herbeizuführen. Infolgedessen mag jeder Anhänger einer dieser Richtungen unter
“reflexivem Recht” ungefähr das verstehen, was er selbst immer schon gemeint
hatte.’ Niklas Luhmann, ‘Einige Probleme mit “Reflexivem Recht”’ (1985) 6 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 1, 2; On Teubner’s reflexive law see Teubner, ‘Substantive
and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (n 26).
28 John Paterson, ‘Reflecting on Reflexive Law’, Luhmann on Law and Politics. Critical
Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 24.
29 Michael King, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’, Luhmann on Law and Politics.
Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 47.
30 ibid 51.
31 ‘Deparadoxification means to invent new distinctions which do not deny the paradox
but dispalce it temporarily and thus relieve it of its paralysing power.’ Gunther
Teubner, ‘Economics of Gift – Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of Jacques
Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’ (2001) 18 Theory, Culture and Society 29, 32.
32 King and Thornhill (n 2) 22.
33 Teubner, ‘Economics of Gift – Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of Jacques
Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’ (n 31) 39.
34 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-Production’, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production
of Science and Social Order (Routledge 2004) 3.
35 Friedrich A Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and
Michael Wutz trs, Stanford University Press 1999) xl.
36 Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young tr,
Stanford University Press 2008) 12.
37 Professor Geoffrey Winthrop-Young evaluates whether it would be feasible to
combine Kittler’s views on media and technology with Luhmann’s systems theory.
According to his view, there is not enough common ground to form a basis for such
hybrid theory regardless of some communalities between their starting points.
Winthrop-Young’s analysis has many merits. However, his analysis does not take
into consideration the potential of structural couplings that may relay information
between different systems much in the same way as Jasanoff’s co-production. See
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, ‘Silicon Sociology, Or, Two Kings on Hegel’s Throne?
Kittler, Luhmann, and the Posthuman Merger of German Media Theory’ (2000) 13
The Yale Journal of Criticism 391, 417. Another train of thought that should be
sought within the framework of systems theory is the possibility of system boundaries
becoming fuzzy, which could result from the decreasing ability of subsystems to
make continuous distinctions as the overall complexity of society and the use of ICT
increases. In other words, do the changes in communication media affect the
constitution of system boundaries? Unfortunately, this issue cannot be further
discussed in this context.
38 Fischer-Lescano (n 24) 8.
39 ‘[Critical systems theory] reveals the contingencies and the political controversies
about these interconnections [in communication], by reading the theory against its
grain with deconstructive elements.’ Andreas Fischer-Lescano (n 24) 4.
40 Adopting Luhmann’s theory as a starting point does not mean that the theory should
be applied in its entirety without the possibility of conceptual supplements. Presumably Luhmann would not be completely averse to this. In fact, Luhmann applies
Thomas Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions without bringing Kuhn’s context to
the application: ‘A rough orientation will suffice to define what we have so far called a
“paradigm change”. We need not concern ourselves with finding out what Kuhn had
in mind when he introduced the concept of paradigm. That is a pointless task today.’
Luhmann, Social Systems (n 3) 4.
41 Fischer-Lescano (n 24) 13.
42 ibid.
54 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
“reflexivem Recht” ungefähr das verstehen, was er selbst immer schon gemeint
hatte.’ Niklas Luhmann, ‘Einige Probleme mit “Reflexivem Recht”’ (1985) 6 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 1, 2; On Teubner’s reflexive law see Teubner, ‘Substantive
and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (n 26).
28 John Paterson, ‘Reflecting on Reflexive Law’, Luhmann on Law and Politics. Critical
Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 24.
29 Michael King, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’, Luhmann on Law and Politics.
Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 47.
30 ibid 51.
31 ‘Deparadoxification means to invent new distinctions which do not deny the paradox
but dispalce it temporarily and thus relieve it of its paralysing power.’ Gunther
Teubner, ‘Economics of Gift – Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of Jacques
Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’ (2001) 18 Theory, Culture and Society 29, 32.
32 King and Thornhill (n 2) 22.
33 Teubner, ‘Economics of Gift – Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of Jacques
Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’ (n 31) 39.
34 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-Production’, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production
of Science and Social Order (Routledge 2004) 3.
35 Friedrich A Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and
Michael Wutz trs, Stanford University Press 1999) xl.
36 Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young tr,
Stanford University Press 2008) 12.
37 Professor Geoffrey Winthrop-Young evaluates whether it would be feasible to
combine Kittler’s views on media and technology with Luhmann’s systems theory.
According to his view, there is not enough common ground to form a basis for such
hybrid theory regardless of some communalities between their starting points.
Winthrop-Young’s analysis has many merits. However, his analysis does not take
into consideration the potential of structural couplings that may relay information
between different systems much in the same way as Jasanoff’s co-production. See
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, ‘Silicon Sociology, Or, Two Kings on Hegel’s Throne?
Kittler, Luhmann, and the Posthuman Merger of German Media Theory’ (2000) 13
The Yale Journal of Criticism 391, 417. Another train of thought that should be
sought within the framework of systems theory is the possibility of system boundaries
becoming fuzzy, which could result from the decreasing ability of subsystems to
make continuous distinctions as the overall complexity of society and the use of ICT
increases. In other words, do the changes in communication media affect the
constitution of system boundaries? Unfortunately, this issue cannot be further
discussed in this context.
38 Fischer-Lescano (n 24) 8.
39 ‘[Critical systems theory] reveals the contingencies and the political controversies
about these interconnections [in communication], by reading the theory against its
grain with deconstructive elements.’ Andreas Fischer-Lescano (n 24) 4.
40 Adopting Luhmann’s theory as a starting point does not mean that the theory should
be applied in its entirety without the possibility of conceptual supplements. Presumably Luhmann would not be completely averse to this. In fact, Luhmann applies
Thomas Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions without bringing Kuhn’s context to
the application: ‘A rough orientation will suffice to define what we have so far called a
“paradigm change”. We need not concern ourselves with finding out what Kuhn had
in mind when he introduced the concept of paradigm. That is a pointless task today.’
Luhmann, Social Systems (n 3) 4.
41 Fischer-Lescano (n 24) 13.
42 ibid.
54 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology