77
Essences of Interaction
of the building collapse can be only partly determined. The event in question
(the “focus” event—the earthquake) is the event that one wants to discuss in
terms of the details of causality. That the focus event is preceded by objectively measurable events is complicated because these events are mostly
countless, with a few being identifiable. The level of delectability of proximate events challenges technology and human cognition. If any one of these
objective events is implicated in a proximate event, then it is usually termed
as a “direct” causal event (insurance companies may associate an earthquake
with an increase in seasonal rain (as was the case in the year prior to the 1906
San Francisco earthquake), but that correlation may not be known to be
causal). Direct causal events are those events that share the responsibility for
the event along with its direct consequences. Should a building inspector not
observe or by circumstance ignore a safety item designated as critical, the
action of the inspector may be implicated in the collapse of the building. As
such, the inspector may bear some responsibility for the collapse, being associated with a proximate cause.
Causality in its most general sense means to not be random. There is
always a pertinent and identifiable relation between an object and an event, or
an object and a process, or a process and a process, or an object and an object.
The notion of randomness is rejected for this presentation. Fundamentally, if
our knowledge was sufficient to know the meaning of all events, all objective
causes, and all circumstances, then (and only then) could the notion of randomness be rejected. As the aim of this book is to explore boundaries, identify constraints, and posit relations between objects and processes for the
purposes of interaction and integration, the deeper the exploration, the
greater the information, and (perhaps) the better match with our perceived
realities. Certainly, the greater our acceptance of the results, the “deeper our
debt” to the like-kind guiding notions.
Objective causalities exactly imply the sequence of events, one instant at a
time. The determination of the boundaries of the objects spans any number
of events until the output EMMI of the sending object (to be here considered
as the cause, i.e., the cause-object) is transformed by another object. It is reasonably arguable that every object at least has the potential to transform
their input EMMI into something that is different, but perhaps not so different that the change is discernable following examination by an outside
observer. So, at best, an outside observer might perceive only a few events,
misexamine some, not detect changes, and maybe not even recognize a
change as having taken place. The result is a blurring of objects (their physical boundaries, their functions, and behaviors) and their respective boundaries. It is suggestive that identifying mechanisms may be difficult at the
elemental object level and that only after some degree of integration will
mechanisms be discernable and examinable.
But only an arbitrariness contrived by our will limits the extent of the phenomena about which we inquire. Human consciousness implicitly limits perceptions in a way that may seem arbitrary and capricious (to a different
Essences of Interaction
of the building collapse can be only partly determined. The event in question
(the “focus” event—the earthquake) is the event that one wants to discuss in
terms of the details of causality. That the focus event is preceded by objectively measurable events is complicated because these events are mostly
countless, with a few being identifiable. The level of delectability of proximate events challenges technology and human cognition. If any one of these
objective events is implicated in a proximate event, then it is usually termed
as a “direct” causal event (insurance companies may associate an earthquake
with an increase in seasonal rain (as was the case in the year prior to the 1906
San Francisco earthquake), but that correlation may not be known to be
causal). Direct causal events are those events that share the responsibility for
the event along with its direct consequences. Should a building inspector not
observe or by circumstance ignore a safety item designated as critical, the
action of the inspector may be implicated in the collapse of the building. As
such, the inspector may bear some responsibility for the collapse, being associated with a proximate cause.
Causality in its most general sense means to not be random. There is
always a pertinent and identifiable relation between an object and an event, or
an object and a process, or a process and a process, or an object and an object.
The notion of randomness is rejected for this presentation. Fundamentally, if
our knowledge was sufficient to know the meaning of all events, all objective
causes, and all circumstances, then (and only then) could the notion of randomness be rejected. As the aim of this book is to explore boundaries, identify constraints, and posit relations between objects and processes for the
purposes of interaction and integration, the deeper the exploration, the
greater the information, and (perhaps) the better match with our perceived
realities. Certainly, the greater our acceptance of the results, the “deeper our
debt” to the like-kind guiding notions.
Objective causalities exactly imply the sequence of events, one instant at a
time. The determination of the boundaries of the objects spans any number
of events until the output EMMI of the sending object (to be here considered
as the cause, i.e., the cause-object) is transformed by another object. It is reasonably arguable that every object at least has the potential to transform
their input EMMI into something that is different, but perhaps not so different that the change is discernable following examination by an outside
observer. So, at best, an outside observer might perceive only a few events,
misexamine some, not detect changes, and maybe not even recognize a
change as having taken place. The result is a blurring of objects (their physical boundaries, their functions, and behaviors) and their respective boundaries. It is suggestive that identifying mechanisms may be difficult at the
elemental object level and that only after some degree of integration will
mechanisms be discernable and examinable.
But only an arbitrariness contrived by our will limits the extent of the phenomena about which we inquire. Human consciousness implicitly limits perceptions in a way that may seem arbitrary and capricious (to a different