210
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
INTRODUCTION
There are more than 10,000 Unmanned Aerial Systems ( UAS) in the air around the
world at any given time ( Waraich, Mazzuchi, Shahram, & Rico, 2013). Over the
past two decades, UAS have grown exponentially ( Matolak & Sun, 2015). Lack of
onboard pilots meant that UAS can be sent deep into hostile environments without
having to fear for pilot safety ( Agarwal, Murphy, & Adams, 2014). It is an appealing aspect for security, law enforcement, and military for conducting intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, search, and rescue ( Gawron, 1998). Its pilot safety
feature initially helped steer the UAS developmental focus mainly towards military use. To meet the warfighters demands, military UAS were hastily developed
and deployed, thus leading to an increased number of UAS mishaps ( Baur, 2007;
Nisser & Westin, 2006).
Nevertheless, the same pilot safety feature led to bypassing majority of the
standardized testing that was conducted for manned fighter aircrafts prior to their
deployment. Nowadays, the use of UAS has expanded in all sectors. The UAS are
assisting to perform all sorts of dangerous and dirty civilian tasks while gathering
high technical quality data. Nonetheless, similar weaknesses in testing of industrial
UAS systems persist.
Several UAS mishap studies have shown human factors involvement in up to 69%
of all such UAS mishaps, and up to 25% are due to ergonomic shortfalls that are
found in human–machine interface ( HMI) design and configuration of ground control stations ( GCS) ( Peter & Karl, 2016; Hobbs & Shively, 2014; Williams, 2004;
Manning, Rash, LeDuc, Noback, & McKeon, 2004; Thompson & Tvaryanas, 2008;
Rogers, Palmer, Chitwood, & Hover, 2004). The design and development of UAS
GCS lack HMI-specific human factors and ergonomic ( HF/ E) standards, leading to
varying GCS designs and/ or configurations that do not suit the operator ( Waraich,
Mazzuchi, Shahram, & Rico, 2013). Lack of UAS-specific HF/ E standards may have
led to following shortfalls in the safety-critical GCS designs: such as, visual/ audio
information presented in text, complicated sequence of menu selection, unguarded
placement of safety-critical controls in areas where they could inadvertently be activated, controls whose functions can be altered by a change in selected mode, out
of reach control placement, pop-up windows blocking critical parts of display, and
proliferation of screen displays ( Hobbs & Lyall, 2016).
As per the studies, seemingly high number of HF/ E GCS-related UAS mishaps call
for an imminent need to develop an HF/ E-specific UAS GCS standard. Generally, a
standard takes years to develop. Nevertheless, there are several national and international human factors standards that may have sections related to HF/ E. These could
possibly be applied to UAS GCS to increase their HF/ E resilience. These standards
Findings
222
..................................................................................................................
Phase I – UAS GCS IO Devices
. 222
......................................................................
Phase II – GCS & CW IO Device Usage
225
..........................................................
Phase III – Sensemaking & ANSI/HFES-100 Application
227
...............................
Conclusion
231
.............................................................................................................
References
232
..............................................................................................................
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
INTRODUCTION
There are more than 10,000 Unmanned Aerial Systems ( UAS) in the air around the
world at any given time ( Waraich, Mazzuchi, Shahram, & Rico, 2013). Over the
past two decades, UAS have grown exponentially ( Matolak & Sun, 2015). Lack of
onboard pilots meant that UAS can be sent deep into hostile environments without
having to fear for pilot safety ( Agarwal, Murphy, & Adams, 2014). It is an appealing aspect for security, law enforcement, and military for conducting intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, search, and rescue ( Gawron, 1998). Its pilot safety
feature initially helped steer the UAS developmental focus mainly towards military use. To meet the warfighters demands, military UAS were hastily developed
and deployed, thus leading to an increased number of UAS mishaps ( Baur, 2007;
Nisser & Westin, 2006).
Nevertheless, the same pilot safety feature led to bypassing majority of the
standardized testing that was conducted for manned fighter aircrafts prior to their
deployment. Nowadays, the use of UAS has expanded in all sectors. The UAS are
assisting to perform all sorts of dangerous and dirty civilian tasks while gathering
high technical quality data. Nonetheless, similar weaknesses in testing of industrial
UAS systems persist.
Several UAS mishap studies have shown human factors involvement in up to 69%
of all such UAS mishaps, and up to 25% are due to ergonomic shortfalls that are
found in human–machine interface ( HMI) design and configuration of ground control stations ( GCS) ( Peter & Karl, 2016; Hobbs & Shively, 2014; Williams, 2004;
Manning, Rash, LeDuc, Noback, & McKeon, 2004; Thompson & Tvaryanas, 2008;
Rogers, Palmer, Chitwood, & Hover, 2004). The design and development of UAS
GCS lack HMI-specific human factors and ergonomic ( HF/ E) standards, leading to
varying GCS designs and/ or configurations that do not suit the operator ( Waraich,
Mazzuchi, Shahram, & Rico, 2013). Lack of UAS-specific HF/ E standards may have
led to following shortfalls in the safety-critical GCS designs: such as, visual/ audio
information presented in text, complicated sequence of menu selection, unguarded
placement of safety-critical controls in areas where they could inadvertently be activated, controls whose functions can be altered by a change in selected mode, out
of reach control placement, pop-up windows blocking critical parts of display, and
proliferation of screen displays ( Hobbs & Lyall, 2016).
As per the studies, seemingly high number of HF/ E GCS-related UAS mishaps call
for an imminent need to develop an HF/ E-specific UAS GCS standard. Generally, a
standard takes years to develop. Nevertheless, there are several national and international human factors standards that may have sections related to HF/ E. These could
possibly be applied to UAS GCS to increase their HF/ E resilience. These standards
Findings
222
..................................................................................................................
Phase I – UAS GCS IO Devices
. 222
......................................................................
Phase II – GCS & CW IO Device Usage
225
..........................................................
Phase III – Sensemaking & ANSI/HFES-100 Application
227
...............................
Conclusion
231
.............................................................................................................
References
232
..............................................................................................................