19 Similarly, ‘A world focused on regulating, influencing or even enforcing behaviours has
little to do with legal normativity. If one cannot disobey a law it is not law but
discipline, as Hegel suggested.’ Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End
(s) of Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 226.
20 Caroline Binham, ‘ICO Regulation Inconsistent as Cryptocurrency Bubble Fears
Growm’ Financial Times (London, 24 November 2017), available at https://www.ft.
com/content/32315636-cb01-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e (accessed 27 June 2018).
21 M King, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’, Luhmann on Law and Politics.
Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 47.
22 M Zalnieriute and T Schneider, ‘ICANN’s Procedures and Policies in the Light of
Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Democratic Values’ (Council of Europe
2014) DGI (2014) 12 available at http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/icannand-human-rights.asp (accessed 27 June 2018). Also, RW Rijgersberg, The State of
Interdependence: Globalization, Internet and Constitutional Governance (TMC Asser
Press 2010) 69-NaN, 215. An often quoted criticism of multi-stakeholder model
comes from Paul R Lehto: ‘In a democracy, it is a scandal that lobbyists have so much
influence that they even write the drafts of laws. But in multi-stakeholder situations they
take that scandal to a whole new level: those who would be lobbyists in a democracy
(corporations, experts, civil society) become the legislators themselves, and dispense with
all public elections and not only write the laws but pass them, enforce them, and in
some cases even set up courts of arbitration that are usually conditioned on waiving the
right to go to the court system set up by democracies.’ The statement is often quoted
without references, as it has apparently first appeared within the Civil Society Internet
Governance Forum. See e.g. Tom Lowenhaupt, ‘Governance of the .nyc TLD’, available at http://www.coactivate.org/projects/campaign-for.nyc/blog/2012/10/02/
governance-of-the-nyc-tld/ (accessed 27 June 2018).
23 See above, Chapter 7, section 7.1.3, and ‘Guide on Article 6 – Civil Limb’, available at
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf (accessed 27 June
2018) 23.
24 As discussed above in Chapter 3, section 3.1, Lister et al. have also recognised the neoliberal underpinnings of promoting ICTs in general. Lister M and others, New Media:
A Critical Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 11.
25 De Filippi has addressed the possibilities and challenges of regulating cryptocurrencies.
See De Filippi (n 8).
26 See e.g., Cortés (n 3) 62–64. For example, World Trustmark Alliance was developed
in 2010. However, members of the voluntary mechanisms are still few and far
between. On members of the alliance, see World Trustmark Alliance, ‘Member
Introduction’ at http://www.worldtrustmark.org/index.php/aboutwta/introduc
tion.html (accessed 27 June 2018).
New bases for justification 191
little to do with legal normativity. If one cannot disobey a law it is not law but
discipline, as Hegel suggested.’ Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End
(s) of Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 226.
20 Caroline Binham, ‘ICO Regulation Inconsistent as Cryptocurrency Bubble Fears
Growm’ Financial Times (London, 24 November 2017), available at https://www.ft.
com/content/32315636-cb01-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e (accessed 27 June 2018).
21 M King, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’, Luhmann on Law and Politics.
Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 47.
22 M Zalnieriute and T Schneider, ‘ICANN’s Procedures and Policies in the Light of
Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Democratic Values’ (Council of Europe
2014) DGI (2014) 12 available at http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/icannand-human-rights.asp (accessed 27 June 2018). Also, RW Rijgersberg, The State of
Interdependence: Globalization, Internet and Constitutional Governance (TMC Asser
Press 2010) 69-NaN, 215. An often quoted criticism of multi-stakeholder model
comes from Paul R Lehto: ‘In a democracy, it is a scandal that lobbyists have so much
influence that they even write the drafts of laws. But in multi-stakeholder situations they
take that scandal to a whole new level: those who would be lobbyists in a democracy
(corporations, experts, civil society) become the legislators themselves, and dispense with
all public elections and not only write the laws but pass them, enforce them, and in
some cases even set up courts of arbitration that are usually conditioned on waiving the
right to go to the court system set up by democracies.’ The statement is often quoted
without references, as it has apparently first appeared within the Civil Society Internet
Governance Forum. See e.g. Tom Lowenhaupt, ‘Governance of the .nyc TLD’, available at http://www.coactivate.org/projects/campaign-for.nyc/blog/2012/10/02/
governance-of-the-nyc-tld/ (accessed 27 June 2018).
23 See above, Chapter 7, section 7.1.3, and ‘Guide on Article 6 – Civil Limb’, available at
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf (accessed 27 June
2018) 23.
24 As discussed above in Chapter 3, section 3.1, Lister et al. have also recognised the neoliberal underpinnings of promoting ICTs in general. Lister M and others, New Media:
A Critical Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 11.
25 De Filippi has addressed the possibilities and challenges of regulating cryptocurrencies.
See De Filippi (n 8).
26 See e.g., Cortés (n 3) 62–64. For example, World Trustmark Alliance was developed
in 2010. However, members of the voluntary mechanisms are still few and far
between. On members of the alliance, see World Trustmark Alliance, ‘Member
Introduction’ at http://www.worldtrustmark.org/index.php/aboutwta/introduc
tion.html (accessed 27 June 2018).
New bases for justification 191