6.1 Working on Discourses
73
As Fig. 6.1 illustrates, social investment based on working on discourses was
company-centred. This means that working on social investment focussed on meeting
the best interests of O&G companies. Social investment grounded in working on
discourses sought (in the words of many of my participants) to enhance the company’s
brand reputation and ‘bribe’ communities and governments. According to my participants, examples of this form of social investment included one-off donations of
a particular good (such as a power generator) and money and gifts-in-kind to a
particular political party.
Figure 6.1 also indicates that social investment based on working on discourses
was non-participatory. The O&G company retained full control of the selection and
implementation of the social investment programme. In contrast, communities and
governments had no part in deciding or shaping the social programmes, which
restricted community and government agency. Communities and the government
were only the recipients of the ‘benefits’ of O&G social investment, not partners in
decision-making.
Additionally, working on social investment did not comply with a code of ethics
(see Fig. 6.1). Rather, companies could be seen as harming the host society by
increasing communities and government’s dependency upon the resources provided,
which creates dependency (see Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2005). However,
dependency has also been historically constructed in negative moralistic ways
according to Ferguson (2013, 2015). In this book, it is not my intention to make
a moralistic claim against dependency when unpacking broader discourses of social
investment. I do acknowledge, however, that the notion of dependency often reflects
hierarchical relations of power, which impact communities when O&G social investment is introduced. Nevertheless, I am aware that companies may rhetorically use
fears of dependency to justify avoiding fully committing to a corporate–community relationship according to community expectations (Ferguson 2013, 2015).
The following examples illustrate how participants drew on working on discourses
when discussing social investment while critiquing top-down approaches to social
investment.
Participants’ narratives revealed considerable opposition to social investment
framed as working on communities. The following excerpt from a social investment
expert’s interview discussion illustrates such resistance:
There is one [type of social investment] that is actually a form of bribery, because it is
the easiest way to do, right? This is when companies unfortunately use donations, such
as building a soccer field, or a school […] This has happened in [names country] where
a company built a library and five years later, when I went back to the country, I went
to see the library and the roof was missing and the windows had been stolen and that is
basically because the community had never assimilated [the library]. This was a gift, which
was idealised by the company, but it was never seen as a real necessity [by the community].
They [the community] never valued it. (P11, translated)
Another social investment expert echoed similar views: “I think that many companies
see SI [Social Investment] as a charitable donation and that is a completely wrong
approach. It raises expectations of communities and also leads to no outcome” (P3).
73
As Fig. 6.1 illustrates, social investment based on working on discourses was
company-centred. This means that working on social investment focussed on meeting
the best interests of O&G companies. Social investment grounded in working on
discourses sought (in the words of many of my participants) to enhance the company’s
brand reputation and ‘bribe’ communities and governments. According to my participants, examples of this form of social investment included one-off donations of
a particular good (such as a power generator) and money and gifts-in-kind to a
particular political party.
Figure 6.1 also indicates that social investment based on working on discourses
was non-participatory. The O&G company retained full control of the selection and
implementation of the social investment programme. In contrast, communities and
governments had no part in deciding or shaping the social programmes, which
restricted community and government agency. Communities and the government
were only the recipients of the ‘benefits’ of O&G social investment, not partners in
decision-making.
Additionally, working on social investment did not comply with a code of ethics
(see Fig. 6.1). Rather, companies could be seen as harming the host society by
increasing communities and government’s dependency upon the resources provided,
which creates dependency (see Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2005). However,
dependency has also been historically constructed in negative moralistic ways
according to Ferguson (2013, 2015). In this book, it is not my intention to make
a moralistic claim against dependency when unpacking broader discourses of social
investment. I do acknowledge, however, that the notion of dependency often reflects
hierarchical relations of power, which impact communities when O&G social investment is introduced. Nevertheless, I am aware that companies may rhetorically use
fears of dependency to justify avoiding fully committing to a corporate–community relationship according to community expectations (Ferguson 2013, 2015).
The following examples illustrate how participants drew on working on discourses
when discussing social investment while critiquing top-down approaches to social
investment.
Participants’ narratives revealed considerable opposition to social investment
framed as working on communities. The following excerpt from a social investment
expert’s interview discussion illustrates such resistance:
There is one [type of social investment] that is actually a form of bribery, because it is
the easiest way to do, right? This is when companies unfortunately use donations, such
as building a soccer field, or a school […] This has happened in [names country] where
a company built a library and five years later, when I went back to the country, I went
to see the library and the roof was missing and the windows had been stolen and that is
basically because the community had never assimilated [the library]. This was a gift, which
was idealised by the company, but it was never seen as a real necessity [by the community].
They [the community] never valued it. (P11, translated)
Another social investment expert echoed similar views: “I think that many companies
see SI [Social Investment] as a charitable donation and that is a completely wrong
approach. It raises expectations of communities and also leads to no outcome” (P3).