ix
Introduction
about how such an accident could occur at all, including the publication of an audio
log where one could hear the ones involved communicate. The Accident Investigation
Board Norway points out that misunderstanding of the situation on the frigate was the
root cause, while at the same time pointing out criticisms of the shipping control centre
as well as the tanker. This chapter explores the actions of the involved parties prior to
the accident focusing on communicative and coordinative practices including the use
of distinct technology, as well as the configuring of events and participants’ expectations. The chapter explores how one can understand this type of accident going beyond
traditional sensemaking by drawing on the idea of prospective sensemaking, i.e. sensemaking processes understood analytically as primarily forward oriented. The chapter
demonstrates a way to operationalize prospective sensemaking on the grounds of the
KNM Helge Ingstad accident and discusses potential benefits from an operationalization of prospective sensemaking within complex organizational domains.
6 – THE CHALLENGES OF SENSEMAKING AND
HUMAN FACTORS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR –
EXPLORING THE HELGE INGSTAD ACCIDENT
The chapter discusses the challenges of sensemaking and human factors in the maritime sector based on accident and incident reports, especially the Helge Ingstad collision from 2018.The Helge Ingstad accident should not come as a surprise when
looking at the poor quality of cognitive ergonomics on the bridge (i.e. poor task
analysis, poor configuration of equipment, poor alarms, poor redundancy of cues,
noise). The accident shows the consequences of performing piecemeal building of
control systems on the bridge instead of focusing on a unified sensemaking design
based on cognitive ergonomics.
7 – ADDRESSING HUMAN FACTORS IN SHIP DESIGN: SHALL WE?
Research shows that more than 80% of accidents and incidents at sea were caused
by human errors and human-related factors. Less adequate design was identified as
one significant factor that moderated human errors. Unlike other industries, the way
human factors issues are managed in the maritime industry is not fully integrated
through the life cycle of a ship, and it is still optional. “Human factors” is a relatively
novel concept to naval architects and marine engineers. It covers a broad discipline
with various dimensions, including habitability, workability, controllability, occupational health and safety (OHS), maintainability, manoeuvrability and survivability.
From the human factor’s perspective a ship can be considered as a living space, as
well as a working place. A ship is usually equipped with one main control centre on
the bridge, one local control centre for the engine room and more local control centres for other purposes. This chapter discusses how human factors are addressed in
ship design, their implementations and challenges. Demanding issues experienced by
the crew include fatigue, poor automation, flooding of alarms and imperfect design.
Some challenges are reported, including inadequate standards and slowly adapting
criteria, despite similar incidents occurred over and over again.
Introduction
about how such an accident could occur at all, including the publication of an audio
log where one could hear the ones involved communicate. The Accident Investigation
Board Norway points out that misunderstanding of the situation on the frigate was the
root cause, while at the same time pointing out criticisms of the shipping control centre
as well as the tanker. This chapter explores the actions of the involved parties prior to
the accident focusing on communicative and coordinative practices including the use
of distinct technology, as well as the configuring of events and participants’ expectations. The chapter explores how one can understand this type of accident going beyond
traditional sensemaking by drawing on the idea of prospective sensemaking, i.e. sensemaking processes understood analytically as primarily forward oriented. The chapter
demonstrates a way to operationalize prospective sensemaking on the grounds of the
KNM Helge Ingstad accident and discusses potential benefits from an operationalization of prospective sensemaking within complex organizational domains.
6 – THE CHALLENGES OF SENSEMAKING AND
HUMAN FACTORS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR –
EXPLORING THE HELGE INGSTAD ACCIDENT
The chapter discusses the challenges of sensemaking and human factors in the maritime sector based on accident and incident reports, especially the Helge Ingstad collision from 2018.The Helge Ingstad accident should not come as a surprise when
looking at the poor quality of cognitive ergonomics on the bridge (i.e. poor task
analysis, poor configuration of equipment, poor alarms, poor redundancy of cues,
noise). The accident shows the consequences of performing piecemeal building of
control systems on the bridge instead of focusing on a unified sensemaking design
based on cognitive ergonomics.
7 – ADDRESSING HUMAN FACTORS IN SHIP DESIGN: SHALL WE?
Research shows that more than 80% of accidents and incidents at sea were caused
by human errors and human-related factors. Less adequate design was identified as
one significant factor that moderated human errors. Unlike other industries, the way
human factors issues are managed in the maritime industry is not fully integrated
through the life cycle of a ship, and it is still optional. “Human factors” is a relatively
novel concept to naval architects and marine engineers. It covers a broad discipline
with various dimensions, including habitability, workability, controllability, occupational health and safety (OHS), maintainability, manoeuvrability and survivability.
From the human factor’s perspective a ship can be considered as a living space, as
well as a working place. A ship is usually equipped with one main control centre on
the bridge, one local control centre for the engine room and more local control centres for other purposes. This chapter discusses how human factors are addressed in
ship design, their implementations and challenges. Demanding issues experienced by
the crew include fatigue, poor automation, flooding of alarms and imperfect design.
Some challenges are reported, including inadequate standards and slowly adapting
criteria, despite similar incidents occurred over and over again.