technology may give the impression of social interaction, of being able to create
social responses, this does not necessarily mean there is social interaction. At the
moment, portrayal of interaction does not constitute mutual recognition of the
other’s subjectivity, that fundamental essence of communication. Despite
advances in neural networks and pattern recognition, artificial general intelligence capable of consciousness is still not on the horizon – much to the relief of
those worried about singularity.
Another possible use for the fourth party analogy could be in its ability to
describe the networks embedded in its adoption. For example, Lodder and
Zeleznikow have developed the analogy further by adding a fifth party, namely
the service provider.
28 If we are to consider other subject positions present in
dispute resolution technology, we might include the programmer behind the
code to the analogy as the sixth party, or the Internet service provider.
Interpreted this way, the fourth party analogy might help in conceptualising
the human intention that is always present in programming. Such further
theorisation bows towards the French sociologist Bruno Latour’s actor-network
theory, in which the social world is created by the networked interactions of
human and non-human actors, such as concepts, ideas, processes and artefacts.
Combining these elements with the fourth party analogy could provide a
solution for maintaining the analogy while overcoming the critique of social
shaping of technology. In this spirit, agency would be created in a network of
human and non-human actors and thus there would be enough room to discuss
the social actions created by such networks without attributing agency to
technology itself. However, it is unclear whether such a theoretical exercise
would indeed be true to the analogy’s original meaning or provide sufficient
added value to justify it. Also, conceptualising such complexity through party
metaphors ties the examination to the actual dispute resolution process, which
limits its applicability.
To conclude, the analogy comes burdened with certain embedded ambiguity
and the need to make further, often problematic distinctions between different
uses of technology that the analogy does not leave room for. Based on this, it
seems that the theory of technology as the fourth or fifth party is not sufficient
for describing the complexity. Technology is not a party to the resolution
procedure, but a structure which frames the process. Although the metaphor of
the fourth or fifth party is appealing, it is an oversimplification that hides the
complexity of dispute resolution technology. Instead of using the analogy, a
more context-orientated approach is needed to create a more nuanced picture of
dispute resolution technology with added explanatory power.
In addition, the fourth party analogy focuses on the resolution process, which
means that technology-driven changes in enforcement and the theoretically
interesting shift towards privatisation of coercion have remained in the margins
of literature on dispute resolution technology. By simultaneously holding on to
the overview of technological change and the contextual approach of different
functionalities, this privatisation development is made visible as an example of the
rupture brought on by dispute resolution technology.
Emerging crisis 67
social responses, this does not necessarily mean there is social interaction. At the
moment, portrayal of interaction does not constitute mutual recognition of the
other’s subjectivity, that fundamental essence of communication. Despite
advances in neural networks and pattern recognition, artificial general intelligence capable of consciousness is still not on the horizon – much to the relief of
those worried about singularity.
Another possible use for the fourth party analogy could be in its ability to
describe the networks embedded in its adoption. For example, Lodder and
Zeleznikow have developed the analogy further by adding a fifth party, namely
the service provider.
28 If we are to consider other subject positions present in
dispute resolution technology, we might include the programmer behind the
code to the analogy as the sixth party, or the Internet service provider.
Interpreted this way, the fourth party analogy might help in conceptualising
the human intention that is always present in programming. Such further
theorisation bows towards the French sociologist Bruno Latour’s actor-network
theory, in which the social world is created by the networked interactions of
human and non-human actors, such as concepts, ideas, processes and artefacts.
Combining these elements with the fourth party analogy could provide a
solution for maintaining the analogy while overcoming the critique of social
shaping of technology. In this spirit, agency would be created in a network of
human and non-human actors and thus there would be enough room to discuss
the social actions created by such networks without attributing agency to
technology itself. However, it is unclear whether such a theoretical exercise
would indeed be true to the analogy’s original meaning or provide sufficient
added value to justify it. Also, conceptualising such complexity through party
metaphors ties the examination to the actual dispute resolution process, which
limits its applicability.
To conclude, the analogy comes burdened with certain embedded ambiguity
and the need to make further, often problematic distinctions between different
uses of technology that the analogy does not leave room for. Based on this, it
seems that the theory of technology as the fourth or fifth party is not sufficient
for describing the complexity. Technology is not a party to the resolution
procedure, but a structure which frames the process. Although the metaphor of
the fourth or fifth party is appealing, it is an oversimplification that hides the
complexity of dispute resolution technology. Instead of using the analogy, a
more context-orientated approach is needed to create a more nuanced picture of
dispute resolution technology with added explanatory power.
In addition, the fourth party analogy focuses on the resolution process, which
means that technology-driven changes in enforcement and the theoretically
interesting shift towards privatisation of coercion have remained in the margins
of literature on dispute resolution technology. By simultaneously holding on to
the overview of technological change and the contextual approach of different
functionalities, this privatisation development is made visible as an example of the
rupture brought on by dispute resolution technology.
Emerging crisis 67