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9 Closing Reflections
around and working for discourses respectively), operation risk mitigation (mainly
informed by working around discourses), social compensation for operation impacts
(mainly informed by working around discourses) and community development
(mainly informed by working with discourses). O&G experts in this research aimed
to address these multiple functions with one single tool: social investment. Arguably,
social investment was positioned by both participants and the guideline documents
as a kind of ‘miracle’ tool for addressing multiple institutional requirements. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the participants’ discussion and guideline documents
revealed multiple, conflicting discourses in relation to social investment.
One way of addressing the contradictions inherent in how social investment is
currently conceptualised would be to limit the scope or intent of social investment.
Instead of approaching social investment as the company’s sole approach to community engagement needs, social investment could be conceptualised solely as a means
to address community development aspirations. These should be determined via a
community-centred, participatory approach, as reflected in working with discourses.
In my study, participants’ narratives and guideline documents positioned community engagement functions, such as disclosure of information of operational activities,
social and/or legal license to operate, operation risk mitigation and social compensation as mainly centred on business considerations. This suggests that these functions
should fall outside the social investment arena, and may be better addressed by
other (more transparent) corporate mechanisms of community engagement aimed at
fulfilling the interests of O&G operations.
If social investment was conceptualised only as a mechanism to address community development aspirations, social investment experts could draw on working with
discourses when thinking about and implementing social investment. However, given
that the bottom line of O&G companies is to make a profit, drawing solely on working
with discourses of social investment may be impossible. Where human relations are
shaped and articulated through a power imbalance intended to address the economic
interests of powerful groups, the profit interests will always dominate O&G activities
(Andreotti, 2011; Freire & Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973). In other words,
removing profit-making considerations from O&G social investment experts will not
change broader company imperatives.
Nevertheless, social investment experts can still be seen as playing a very important role for host communities. Given that there is an inherent power imbalance
between O&G companies and host communities, and that social investment experts
‘sit’ between companies and impacted communities, then social investment experts
are key players in the company–community relationship. This is because social
investment experts, as company insiders, can access company decision-making
mechanisms and serve as community ‘translators’, and potentially, advocates. If, as
argued above, social investment experts’ work was solely focussed on working with
communities, social investment experts could be more effective as community advocates, or community liaison personnel. However, for social investment experts’ work
to have value in the inherently unequal O&G context, then companies would need to
recognise the complexity and the importance of the work that they do, and provide the
9 Closing Reflections
around and working for discourses respectively), operation risk mitigation (mainly
informed by working around discourses), social compensation for operation impacts
(mainly informed by working around discourses) and community development
(mainly informed by working with discourses). O&G experts in this research aimed
to address these multiple functions with one single tool: social investment. Arguably,
social investment was positioned by both participants and the guideline documents
as a kind of ‘miracle’ tool for addressing multiple institutional requirements. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the participants’ discussion and guideline documents
revealed multiple, conflicting discourses in relation to social investment.
One way of addressing the contradictions inherent in how social investment is
currently conceptualised would be to limit the scope or intent of social investment.
Instead of approaching social investment as the company’s sole approach to community engagement needs, social investment could be conceptualised solely as a means
to address community development aspirations. These should be determined via a
community-centred, participatory approach, as reflected in working with discourses.
In my study, participants’ narratives and guideline documents positioned community engagement functions, such as disclosure of information of operational activities,
social and/or legal license to operate, operation risk mitigation and social compensation as mainly centred on business considerations. This suggests that these functions
should fall outside the social investment arena, and may be better addressed by
other (more transparent) corporate mechanisms of community engagement aimed at
fulfilling the interests of O&G operations.
If social investment was conceptualised only as a mechanism to address community development aspirations, social investment experts could draw on working with
discourses when thinking about and implementing social investment. However, given
that the bottom line of O&G companies is to make a profit, drawing solely on working
with discourses of social investment may be impossible. Where human relations are
shaped and articulated through a power imbalance intended to address the economic
interests of powerful groups, the profit interests will always dominate O&G activities
(Andreotti, 2011; Freire & Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973). In other words,
removing profit-making considerations from O&G social investment experts will not
change broader company imperatives.
Nevertheless, social investment experts can still be seen as playing a very important role for host communities. Given that there is an inherent power imbalance
between O&G companies and host communities, and that social investment experts
‘sit’ between companies and impacted communities, then social investment experts
are key players in the company–community relationship. This is because social
investment experts, as company insiders, can access company decision-making
mechanisms and serve as community ‘translators’, and potentially, advocates. If, as
argued above, social investment experts’ work was solely focussed on working with
communities, social investment experts could be more effective as community advocates, or community liaison personnel. However, for social investment experts’ work
to have value in the inherently unequal O&G context, then companies would need to
recognise the complexity and the importance of the work that they do, and provide the