5 It could be claimed that the question of precedents is a question of law’s self-renewal.
According to Luhmann, structures provide constraint and internal guidance for the
system’s autopoiesis. See N Luhmann, Social Systems (John Bedmarz, Jr and Dirk
Baecker trs, Stanford University Press 1995) 85, 282–283. When examining the
relationship between court precedents and the traditional ideal model, we notice that
the structures within the legal system have changed. However, the change in structures
should not be understood as synonymous to lack of structures, which would lead to
disruption of guidance for autopoiesis.
6 Oreste Pollicino and Marco Bassini, ‘The Law of the Internet between Globalisation
and Localisation’ in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (eds), Transnational Law. Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University
Press 2014) 361.
7 ibid.
8 This follows Luhmann’s understanding. According to Luhmann, who considers the
issue on a higher level of abstraction, ‘Questions of final justification can only be
answered within the self-referential theories of self-referential systems’. See Luhmann,
Social Systems (n 5) 485.
9 On programmes and programming see Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Fatima
Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert tr, Oxford University Press 2004) 118.
10 ibid 381.
11 Baraldi et al. formulate this elegantly: ‘Ohne Teilnahme von Bewussstseinsystemen
gibt es keine Kommunikation, und ohne Teilnahme an Kommunikation gibt es keine
Entwicklung des Bewusstseins.’ Claudio Baraldi, Giancarlo Corsi and Elena Esposito,
Glossar Zu Niklas Luhmanns Theorie Sozialer Systeme (Suhrkamp Verlag 1997) 86.
12 ibid 85–88.
13 As Luhmann states, this example is a simplification. See, Luhmann, Law as a Social
System (n 9) 189.
14 ibid 190–193.
15 ibid 193.
16 Günther Teubner, ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of
Law?’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 1, 11.
17 Luhmann, Law as a Social System (n 9) 196–201.
18 ibid 195.
19 ibid 201.
20 Emilios Christodoulidis, ‘The Objection That Cannot Be Heard: Communication and
Legitimacy in the Courtroom’ in Antony Duff and others (eds), The Trial on Trial
Volume 1: Truth and Due Process (Hart Publishing 2004).
21 ‘If the symmetry between addressor and addressee of norms is not assumed at some
level, the imposition of a norm on a citizen who isn’t its addressor needs to seek an
external justification and this externality instantly imports a certain arbitrariness into
the political context, a question-begging premise. This applies to most kinds of
arguments that are called upon to provide such external justifications, whether natural
law arguments, arguments from authority, or whatever. . .. I want simply to warn that
“external” reasons for silencing statements (rather than democratic/ consensual ones)
are only binding to those who find them convincing and thus carry uncertain
justificatory weight . . .’ See ibid 188.
22 ibid 198.
23 On trustmarks see P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European
Union (Routledge 2011) 60–66.
24 According to Luhmann, another example of this is “the much-decried erosion of
traditional societies’ cultural heritage”. See, Luhmann, Social Systems (n 5) 92.
25 This truism is often so self-evident that it is not necessary to express it in words;
however, it is still presumed to be a template for formulating cooperation instruments.
Heading towards justification 107
According to Luhmann, structures provide constraint and internal guidance for the
system’s autopoiesis. See N Luhmann, Social Systems (John Bedmarz, Jr and Dirk
Baecker trs, Stanford University Press 1995) 85, 282–283. When examining the
relationship between court precedents and the traditional ideal model, we notice that
the structures within the legal system have changed. However, the change in structures
should not be understood as synonymous to lack of structures, which would lead to
disruption of guidance for autopoiesis.
6 Oreste Pollicino and Marco Bassini, ‘The Law of the Internet between Globalisation
and Localisation’ in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (eds), Transnational Law. Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University
Press 2014) 361.
7 ibid.
8 This follows Luhmann’s understanding. According to Luhmann, who considers the
issue on a higher level of abstraction, ‘Questions of final justification can only be
answered within the self-referential theories of self-referential systems’. See Luhmann,
Social Systems (n 5) 485.
9 On programmes and programming see Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Fatima
Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert tr, Oxford University Press 2004) 118.
10 ibid 381.
11 Baraldi et al. formulate this elegantly: ‘Ohne Teilnahme von Bewussstseinsystemen
gibt es keine Kommunikation, und ohne Teilnahme an Kommunikation gibt es keine
Entwicklung des Bewusstseins.’ Claudio Baraldi, Giancarlo Corsi and Elena Esposito,
Glossar Zu Niklas Luhmanns Theorie Sozialer Systeme (Suhrkamp Verlag 1997) 86.
12 ibid 85–88.
13 As Luhmann states, this example is a simplification. See, Luhmann, Law as a Social
System (n 9) 189.
14 ibid 190–193.
15 ibid 193.
16 Günther Teubner, ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of
Law?’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 1, 11.
17 Luhmann, Law as a Social System (n 9) 196–201.
18 ibid 195.
19 ibid 201.
20 Emilios Christodoulidis, ‘The Objection That Cannot Be Heard: Communication and
Legitimacy in the Courtroom’ in Antony Duff and others (eds), The Trial on Trial
Volume 1: Truth and Due Process (Hart Publishing 2004).
21 ‘If the symmetry between addressor and addressee of norms is not assumed at some
level, the imposition of a norm on a citizen who isn’t its addressor needs to seek an
external justification and this externality instantly imports a certain arbitrariness into
the political context, a question-begging premise. This applies to most kinds of
arguments that are called upon to provide such external justifications, whether natural
law arguments, arguments from authority, or whatever. . .. I want simply to warn that
“external” reasons for silencing statements (rather than democratic/ consensual ones)
are only binding to those who find them convincing and thus carry uncertain
justificatory weight . . .’ See ibid 188.
22 ibid 198.
23 On trustmarks see P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European
Union (Routledge 2011) 60–66.
24 According to Luhmann, another example of this is “the much-decried erosion of
traditional societies’ cultural heritage”. See, Luhmann, Social Systems (n 5) 92.
25 This truism is often so self-evident that it is not necessary to express it in words;
however, it is still presumed to be a template for formulating cooperation instruments.
Heading towards justification 107