Similarly, what are elsewhere seen as effects, and as such subject to social, cultural,
psychological and moral questioning, are excluded as irrelevant by comparison with the
direct physiological and therefore “psychic” effects of the media as such.’ Raymond
Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (Schocken Books 1975) 127.
81 As Lister et al. formulate Williams’ position: ‘The extent to which the technoloy can
have tranformative “effects” is more or less in relation to other pre-existing patterns of
wealth and power’. Lister and others (n 74) 87.
82 ibid 78–79. For an application of Williams’s approach see e.g., Donald MacKenzie and
Judy Wajcman, ‘Introductory Essay’ in Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds),
The Social Shaping of Technology, vol 2 (Open University Press 1999). In a Williamsite
spirit, MacKenzie and Wajcman point out that there are no single nominators which
affect technological change, but instead, the social relations are more complex.
83 See Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Open University Press 1987).
84 For example, Katsh and Rifkin refer to McLuhan in their work on ODR. See Katsh
and Rifkin (n 62) 21–22.
85 Kittler (n 35) xxxix.
86 ‘From Kittler’s point of view (informed, no doubt, by Heidegger’s take on technology)
the notion of media as means, no matter how formative, still reserves a central position
for humans. Against this instrumentalist anthropocentrism he posits media as ‘anthropological aprioris’: humans are appendages of media technologies rather than beneficiaries of their storage and communication potential. Subsequently, McLuhan’s vision of a
tech- nologically mediated global community as an all-encompassing electronic noosphere is replaced with the vista of machines that can connect and operate without any
detour into human consciousness because, just like humans before them, they have
learned to read and write on their own.’ Winthrop-Young (n 37) 394–395.
87 See e.g. Stuart Jeffries, ‘Friedrich Kittler Obituary’ The Guardian (21 October 2011)
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/oct/21/friedrich-kittler (accessed 18
June 2018).
88 Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of Mass Media (Polity Press 2000) 2.
89 ‘There are already computers in use whose operations are not accessible to neither
consciousness nor communication, neither simultaneously nor reconstructively.
Although they are manufactured and programmed machines, such computers function
nontransparently for consciousness and communication – but which by way of
structural coupling nevertheless influence consciousness and communication; their
operations nevertheless affect consciousness and communication through structural
couplings. Strictly speaking, they are invisible machines. If we ask whether computers
are machines that work analogously to consciousness and can replace or even outdo
consciousness systems, we are putting the problem wrongly and probably playing it
down. Nor is it relevant whether the internal operations of the computer can be
understood as communications. We must presumably leave aside all analogies of this
sort and ask instead what consequences it would have if computers could establish a
quite independent structural coupling between a reality they were able construct and
consciousness or communicative systems. This question deserves greater attention; it is
impossible to judge at present what consequences it would have for the further
evolution of the societal system. At any rate, any theory of society should reserve an
indeterminacy position for the issue, and the structural coupling concept offers such a
possibility.’ Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society. Volume I (Rhodes Barrett tr, Stanford
University Press 2012) 66.
90 André Reichel, ‘Technology as a System. Towards an Autopoietic Theory of Technology’
(2011) 5 International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development 105, 106.
91 ibid 110.
92 ibid 111.
93 ibid 112.
58 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
psychological and moral questioning, are excluded as irrelevant by comparison with the
direct physiological and therefore “psychic” effects of the media as such.’ Raymond
Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (Schocken Books 1975) 127.
81 As Lister et al. formulate Williams’ position: ‘The extent to which the technoloy can
have tranformative “effects” is more or less in relation to other pre-existing patterns of
wealth and power’. Lister and others (n 74) 87.
82 ibid 78–79. For an application of Williams’s approach see e.g., Donald MacKenzie and
Judy Wajcman, ‘Introductory Essay’ in Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds),
The Social Shaping of Technology, vol 2 (Open University Press 1999). In a Williamsite
spirit, MacKenzie and Wajcman point out that there are no single nominators which
affect technological change, but instead, the social relations are more complex.
83 See Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Open University Press 1987).
84 For example, Katsh and Rifkin refer to McLuhan in their work on ODR. See Katsh
and Rifkin (n 62) 21–22.
85 Kittler (n 35) xxxix.
86 ‘From Kittler’s point of view (informed, no doubt, by Heidegger’s take on technology)
the notion of media as means, no matter how formative, still reserves a central position
for humans. Against this instrumentalist anthropocentrism he posits media as ‘anthropological aprioris’: humans are appendages of media technologies rather than beneficiaries of their storage and communication potential. Subsequently, McLuhan’s vision of a
tech- nologically mediated global community as an all-encompassing electronic noosphere is replaced with the vista of machines that can connect and operate without any
detour into human consciousness because, just like humans before them, they have
learned to read and write on their own.’ Winthrop-Young (n 37) 394–395.
87 See e.g. Stuart Jeffries, ‘Friedrich Kittler Obituary’ The Guardian (21 October 2011)
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/oct/21/friedrich-kittler (accessed 18
June 2018).
88 Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of Mass Media (Polity Press 2000) 2.
89 ‘There are already computers in use whose operations are not accessible to neither
consciousness nor communication, neither simultaneously nor reconstructively.
Although they are manufactured and programmed machines, such computers function
nontransparently for consciousness and communication – but which by way of
structural coupling nevertheless influence consciousness and communication; their
operations nevertheless affect consciousness and communication through structural
couplings. Strictly speaking, they are invisible machines. If we ask whether computers
are machines that work analogously to consciousness and can replace or even outdo
consciousness systems, we are putting the problem wrongly and probably playing it
down. Nor is it relevant whether the internal operations of the computer can be
understood as communications. We must presumably leave aside all analogies of this
sort and ask instead what consequences it would have if computers could establish a
quite independent structural coupling between a reality they were able construct and
consciousness or communicative systems. This question deserves greater attention; it is
impossible to judge at present what consequences it would have for the further
evolution of the societal system. At any rate, any theory of society should reserve an
indeterminacy position for the issue, and the structural coupling concept offers such a
possibility.’ Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society. Volume I (Rhodes Barrett tr, Stanford
University Press 2012) 66.
90 André Reichel, ‘Technology as a System. Towards an Autopoietic Theory of Technology’
(2011) 5 International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development 105, 106.
91 ibid 110.
92 ibid 111.
93 ibid 112.
58 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology