However, as Cox points out, Locke’s political philosophy does not actually
include a theory of international relations, although it is evident that he did not
advocate a global world-state.
34
Sovereignty and globalisation
From the basis of work conducted by Locke and Rousseau, the absolutist
perception of sovereignty subsequently translated into popular sovereignty in
the eighteenth century. This idea of popular sovereignty saw the people as the
source of sovereign power. This interpretation was later incorporated into the
revolutionary constitutions of America and France in the end of that century.
35
Although social contract theories have developed under completely different
social conditions, their remnants are present in our current understanding of the
relationship between society, law, governance and the consent of the governed.
These roots can be found, for example, in the focal role of the principle of
democracy, which has its roots in popular sovereignty. This consent of the
governed, which interestingly is also the basis of contractual relationships, is
central to democratic justification of rule creation, to juris-diction, where ‘we’
speak the law to us.
36
Several scholars have discussed the future of sovereignty in a globalised
world, where European integration and the globalisation of markets and communication have created competing authorities alongside the traditional supremacy of the nation-state. Castells has analysed the changes of nation-states
brought on by globalisation in general and the emergence of new technology
in particular. As crime, financial markets and technology are increasingly
detaching from the nation-state, sovereignty is increasingly shared by multiple
stakeholders in addition to the state. According to Castells, we are witnessing
‘the systemic erosion of their [nation-states’] power in exchange for their
durability’.
37 Instead of the demise of the nation-state, Castells suggest the
emergence of a network state, where the states will become nodes in a network
of power. Instead of upholding Bodin’s absolutist concept of sovereignty,
Castells claims that parts of sovereignty are escaping beyond the state and the
states become more and more dependent on one another and other players of
the power network.
38
Mutanen examines the role and interpretation of sovereignty in the context of
European integration and the EU and asks what has changed regarding state
sovereignty as the Member States have transferred some of their sovereign power
to the EU. Her comparative analysis of how sovereignty is interpreted and
perceived in different EU Member States illustrates how the changes brought
on by integration are acknowledged in national constitutional understandings.
The paradoxical nature of combining the theory of sovereignty with current
constitutional practice raises the question of the scope of the concept’s flexibility.
Mutanen considers that the concept of sovereignty is still relevant in constitutional law and, by reinterpretation, the theory can be accommodated to modern
constitutional pluralism, which she advocates as the solution.
39
Sovereignty and state agenda 115
include a theory of international relations, although it is evident that he did not
advocate a global world-state.
34
Sovereignty and globalisation
From the basis of work conducted by Locke and Rousseau, the absolutist
perception of sovereignty subsequently translated into popular sovereignty in
the eighteenth century. This idea of popular sovereignty saw the people as the
source of sovereign power. This interpretation was later incorporated into the
revolutionary constitutions of America and France in the end of that century.
35
Although social contract theories have developed under completely different
social conditions, their remnants are present in our current understanding of the
relationship between society, law, governance and the consent of the governed.
These roots can be found, for example, in the focal role of the principle of
democracy, which has its roots in popular sovereignty. This consent of the
governed, which interestingly is also the basis of contractual relationships, is
central to democratic justification of rule creation, to juris-diction, where ‘we’
speak the law to us.
36
Several scholars have discussed the future of sovereignty in a globalised
world, where European integration and the globalisation of markets and communication have created competing authorities alongside the traditional supremacy of the nation-state. Castells has analysed the changes of nation-states
brought on by globalisation in general and the emergence of new technology
in particular. As crime, financial markets and technology are increasingly
detaching from the nation-state, sovereignty is increasingly shared by multiple
stakeholders in addition to the state. According to Castells, we are witnessing
‘the systemic erosion of their [nation-states’] power in exchange for their
durability’.
37 Instead of the demise of the nation-state, Castells suggest the
emergence of a network state, where the states will become nodes in a network
of power. Instead of upholding Bodin’s absolutist concept of sovereignty,
Castells claims that parts of sovereignty are escaping beyond the state and the
states become more and more dependent on one another and other players of
the power network.
38
Mutanen examines the role and interpretation of sovereignty in the context of
European integration and the EU and asks what has changed regarding state
sovereignty as the Member States have transferred some of their sovereign power
to the EU. Her comparative analysis of how sovereignty is interpreted and
perceived in different EU Member States illustrates how the changes brought
on by integration are acknowledged in national constitutional understandings.
The paradoxical nature of combining the theory of sovereignty with current
constitutional practice raises the question of the scope of the concept’s flexibility.
Mutanen considers that the concept of sovereignty is still relevant in constitutional law and, by reinterpretation, the theory can be accommodated to modern
constitutional pluralism, which she advocates as the solution.
39
Sovereignty and state agenda 115