8.2 Engaging with the Community
119
P3’s reservations were also shared by P1, who said:
People in general sometimes feel that the company who works, who has money, should
solve all the problems, so they come up with some strange … plans that may not be part
of our policy or our strategy and they insist of giving them a chance of doing something
like building a road, or [financially] assist[ing] a football team or something like that. …
And you have to explain that the company is not here to undertake the responsibility of the
government. (P1, social investment expert)
P3 and P1’s interview excerpts have suggested that communities’ unrealistic expectations sometimes derived from the host country government’s inability to perform
its role as a social service provider. These participants believed that O&G companies should not replace the government as a welfare provider (see Chapter 6) when
providing social investment.
As noted, O&G social investment as an alternative to government spending on
social services creates an unequal balance of social power between the firm and
government (see Chapter 3) (Cash, 2012; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Hilson, 2012). An
unequal balance occurs because O&G social investment: (1) raises high and unrealistic expectations of what can be expected of O&G companies; (2) provides an
alternative to corrupt governments which withhold their investment in development;
(3) raises community dependency on company provision; (4) can lead to communities’ sense of abandonment during post-production times; and (5) hinders democratic
decisions on operational licensing because of the unequal balance of power between
the firm, government and local community (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 2009). P3 and P1
understood that communities’ expectations of O&G social investment were unrealistic because communities tended to transfer their expectations of the provision
of social services onto companies’ social investment. When P3 and P1 discussed
their concerns about social investment being used as a substitute for government,
they expressed reservations about top-down, non-participatory approaches to social
investment. These participants criticised social investment based on working on and
working for discourses because they felt such programmes moved away from local
community needs. According to the participants, such forms of social investment
primarily focussed on the agendas of companies or governments (see Chapter 6).
Experts’ caveats in regard to the idea of ‘company as government’ can, however,
rethorically ‘enable’ companies to avoid having to commit to a longer-term relationship with host communities. In situations where the retreat of the state from
responsibility for extractive operations is well established, the community perspective is likely to be different to that of social investment experts and their companies.
On the other hand, the risks associated with the notion of ‘company as government’
are still present, especially when companies prioritise profit.
To counterbalance experts’ caveats in relation to social investment substituting
government welfare provision, participants recommended that O&G companies
engage with the government through public–private partnerships. However, participants also recognised the risk of governmental absence in such approaches to O&G
social investment. The following section focusses on participants’ recommendations
for engaging with the host country’s government.
119
P3’s reservations were also shared by P1, who said:
People in general sometimes feel that the company who works, who has money, should
solve all the problems, so they come up with some strange … plans that may not be part
of our policy or our strategy and they insist of giving them a chance of doing something
like building a road, or [financially] assist[ing] a football team or something like that. …
And you have to explain that the company is not here to undertake the responsibility of the
government. (P1, social investment expert)
P3 and P1’s interview excerpts have suggested that communities’ unrealistic expectations sometimes derived from the host country government’s inability to perform
its role as a social service provider. These participants believed that O&G companies should not replace the government as a welfare provider (see Chapter 6) when
providing social investment.
As noted, O&G social investment as an alternative to government spending on
social services creates an unequal balance of social power between the firm and
government (see Chapter 3) (Cash, 2012; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Hilson, 2012). An
unequal balance occurs because O&G social investment: (1) raises high and unrealistic expectations of what can be expected of O&G companies; (2) provides an
alternative to corrupt governments which withhold their investment in development;
(3) raises community dependency on company provision; (4) can lead to communities’ sense of abandonment during post-production times; and (5) hinders democratic
decisions on operational licensing because of the unequal balance of power between
the firm, government and local community (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 2009). P3 and P1
understood that communities’ expectations of O&G social investment were unrealistic because communities tended to transfer their expectations of the provision
of social services onto companies’ social investment. When P3 and P1 discussed
their concerns about social investment being used as a substitute for government,
they expressed reservations about top-down, non-participatory approaches to social
investment. These participants criticised social investment based on working on and
working for discourses because they felt such programmes moved away from local
community needs. According to the participants, such forms of social investment
primarily focussed on the agendas of companies or governments (see Chapter 6).
Experts’ caveats in regard to the idea of ‘company as government’ can, however,
rethorically ‘enable’ companies to avoid having to commit to a longer-term relationship with host communities. In situations where the retreat of the state from
responsibility for extractive operations is well established, the community perspective is likely to be different to that of social investment experts and their companies.
On the other hand, the risks associated with the notion of ‘company as government’
are still present, especially when companies prioritise profit.
To counterbalance experts’ caveats in relation to social investment substituting
government welfare provision, participants recommended that O&G companies
engage with the government through public–private partnerships. However, participants also recognised the risk of governmental absence in such approaches to O&G
social investment. The following section focusses on participants’ recommendations
for engaging with the host country’s government.