klein et al., 2010).
aDaPtive SenSemaking
As we have seen, sensemaking can be both helpful and harmful in safety-critical situations. Maitlis and Sonenshein ( 2010) argue that adaptive sensemaking is necessary
for sensemaking to be helpful especially in crisis. Adaptive sensemaking is enabled
when emotions are moderately intense, not too negative but not too positive either.
Emotions can provide valuable information to a sensemaker and should be intense
enough to be noticed. However, the capacity for anxiety toleration is important for
the ability to make sense of a situation ( Stein, 2004).
According to Maitlis and Sonenshein ( 2010), another enabler of adaptive sensemaking is the two processes of updating and doubting. Updating has to do with
gathering new information and revising interpretations while doubt is a reminder of
constantly generating new understandings. A finite sense of a situation is never made
as things are always changing ( Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).
Adaptive sensemaking is related to improvisation. The ability to improvise has
been connected to resilience ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Skill in improvisation, as
well as having the flexibility to use it, increases the potential actions available in
people’s repertoire, meaning they can act on a greater variety of situations and surprises as well as broaden the range of cues that can be noticed ( Ibid). The connection
between sensemaking and resilience has been made by several scholars, in the sense