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Prospective Sensemaking
appear to be a distinction between s hort-term expectation versus long-term expectation based on the traffic controller’s handling of the two ships, which makes it interesting to investigate more closely how a time dimension associated with different
expectations influences preparation.
It would be interesting to examine further whether the actions relating to the
former are carried out at the expense of the latter and whether there is a tension
between these two that can be detrimental for the opportunity the traffic controller
has to strengthen or weaken own expectations during the course of the event. It also
appears ( from the perspective of Fedje VTS) that the sailings of the two ships from
the beginning are somewhat disconnected events, which arguably can make coordination challenging when the situation gradually tightens.
Moreover, at the same time as Sola TS left the Sture terminal, a change of OOW’s
began on the frigate bridge, which is our second example. According to the AIBN
report, both the outgoing and the incoming OOW’s relate to an object on starboard
side of the frigate. The report describes that the object was identified visually as
well as using radar with subsequent discussion between the OOW’s related to the
object’s identity. A positive identification was not carried out, but both officers were
of the opinion that the object was stationary and posed no risk to the frigate. The
AIBN report states that after the shift, the opinion on the frigate bridge prevailed
that Sola TS was a stationary object, which was also the starting point for the oncoming officer’s subsequent actions. The situation on the frigate bridge was such that the
training of a new OOW received a good deal of attention, which affected the crew’s
capacity to monitor the overall together with specific aspects of the traffic situation
in Hjeltefjord.
The accident report also points out that the starboard look was unmanned, which
further reduced the possibility of changing the perception of the traffic situation on
the bridge. Since the incoming OOW was of the opinion that the Sola TS was a
stationary object, the tanker was not radar tracked, which also meant that there was
no alarm when the ships approached each other. Initially in example two, we saw
how the overlapping OOW’s discussed what the unidentified object was – the consequence of this interaction being a common anchorage linked to expectations of
what will be current events in the future. It can thus be argued that anchoring which
events are relevant in the future involves a clear social dimension through negotiations between different actors in relation to the interpretation of available information, which may challenge the idea that, for example, functional redundancy will
most often minimize the risk of accidents.
Furthermore, the third example involves the use of distinct technology, e.g., that
the radio communication between Sola TS and Fedje VTS was not heard by KNM
Helge Ingstad. This information was broadcasted on an open frequency and such
information can be imperative to either strengthen or weaken own expectations,
and it connects in general with how key actors configure actions to prepare so as
to be ahead of any upcoming event. The AIBN report speculates that this is related
to either the switching of OOW on the frigate bridge or that Fedje VTS did not
explicitly inform KNM Helge Ingstad or other vessels in the area about Sola TS’
intentions. Alternatively, the frigate had distinct routines or practices related to listening to radio which caused the communication between Sola TS and Fedje VTS
Prospective Sensemaking
appear to be a distinction between s hort-term expectation versus long-term expectation based on the traffic controller’s handling of the two ships, which makes it interesting to investigate more closely how a time dimension associated with different
expectations influences preparation.
It would be interesting to examine further whether the actions relating to the
former are carried out at the expense of the latter and whether there is a tension
between these two that can be detrimental for the opportunity the traffic controller
has to strengthen or weaken own expectations during the course of the event. It also
appears ( from the perspective of Fedje VTS) that the sailings of the two ships from
the beginning are somewhat disconnected events, which arguably can make coordination challenging when the situation gradually tightens.
Moreover, at the same time as Sola TS left the Sture terminal, a change of OOW’s
began on the frigate bridge, which is our second example. According to the AIBN
report, both the outgoing and the incoming OOW’s relate to an object on starboard
side of the frigate. The report describes that the object was identified visually as
well as using radar with subsequent discussion between the OOW’s related to the
object’s identity. A positive identification was not carried out, but both officers were
of the opinion that the object was stationary and posed no risk to the frigate. The
AIBN report states that after the shift, the opinion on the frigate bridge prevailed
that Sola TS was a stationary object, which was also the starting point for the oncoming officer’s subsequent actions. The situation on the frigate bridge was such that the
training of a new OOW received a good deal of attention, which affected the crew’s
capacity to monitor the overall together with specific aspects of the traffic situation
in Hjeltefjord.
The accident report also points out that the starboard look was unmanned, which
further reduced the possibility of changing the perception of the traffic situation on
the bridge. Since the incoming OOW was of the opinion that the Sola TS was a
stationary object, the tanker was not radar tracked, which also meant that there was
no alarm when the ships approached each other. Initially in example two, we saw
how the overlapping OOW’s discussed what the unidentified object was – the consequence of this interaction being a common anchorage linked to expectations of
what will be current events in the future. It can thus be argued that anchoring which
events are relevant in the future involves a clear social dimension through negotiations between different actors in relation to the interpretation of available information, which may challenge the idea that, for example, functional redundancy will
most often minimize the risk of accidents.
Furthermore, the third example involves the use of distinct technology, e.g., that
the radio communication between Sola TS and Fedje VTS was not heard by KNM
Helge Ingstad. This information was broadcasted on an open frequency and such
information can be imperative to either strengthen or weaken own expectations,
and it connects in general with how key actors configure actions to prepare so as
to be ahead of any upcoming event. The AIBN report speculates that this is related
to either the switching of OOW on the frigate bridge or that Fedje VTS did not
explicitly inform KNM Helge Ingstad or other vessels in the area about Sola TS’
intentions. Alternatively, the frigate had distinct routines or practices related to listening to radio which caused the communication between Sola TS and Fedje VTS