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Foundations in Systems Integration
variables, the framework must suggest new models of practice (and likely,
possible extensions of theory).
Simplicity is a desired outcome so that both circuitous and the sublime
notions find their places. The ultimate aim is to formulate a theory framework that is both holistic by design and sufficiently introspective to be useful
to disciplines (Swanson 2007).
If the framework was particularly theoretical, it might tend to (1) cover a
limited number of categories and variability, (2) not contribute to the practice
of integration, and (3) overlook what it could not explain. If the framework
was overly practical, observations might be made in the absence of their
implications; there might be no discernable context for defining relations
between variables in the context of what remains unknown; and there would
be no reliable method to extend best practices beyond some limits of ambiguity. Systems engineering suffers from an overly practical implementation
without a theory framework that is integral to its proclamations and variety
of usages (in spite of “standards”).
Integration as Mechanism
Objects interact and systems become systems through integration. Working
from a sociological neopositivist position—the aim of which is naively stated
to associate causal actions with events—a workable framework can be substantiated on theoretical grounds that integration is mechanistic by its
nature. The discursive objects of integration—illation, ontology, epistemology, axiology, methodology, metaphysics, and ideological inferences and
deductions—form the essence of integration, its nature, that is, the indispensible qualities exhibited by it abstractions, decompositions, and extractions.
The concept of integration is itself an integration of cognitive representations
or models of reality. If there is logic to integration, then that logic shall (1) be
defined as sufficient to support detailed analysis and interpretation of within
a framework of relevant variables; (2) be based on a consistent set of assumptions; (3) stipulate the ontology of formalisms that translate into each other;
(4) reside within the traditions of epistemology; (5) agree on a narrative that
elicits particular interpretations of phenomenology; (6) be a consistent set of
metaphysical facts that relate “phenomena as a whole to other genera of existence” (Lewes 1875); (7) support a set of value structures that are at least
partially, piece-wise predictable; and (8) apply methodology to define and
transform relations into knowledge (Lazarsfeld 1993). The methods of integration are bound in natural processes and inspired by human methods. We
refer to integration as a method.
All things in parts that become whole are boffo examples of the processes
that result in integration. Integration must deal with the inconsistencies and
cross-purposes of all constituent parts, the end result being the integrated
Foundations in Systems Integration
variables, the framework must suggest new models of practice (and likely,
possible extensions of theory).
Simplicity is a desired outcome so that both circuitous and the sublime
notions find their places. The ultimate aim is to formulate a theory framework that is both holistic by design and sufficiently introspective to be useful
to disciplines (Swanson 2007).
If the framework was particularly theoretical, it might tend to (1) cover a
limited number of categories and variability, (2) not contribute to the practice
of integration, and (3) overlook what it could not explain. If the framework
was overly practical, observations might be made in the absence of their
implications; there might be no discernable context for defining relations
between variables in the context of what remains unknown; and there would
be no reliable method to extend best practices beyond some limits of ambiguity. Systems engineering suffers from an overly practical implementation
without a theory framework that is integral to its proclamations and variety
of usages (in spite of “standards”).
Integration as Mechanism
Objects interact and systems become systems through integration. Working
from a sociological neopositivist position—the aim of which is naively stated
to associate causal actions with events—a workable framework can be substantiated on theoretical grounds that integration is mechanistic by its
nature. The discursive objects of integration—illation, ontology, epistemology, axiology, methodology, metaphysics, and ideological inferences and
deductions—form the essence of integration, its nature, that is, the indispensible qualities exhibited by it abstractions, decompositions, and extractions.
The concept of integration is itself an integration of cognitive representations
or models of reality. If there is logic to integration, then that logic shall (1) be
defined as sufficient to support detailed analysis and interpretation of within
a framework of relevant variables; (2) be based on a consistent set of assumptions; (3) stipulate the ontology of formalisms that translate into each other;
(4) reside within the traditions of epistemology; (5) agree on a narrative that
elicits particular interpretations of phenomenology; (6) be a consistent set of
metaphysical facts that relate “phenomena as a whole to other genera of existence” (Lewes 1875); (7) support a set of value structures that are at least
partially, piece-wise predictable; and (8) apply methodology to define and
transform relations into knowledge (Lazarsfeld 1993). The methods of integration are bound in natural processes and inspired by human methods. We
refer to integration as a method.
All things in parts that become whole are boffo examples of the processes
that result in integration. Integration must deal with the inconsistencies and
cross-purposes of all constituent parts, the end result being the integrated