Now, in the twenty-first century, ‘Luddite’ has become a pejorative word for
describing someone who resists technological change. Neoluddites are seen as
old-fashioned fools who are unable to find any reason, other than their own
inability, to oppose technological innovation. However, a look into history
reveals that the original Luddites did not object to advances in technology as
such, but to the social implications inherent in the mechanisation of manual
labour, which left them unemployed and on the verge of famine.
Two hundred years later we are talking about a new chapter in automation,
namely that of non-routine cognitive labour. We are amidst a change the impact
of which expands into the established field of law. The question that arises is,
how should we react to the shifts in the legal system brought on by technology,
especially those transforming the core of many legal practices, dispute resolution?
Should we become luddites and claim ownership of the term, and, in a bid to
preserve the fundamental elements of our old-established practices in the name of
justice, break the new frames of technology? Or are we to embrace the change,
come to grips with it, define its nature, to create a frame for technology inside
law? In order to find answers, we must first understand what are the implications
of this complex and multifaceted change created by the interplay between law,
technology and society. Grasping the meaning of change, especially the meaning
of technological change within an established, long-lasting, and authoritative field
of law, requires a leap of faith. In order to see beyond the devastating threats of
technology painted by the technophobes and the infinite possibilities preached by
the technophiles, we need to place technological innovation in its historical
context to define how the current disruptive trends affect the application of law.
This is a book about on-going technological change in the society, about
digitalisation of legal practices, and about the impact that digital technologies
have on the most quintessential of legal practices, dispute resolution. I claim that
the implementation of digital technologies in dispute resolution creates a discrepancy in the ways in which we have justified the establishment, function, and
appearances of dispute resolution. In pursuing an understanding of technology in
dispute resolution, we enter a world of many questions and few answers.
1 This
objective connects with the wider inquiry into what exactly technological
disruption
2 means for the legal system. Over recent years disruption has become
almost synonymous with technological innovation, and, although it is probable
that data analytics, AI applications such as neural networks and machine learning
as well as increasing automation will alter the legal profession’s working methods,
it remains open to what extent these emerging technologies will, in fact, disrupt
the essence of legal practice. However, one consequence of legal technologies has
already become visible. Technological solutions developed by non-lawyers to
tackle legal problems are gaining ground and thus challenge the lawyers’ professional hegemony on deciding how dispute resolution should be organised.
Questions on the implications of technology tend to voice both our hopes and
fears. Will computer judges driven by artificial intelligence soon replace human
intuition? Is human error removed from the equation? Are we finally reaching an
era of true access to justice or are we endangering the stability of society? By
4 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
describing someone who resists technological change. Neoluddites are seen as
old-fashioned fools who are unable to find any reason, other than their own
inability, to oppose technological innovation. However, a look into history
reveals that the original Luddites did not object to advances in technology as
such, but to the social implications inherent in the mechanisation of manual
labour, which left them unemployed and on the verge of famine.
Two hundred years later we are talking about a new chapter in automation,
namely that of non-routine cognitive labour. We are amidst a change the impact
of which expands into the established field of law. The question that arises is,
how should we react to the shifts in the legal system brought on by technology,
especially those transforming the core of many legal practices, dispute resolution?
Should we become luddites and claim ownership of the term, and, in a bid to
preserve the fundamental elements of our old-established practices in the name of
justice, break the new frames of technology? Or are we to embrace the change,
come to grips with it, define its nature, to create a frame for technology inside
law? In order to find answers, we must first understand what are the implications
of this complex and multifaceted change created by the interplay between law,
technology and society. Grasping the meaning of change, especially the meaning
of technological change within an established, long-lasting, and authoritative field
of law, requires a leap of faith. In order to see beyond the devastating threats of
technology painted by the technophobes and the infinite possibilities preached by
the technophiles, we need to place technological innovation in its historical
context to define how the current disruptive trends affect the application of law.
This is a book about on-going technological change in the society, about
digitalisation of legal practices, and about the impact that digital technologies
have on the most quintessential of legal practices, dispute resolution. I claim that
the implementation of digital technologies in dispute resolution creates a discrepancy in the ways in which we have justified the establishment, function, and
appearances of dispute resolution. In pursuing an understanding of technology in
dispute resolution, we enter a world of many questions and few answers.
1 This
objective connects with the wider inquiry into what exactly technological
disruption
2 means for the legal system. Over recent years disruption has become
almost synonymous with technological innovation, and, although it is probable
that data analytics, AI applications such as neural networks and machine learning
as well as increasing automation will alter the legal profession’s working methods,
it remains open to what extent these emerging technologies will, in fact, disrupt
the essence of legal practice. However, one consequence of legal technologies has
already become visible. Technological solutions developed by non-lawyers to
tackle legal problems are gaining ground and thus challenge the lawyers’ professional hegemony on deciding how dispute resolution should be organised.
Questions on the implications of technology tend to voice both our hopes and
fears. Will computer judges driven by artificial intelligence soon replace human
intuition? Is human error removed from the equation? Are we finally reaching an
era of true access to justice or are we endangering the stability of society? By
4 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology