unclear whether the scope of chargebacks could be expanded beyond their
current use.
In addition to chargebacks, different types of reputation systems have been
suggested to address both the need for compliance with the rules of the market
place and the need for increasing customer trust in the market. Feedback systems
are one such option, and they are included in most e-commerce market platforms. After the transaction is concluded, both parties, seller and buyer, have the
possibility to leave positive or negative feedback. The idea is that sellers with the
best user ratings will have more transactions in the future and sellers with bad
reviews are either forced to improve their behaviour or discontinue their activities. There are several difficulties with feedback systems, but first and foremost
their effectiveness may be questioned on the ground that negative feedback does
not necessarily describe what has actually been the issue with the transaction. It is
stated that negative feedback can be left out of spite or positive feedback can be
manipulated.
44 However, the main issue with feedback systems is that they do
not provide redress for individual cases but try to affect future behaviour at the
market place.
Another form of reputation system tries to provide a trust mark for those
market places with a functioning ODR system that follows certain criteria of
access to justice. Ponte suggests that these trust marks be granted by a transnational authority, which would be established by the cooperation of governmental
institutions. Such trust mark would include an enforcement function as well as
minimum criteria for due process. Trust marks would be granted to businesses
that follow the rules of such an international Convention. Non-compliance with
an ODR decision would lead to temporary or permanent loss of the trust mark.
45
However, there are several difficulties with creating a system of trust marks. If the
intention is to create a transnational system similar to the New York Convention,
government action is needed. Until now, the success of engaging different states
in developing ODR standards has been low. Also, there is an issue related to
Internet governance. Ponte suggests that a non-complying merchant would be
banned from e-commerce altogether – a task that is not an actual option when
taking into consideration the disharmonious infrastructure of Internet. Regardless, trust marks have a similar inherent problem as feedback systems: they
regulate future behaviour, but outside a Convention for enforcement they do
little for the singular case.
However, technology enables also more exhaustive means of forcing compliance
than reputational systems, namely direct self-enforcement. eBay’s enforcement
mechanism is enabled by its easy access to a payment mechanism, but also other
applications do exist, such as ICANN’s supremacy over the domain name system
and self-executing blockchains.
For example, ICANN’s dispute resolution procedure emerged from the need
to solve disputes arising from a new global infrastructure of the domain name
system. ICANN is responsible for distribution and maintenance of the global
domain name system. ICANN has established a Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organisation
74 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
current use.
In addition to chargebacks, different types of reputation systems have been
suggested to address both the need for compliance with the rules of the market
place and the need for increasing customer trust in the market. Feedback systems
are one such option, and they are included in most e-commerce market platforms. After the transaction is concluded, both parties, seller and buyer, have the
possibility to leave positive or negative feedback. The idea is that sellers with the
best user ratings will have more transactions in the future and sellers with bad
reviews are either forced to improve their behaviour or discontinue their activities. There are several difficulties with feedback systems, but first and foremost
their effectiveness may be questioned on the ground that negative feedback does
not necessarily describe what has actually been the issue with the transaction. It is
stated that negative feedback can be left out of spite or positive feedback can be
manipulated.
44 However, the main issue with feedback systems is that they do
not provide redress for individual cases but try to affect future behaviour at the
market place.
Another form of reputation system tries to provide a trust mark for those
market places with a functioning ODR system that follows certain criteria of
access to justice. Ponte suggests that these trust marks be granted by a transnational authority, which would be established by the cooperation of governmental
institutions. Such trust mark would include an enforcement function as well as
minimum criteria for due process. Trust marks would be granted to businesses
that follow the rules of such an international Convention. Non-compliance with
an ODR decision would lead to temporary or permanent loss of the trust mark.
45
However, there are several difficulties with creating a system of trust marks. If the
intention is to create a transnational system similar to the New York Convention,
government action is needed. Until now, the success of engaging different states
in developing ODR standards has been low. Also, there is an issue related to
Internet governance. Ponte suggests that a non-complying merchant would be
banned from e-commerce altogether – a task that is not an actual option when
taking into consideration the disharmonious infrastructure of Internet. Regardless, trust marks have a similar inherent problem as feedback systems: they
regulate future behaviour, but outside a Convention for enforcement they do
little for the singular case.
However, technology enables also more exhaustive means of forcing compliance
than reputational systems, namely direct self-enforcement. eBay’s enforcement
mechanism is enabled by its easy access to a payment mechanism, but also other
applications do exist, such as ICANN’s supremacy over the domain name system
and self-executing blockchains.
For example, ICANN’s dispute resolution procedure emerged from the need
to solve disputes arising from a new global infrastructure of the domain name
system. ICANN is responsible for distribution and maintenance of the global
domain name system. ICANN has established a Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organisation
74 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology