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Improving Safety
( UTO). UTO has been in operations since 1980. According to UITP ( 2013), there
is 674 km of automated metros consisting of 48 lines in 32 cities. Examples of cities with UTOs are Barcelona, Copenhagen, Dubai, Kobe, Lille, Nuremberg, Paris,
Singapore, Taipei, Tokyo, Toulouse and Vancouver. There is large infrastructure cost
to ensure safe on and offloading of passengers and that the track is isolated from
other traffic. Four distinct levels of automation are defined:
GoA1: Non-automated train operation, with a driver in the cabin.
GoA2: Automatic train operation system controls train movements, but a driver
in the cabin observes and stops the train in case of a hazardous situation.
GoA3: No driver in the cabin but an operation staff on board.
GoA4: Unattended train operation, with no operation staff on board.
Safety Challenges
Wang et al. ( 2016) list the following as arguments for UTO: increased reliability, lower
operation costs, increased capacity, energy efficiency and an impressive safety record.
We have at present not found normalised accident data for UTO ( incidents based on
person km), and no accidents have been reported. We have found reports in newspapers
about minor incidents, without any fatalities reported. Based on data and experiences
so far, it seems that the UTO has exceptionally high safety. However, more systematic
analysis and normalisation of all international UTO transport incidents are needed.
Even though driverless trains have an impressive safety record, experience shows
that they still face some challenges related to reliability and operability. One example of this is seen in Singapore. UTOs were introduced in Singapore’s Mass Rapid
Transits ( MRT) system in 2003. Here, the operations were monitored remotely from
an operations control centre. However, in 2018, most of these trains were manned
again, for improving reliability. Some of the trains experienced technical issues and
failures. In these cases, a driver on board a train will immediately be able to assess the
problem, and, if necessary, push another disabled train out of the way. With a driverless system, a driver had to make his way to the unmanned train, which takes time.
Nevertheless, the safety record of driverless trains is impressive, maybe due to the rail
track as a system. Hence, further automation of railway systems is ongoing.
Lesson Learned
As mentioned, it seems that the UTO has an exceptionally high level of safety.
However, systematic analysis and normalisation of all international UTO transport
incidents are needed. Thus, there is a need for systematic reporting and analysis
of minor incidents/ small accidents in order to support risk-based regulation and
risk-based design of the technology.
A key issue related to safety is the focus on a restricted design domain and operational envelope. The environment/ context of which the UTOs operates is typically
underground, with few or no interaction with other traffic. Protection systems are
in place at the embarkment area/ platform preventing the most common incidents
( people falling on tracks). There has been a focus on analysing personnel incidents
when entering and leaving the UTOs and building safer infrastructure to minimise
dangerous situations.
Improving Safety
( UTO). UTO has been in operations since 1980. According to UITP ( 2013), there
is 674 km of automated metros consisting of 48 lines in 32 cities. Examples of cities with UTOs are Barcelona, Copenhagen, Dubai, Kobe, Lille, Nuremberg, Paris,
Singapore, Taipei, Tokyo, Toulouse and Vancouver. There is large infrastructure cost
to ensure safe on and offloading of passengers and that the track is isolated from
other traffic. Four distinct levels of automation are defined:
GoA1: Non-automated train operation, with a driver in the cabin.
GoA2: Automatic train operation system controls train movements, but a driver
in the cabin observes and stops the train in case of a hazardous situation.
GoA3: No driver in the cabin but an operation staff on board.
GoA4: Unattended train operation, with no operation staff on board.
Safety Challenges
Wang et al. ( 2016) list the following as arguments for UTO: increased reliability, lower
operation costs, increased capacity, energy efficiency and an impressive safety record.
We have at present not found normalised accident data for UTO ( incidents based on
person km), and no accidents have been reported. We have found reports in newspapers
about minor incidents, without any fatalities reported. Based on data and experiences
so far, it seems that the UTO has exceptionally high safety. However, more systematic
analysis and normalisation of all international UTO transport incidents are needed.
Even though driverless trains have an impressive safety record, experience shows
that they still face some challenges related to reliability and operability. One example of this is seen in Singapore. UTOs were introduced in Singapore’s Mass Rapid
Transits ( MRT) system in 2003. Here, the operations were monitored remotely from
an operations control centre. However, in 2018, most of these trains were manned
again, for improving reliability. Some of the trains experienced technical issues and
failures. In these cases, a driver on board a train will immediately be able to assess the
problem, and, if necessary, push another disabled train out of the way. With a driverless system, a driver had to make his way to the unmanned train, which takes time.
Nevertheless, the safety record of driverless trains is impressive, maybe due to the rail
track as a system. Hence, further automation of railway systems is ongoing.
Lesson Learned
As mentioned, it seems that the UTO has an exceptionally high level of safety.
However, systematic analysis and normalisation of all international UTO transport
incidents are needed. Thus, there is a need for systematic reporting and analysis
of minor incidents/ small accidents in order to support risk-based regulation and
risk-based design of the technology.
A key issue related to safety is the focus on a restricted design domain and operational envelope. The environment/ context of which the UTOs operates is typically
underground, with few or no interaction with other traffic. Protection systems are
in place at the embarkment area/ platform preventing the most common incidents
( people falling on tracks). There has been a focus on analysing personnel incidents
when entering and leaving the UTOs and building safer infrastructure to minimise
dangerous situations.